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This dissertation aims to extend the academic literature on optimal consumption and
portfolio choice over the life cycle. In particular, we analyze optimal choice under
preference specifications that incorporate loss aversion, internal habit formation and
probability weighting. Furthermore, this dissertation formalizes and analyzes a new
pension contract, a so-called personal pension plan with risk sharing (PPR), that plays
a dominant role in recent policy reform discussions in the Netherlands. This dissertation
has implications for a wide variety of real world pension contracts. We analyze (dis)saving
and investing in not only the accumulation phase but also the decumulation (payout)
phase of defined contribution (DC) pension plans. This is highly relevant as many retirees
worry about the lack of guidance and regulation on how to draw-down accumulated
wealth in retirement. This dissertation is equally relevant to analyze reform options for
defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In many countries, employers are no longer able
or willing to absorb the (investment) risks of their pension plans. We analyze pension
plans (without external risk sponsors) that aim to retain key attractive features of DB
pension plans (such as stable lifelong income streams). Adequate design of consumption
and portfolio strategies, which is the central theme of this dissertation, is thus of great
importance to many workers and retirees around the world.
Part I
The classical workhorse model for the determination of an agent’s optimal consumption
and portfolio choice is the Merton model (Merton, 1969). This model advocates to
invest a constant fraction of total wealth into risk-bearing assets, and to consume at a
constant fraction of wealth. The Merton model implies life cycle investment of financial
wealth (net of human capital); see also Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). These
results are driven by strong simplifying assumptions about preferences, labor income,
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
and future investment opportunities. The first part of my dissertation (Chapters 2, 3
and 4) explores novel extensions of the classical Merton model. In particular, we focus
on deriving and studying optimal consumption and portfolio choice under alternative
preference specifications. To keep the analysis tractable and to isolate the effect of
preference specifications, we retain the assumptions of risk-free (tradable) labor income
(see, e.g., Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein,
2007, for extensions), and independent and normally distributed stock returns (see, e.g.,
Liu, 2007, for extensions). Figure 1.1 illustrates the central idea of the first part of my
dissertation: the analysis of optimal consumption and portfolio choice under alternative
preferences. By contrast, the second part of my dissertation (Chapters 5, 6 and 7)
abstains from explicit preference assumptions, and takes the consumption and portfolio
decisions as given.
Figure 1.1.
The first part of my dissertation focuses on deriving and studying optimal consumption and
portfolio decisions under alternative preference specifications.
Chapter 2 derives and analyzes the optimal consumption and portfolio choice of a loss
averse agent. His reference level, which divides consumption into gains and losses, is
endogenously updated over time. Loss aversion and reference dependence constitute
two key aspects of prospect theory (PT for short), developed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). While the PT literature typically considers an exogenous reference level, Chapter
2
Introduction
2 assumes that the current reference level is a function of past consumption choices,
reflecting internal habit formation.1 We find that, compared to the Merton model,
consumption is shifted from good to bad economic scenarios. As a result, the agent can
maintain consumption above the reference level in many economic scenarios; he only
consumes below the reference level when the economy is doing really bad. This finding
is due to loss aversion, and triggers a demand for “guarantee like” features in pension
products. We also find that consumption adjusts gradually (and not directly as in the
Merton consumption strategy) to unexpected financial shocks. This finding is due to
endogenous updating of the reference level, and justifies a mechanism for smoothing the
change in consumption due to financial shocks. The fraction of total wealth invested
in risk-bearing assets is low in economic scenarios where consumption is close to the
reference level. Indeed, the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases as consumption
approaches the reference level. As is well-known, under the Merton model, the individual
invests a constant (age independent) fraction of wealth into risk-bearing assets. Chapter
2 shows that the endogenous reference specification triggers life cycle investing, not only
in the accumulation phase but also in the decumulation phase (i.e., life cycle investment
of not only financial wealth but also total wealth). Intuitively, households with a shorter
investment horizon are less flexible in absorbing financial shocks. Hence, older households
take less investment risk and thus own smaller investment portfolios. Furthermore,
our model is consistent with two stylized facts about consumption data: hump-shaped
consumption profiles, and excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption.
The third key aspect of PT is probability weighting. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of
probability weighting on the agent’s optimal consumption and investment decisions. This
chapter – which extends Chapter 2 – explores a dynamic consumption and investment
choice problem featuring loss aversion, endogenous updating of the reference level, as
well as probability weighting. We show that an inverse S-shaped probability weighting
function is able to generate an endogenous floor on consumption (i.e., a “hard” guarantee
rather than a “soft” guarantee as in Chapter 2).
1Our preference model implies that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coefficient of
relative risk aversion are not constant (as assumed by the Merton model) but rather depend on age or
financial shocks. In particular, in the case of habit formation, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion depend on the investment horizon and thus on age. With loss




In Chapter 4, we build a consumption and investment choice model that combines
the ratio model of (internal) habit formation with stochastic differential utility (i.e.,
continuous-time limit of recursive utility; see Duffie and Epstein, 1992). These two
utility models are particularly popular in the life cycle literature. We obtain closed-form
solutions by applying a linearization to the agent’s budget constraint. Our results
show that the agent gradually adjusts consumption to financial shocks. This justifies
a return smoothing mechanism. We are able to fully characterize (in terms of the
preference parameters) this return smoothing mechanism. The ratio model of habit
formation analyzed in this chapter differs from the additive model of habit formation
(analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3), in that relative risk aversion is constant. As a result, the
optimal investment strategy is state-independent, and thus easy to implement. This is
a clear advantage of the ratio model of habit formation over the additive model of habit
formation. While in the Merton model the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution are intimately related, this is not the case in the
model of Chapter 4.
Part II
The pension plans proposed by Bovenberg and Nijman (2015) promise to play a new
role in the provision of retirement income in the Netherlands.2 These pension plans,
which are called personal pension plans with risk pooling (PPRs), unbundle the various
functions of variable annuities. In particular, a PPR individualizes the (dis)savings and
investment functions of variable annuities, and arranges the insurance function (i.e.,
pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk) collectively. A PPR defines property rights in
terms of a personal investment account, rather than in terms of payouts or annuity
units (as in variable annuities). Policyholders can adopt an investment approach or a
consumption approach to a PPR. The investment approach takes the investment policy,
the assumed rate of return (ARR) and the initial amount of capital as given. The
consumption stream is derived endogenously (i.e., volatility of consumption, growth rate
2At the time of completion of this dissertation, the Dutch government has proposed new regulation on
the decumulation of Dutch DC pension plans based on the PPR concept. Furthermore, the Dutch
government has announced to consider PPRs as a very important option for the reform of the current




of consumption and initial consumption). By contrast, the consumption approach takes
the consumption stream as given, and derives the investment policy, the ARR and the
initial amount of capital endogenously.
Chapter 5 explores the investment approach and the consumption approach in more
detail. This chapter also explores a collective defined contribution (CDC) and a collective
defined ambition (CDA) pension system. These collective pension systems define property
rights in terms of annuity units, rather than in terms of personal investment accounts.
A CDC and a CDA pension system feature one general investment account and thus
cannot tailor (dis)saving and investment policies to individual preferences and individual
investment beliefs. Furthermore, valuation of annuity units can be difficult as assets are
not assigned to individual policyholders. This may result in conflicts of interests between
policyholders. An advantage of a collective pension system is that non-traded risks (e.g.,
systematic longevity risk) can be shared between generations.
The pension plans considered in the second part of my dissertation can be classified
along two criteria: the definition of property rights (personal investment account versus
annuity units) and the framing of pension plans (investment frame versus consumption
frame). Figure 1.2 classifies the various sections of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 along these two
criteria. The horizontal axis shows the first criterium, while the vertical axis depicts the
second criterium.
The pension plan considered in Chapter 6 adopts a consumption frame and defines
property rights in terms of annuity units; see also Figure 1.2. In this chapter, we assume
that annuity units respond gradually to financial shocks.Gradual absorption of financial
shocks is consistent with internal habit formation (this is formally shown in Chapter 4).
This chapter values the annuity units in a market-consistent fashion. In particular, we
show that the market-consistent discount rate includes a risk premium that rises with
the horizon and that the optimal fraction of accumulated wealth invested in risk-bearing
assets decreases as the policyholder ages. Also, we show that gradual absorption of
financial shocks leads to predictable changes in annuity units.
Chapter 7 investigates the pricing and risk management of variable annuities. We
consider an economy with three risk factors: real interest rate risk, expected inflation risk
and stock market risk (Chapters 5 and 6 only consider stock market risk). This chapter




The figure classifies the sections of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 along two criteria: the definition of
property rights (horizontal axis) and the framing of pension plans (vertical axis). For example,
the pension plan considered in Chapter 6 adopts the consumption approach and defines property
rights in terms of annuity units.
interest rate than the prices of fixed nominal annuities. This finding is of key importance
to determine the optimal hedging of interest rate risk, and is driven by three factors.
First, the desired growth rate of the annuity payment may change with the interest rate
due to intertemporal substitution in consumption. Second, the desired growth rate of
the annuity payment increases with the expected inflation rate. Hence, the prices of real
annuities depend on the real rather than the nominal interest rate. In an incomplete
financial market in which expected inflation risk and real interest rate risk cannot be
hedged at the same time, insurers must trade-off hedging expected inflation risk against
hedging real interest rate risk. This reduces the nominal interest sensitivity of the annuity
factor, especially when fluctuations in the nominal interest rate are driven by changes in
the expected inflation rate rather than by changes in the real interest rate. Third, the
expected returns on risky securities tend to be less sensitive to the nominal interest rate
as compared to the returns on safe securities. Hence, the nominal interest sensitivity of
real annuities is relatively low if the policyholder takes speculative stock market risk.
6
Part I:
Optimal Consumption and Portfolio




Consumption and Portfolio Choice
under Loss Aversion and
Endogenous Updating of the
Reference Level3
This chapter explicitly derives the optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio choice of a
loss averse agent who endogenously updates his reference level. His optimal choice seeks
protection against consumption losses due to downside financial shocks. This induces a
(soft) guarantee on consumption and is due to loss aversion. Furthermore, his optimal
consumption choice gradually adjusts to financial shocks. This resembles the payout
streams of financial plans that respond sluggishly, smoothing investment returns to reduce
payout volatility, and is due to endogenous updating. The welfare losses associated with
various suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies are also evaluated. They can be
substantial.
2.1. Introduction
The pension fund industry has grown dramatically over the past four decades: total
U.S. retirement assets rose from 369 billion dollars in 1974 to 23 trillion dollars in
2013 (Investment Company Institute, 2014). During the same period, we have seen
in particular a pronounced increase in retirement saving through personal retirement
accounts, such as IRAs and DC plans (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2009). More specifically,
the percentage of total U.S. retirement assets accounted for by IRAs and DC plans grew
3This chapter is co-authored with Roger Laeven and Theo Nijman.
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from about 18% in 1974 to about 54% in 2013 (Investment Company Institute, 2014).
These figures highlight the importance of adequate individual consumption, savings and
investment decisions over the life cycle, and of the design of such individual financial
plans.
Since the seminal works of Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969), a considerable
number of authors have studied optimal consumption and portfolio choice over the life
cycle in a wide variety of settings. Standard life cycle models assume that preferences
are represented by expected utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA); see,
e.g., Wachter (2002), Cocco et al. (2005), Liu (2007), Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira
(2008), to name just a few. With such standard preferences (and without constraints),
the optimal log consumption choice is a linear function of the log state price density (see,
e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, p. 103). Furthermore, under such standard preferences,
financial shocks are directly absorbed into the optimal log consumption choice: a CRRA
agent chooses to instantaneously adjust consumption to financial shocks.
These predictions of standard life cycle models stand in sharp contrast to actual
income streams generated by financial and insurance products. Financial fiduciaries
have developed a variety of features, options and guarantees so as to make base financial
products more attractive for individuals (see, e.g., Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast, 2007;
Antoĺın, Payet, Whitehouse, and Yermo, 2011; Bodie and Taqqu, 2011). These include
guaranteed minimum income benefits, guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits and
minimum rate of return guarantees. In addition, many actively traded financial derivative
securities have a nonlinear payoff structure, and provide some degree of protection against
downside risk. The popularity of these products contradicts the linearity of the standard
consumption rule.
Also, a substantial body of literature (see, e.g., Sundaresan, 1989; Constantinides,
1990) argues that agents become accustomed to a certain level of consumption. This
strand of the literature suggests that agents evaluate and adjust consumption relative to
a reference (or a habit) level. The empirical literature (see, e.g., Lupton, 2003) provides
evidence of habit persistence in consumption, with consumption being smooth relative
to wealth. Moreover, financial fiduciaries (such as life insurers and pension funds)
increasingly offer plans with payout streams that are not directly but only sluggishly
10
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linked to the performance of the underlying investment portfolio.4 There have been
numerous attempts to reconcile theory and practice of life cycle consumption and portfolio
choice. However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has not yet been able to
provide a fully satisfactory answer that accommodates these features — nonlinearity of
the consumption rule and smoothing of financial shocks — all together.
This chapter explores consumption and portfolio choice under reference-dependent
preferences. More specifically, we analyze optimal consumption and portfolio choice
under the utility (or value) function of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and adopt an endogenous updating mechanism for the
dynamics of the reference level.5 The consumption and portfolio choice model we consider
is able to generate both a nonlinear consumption rule and smoothing of financial shocks
in an integrated framework. The optimal choice seeks protection against consumption
losses due to financial shocks inducing a (“soft”) guarantee on consumption. Furthermore,
the optimal consumption choice exhibits sluggish response to financial shocks.
Following prospect theory, we assume that the agent’s instantaneous utility function
is represented by the two-part power utility function. This utility function incorporates
several behavioral properties, such as reference dependence (i.e., the carriers of utility
are gains and losses rather than absolute levels of consumption), loss aversion (i.e.,
losses hurt more than gains satisfy), and diminishing sensitivity (i.e., the impact of a
marginal change in consumption decreases as the agent moves further away from the
reference level).6,7 Diminishing sensitivity implies a convex utility function below the
reference level.8 The empirical literature is, however, inconclusive as to whether the
utility function is convex in the loss domain; see, e.g., Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber
(2005).9 Therefore, the current chapter considers not only the case of a convex utility
4In many European countries, but also in the US and Japan, the importance of participating (or with
profits) annuities is growing (see, e.g., Guillén, Jørgensen, and Nielsen, 2006; Maurer, Mitchell, and
Rogalla, 2010). A key characteristic of participating annuities is that investment returns are smoothed
so as to reduce payout volatility. For example, in the Netherlands, pension funds are allowed to
gradually absorb financial shocks into pension entitlements. Also, life insurers use special smoothing
techniques in an attempt to stabilize payouts.
5We abstract away from probability weighting.
6Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a class of reference-dependent preferences with endogenous
updating (and without probability weighting). See Section 2.4 for further details about the connection
between the class of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and our model.
7According to Wakker (2010, p. 242), “reference dependence, in combination with loss aversion, is one
of the most pronounced empirical phenomena in decision under risk and uncertainty.”
8We note that, in our context, a convex utility function implies risk-seeking behavior.
9Etchart-Vincent (2004) investigated the sensitivity of the utility function to the magnitude of the
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function in the loss domain, but also the case of a concave utility function in the loss
domain.10
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we demonstrate that the
agent optimally chooses to divide the states of the economy into two categories: insured
states (i.e., good to intermediate economic scenarios or, equivalently, low to intermediate
state prices) and uninsured states (i.e., bad economic scenarios or high state prices). In
insured states, consumption is guaranteed to be larger than the reference level, while
in uninsured states, consumption is smaller than the reference level. If consumption is
larger (smaller) than the reference level, then the agent experiences a gain (loss). Because
of loss aversion, the agent has a strong preference to maintain consumption above the
reference level, but when the state of the economy is really bad, the (soft) guarantee on
consumption can no longer be maintained. More specifically, the optimal consumption
profile (i.e., the optimal consumption choice as a function of the log state price density)
displays a 90◦ rotated S-shaped pattern.11 We show that when the agent becomes more
afraid of incurring losses, the probability of consumption falling below the reference level
decreases. At the same time, the agent must give up some upward potential in order to
finance this more conservative consumption profile.
Second, under our preference assumptions, the optimal consumption choice gradually
adjusts to financial shocks. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the status quo, an
expectation or an aspiration level can serve as a reference level, but do not specify how the
reference level is formed and updated over time. Following the internal habit formation
literature (see, e.g., Constantinides, 1990), we assume that the reference level depends
on the agent’s own past consumption choices. More specifically, we assume that the
reference level can be decomposed into two components: a stochastic and a deterministic
component.12 The stochastic component is given by an exponentially weighted average
underlying payoffs. She found that a larger proportion of the subjects exhibited concavity when facing
large losses than when facing small losses.
10The literature also provides some support for the idea that agents exhibit an inverted S-shaped utility
function in the loss domain. For example, Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum (1980) found that a large
proportion of the subjects (64%) switched from risk-seeking to risk-averse behavior when facing ruinous
losses.
11The exact behavior of the agent below the reference level depends on the shape of utility function in
the loss domain.
12The reference level is characterized by three parameters: the initial reference level, an endogeneity
parameter (which measures the degree of endogeneity) and a deprecation parameter (which measures
the rate at which the agent depreciates the reference level).
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of the agent’s own past consumption choices. The specification of the reference level is
motivated by the idea that agents become accustomed to a certain level of consumption.
A main implication of the consumption and portfolio choice model we consider is that
after a financial shock, optimal consumption adjustment is sluggish (at least in the short
run). That is, a current financial shock has a larger impact on consumption in the
distant future than on consumption in the near future. Part of the financial shock will
be directly reflected into gains and losses, another part will smoothly enter through the
reference level, which is endogenously updated over time.
Third, the optimal portfolio profile displays a U-shaped pattern: the total dollar
amount invested in risk-bearing assets will be lower in intermediate economic scenarios
than in good or bad economic scenarios. As a by-product of interest in its own right, the
agent implements a life cycle investment strategy, even without taking human capital
into account.13 Since the agent has less time to absorb financial shocks as he grows older,
the equity risk exposure, on average, decreases over the life cycle.
Finally, to investigate the impact of implementing suboptimal consumption and
portfolio strategies on the agent’s welfare, we conduct a welfare analysis. We compute
the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption)
associated with implementing suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies. Because
of the endogeneity of the reference level, this requires a non-standard computation
of certainty equivalents. The results indicate that welfare losses can be substantial.
Particularly, for our realistic parameter values, we find that the welfare loss associated
with implementing the classical Merton strategy (see Merton, 1969) can be as large
as 40%. We also compute the welfare losses of suboptimal behavior due to incorrect
assumptions on the underlying agent’s preference parameters. We find that consumption
and portfolio strategies based on incorrectly assuming a constant exogenous reference
level (or only a very limited degree of endogeneity), thus implying no (or only very
limited) smoothing of financial shocks, substantially reduce welfare.
In order to solve the consumption and portfolio choice model, we first apply the
13Under CRRA utility, the agent has a constant equity risk exposure if the investment opportunity set
is assumed to be constant. Bodie et al. (1992) give a justification for adopting a life cycle investment
strategy based on human capital considerations. If human capital is risk-free, then agents implicitly
hold a risk-free asset. To offset this implicit risk-free asset holding, financial wealth should be tilted
toward risky assets. As the share of human capital in total wealth decreases from one to zero during
the working period, the optimal proportion of financial wealth invested in risk-free assets increases
over the life cycle.
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solution technique of Schroder and Skiadas (2002). This method enables us to convert
the consumption and portfolio choice model with endogenous updating into a dual
consumption and portfolio choice model without endogenous updating. The dual utility
function is time-additive and separable. This fact facilitates the derivation of the optimal
consumption and portfolio choice. Next, we solve the dual problem by using convex
duality (or martingale) techniques, and by using techniques proposed by Basak and
Shapiro (2001) and Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004) in order to deal with
pseudo-concavity and non-differentiability aspects of the problem. We adapt the latter
techniques to our setting with intertemporal consumption. Upon transforming our
solutions under the dual model back into the primal model, we finally arrive at explicit
closed-form solutions to our initial problem under consideration.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature
review. The economy is described in Section 2.3. The agent’s instantaneous utility
function is introduced in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 derives the optimal consumption and
portfolio choice. The properties of the optimal strategies are explored in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 considers, as a robustness check, the optimal consumption and portfolio choice
under a slightly alternative specification of the agent’s instantaneous utility function.
Finally, Section 2.8 concludes the chapter. The proofs of the theorems and propositions
and the details of the certainty equivalent computations are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2. Literature Review
In this chapter, we extend the existing life cycle literature by analyzing an alternative
preference specification that embeds two key aspects of prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) – loss aversion and reference dependence –
in a continuous-time framework.14 To isolate the effect of preferences, we assume risk-free
(tradable) labor income (see, e.g., Cocco et al., 2005; Benzoni et al., 2007; Lynch and
Tan, 2011, for extensions), and independent and normally distributed stock returns (see,
e.g., Liu, 2007; Buraschi, Porchia, and Trojani, 2010, for extensions). In an extension
14Prospect theory has been actively studied in the finance literature to explain the equity premium
puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), the cross section of average returns (Barberis and Huang, 2008),
and the deposition effect (Barberis and Xiong, 2009).
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of our model, we also explore the implications of probability weighting as a third key
aspect of prospect theory (see Chapter 3).
The literature on optimal consumption and portfolio choice under prospect theory
type preferences is scarce. Berkelaar et al. (2004) examine analytically optimal portfolio
choice under the two-part power utility function. Their model differs from ours in at
least two main respects. First and foremost, we assume that the agent is concerned not
with terminal wealth, but with intertemporal consumption. This allows us to examine
how the agent’s consumption strategy evolves as time proceeds and risk resolves, which
is our prime focus. Second, in this setting with intertemporal consumption, we allow
the agent to not just stochastically but also endogenously update his reference (or habit)
level of consumption over time. Guasoni, Huberman, and Ren (2014) explore the optimal
consumption (or spending) and portfolio choice of a short fall averse agent. This paper
considers a multiplicative habit formation model in which, in contrast to the traditional
approach of Abel (1990), the habit level (or reference level) equals past peak spending.
By contrast, we assume that the agent’s preferences are characterized by the two-part
power utility function, and that the reference level is equal to a weighted average of
past consumption choices. Jin and Zhou (2008) and He and Zhou (2011, 2014) consider
optimal portfolio choice under prospect theory. They focus on the impact of probability
weighting on optimal portfolio (not consumption) choice, developing an analytic solution
method based on a quantile formulation. They do not consider endogenous updating of
the reference level. Our model specification has the attractive feature that it allows to
analyze both separately and jointly the effects on consumption and portfolio choice of loss
aversion and of endogenous updating of the reference level, which are controlled in the
model by separate parameters. Furthermore, our model nests traditional models, such as
models with internal habit formation, with an exogenous minimum level of consumption,
and with CRRA utility, as special (limiting) cases.
Our first finding is that loss aversion, entailing that negative changes in consumption
are perceived more severely than equivalent positive changes in consumption, triggers a
demand for “guarantee like” features in the consumption profile that we also encounter
in many real life financial plans. This finding is consistent with the related strand of
the literature on regret aversion, driven by fears of unfavorable outcomes, initiated by
Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982). For example, Muermann, Mitchell, and
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Volkman (2006) show, in a static portfolio choice problem, that regret aversion has a
positive impact on the willingness to pay for a rate of return guarantee on the risky
asset; see also Merton and Bodie (2005). Different from the above mentioned papers,
our paper generates this implication in a dynamic consumption-portfolio choice setting
in which guarantees take the form of a stable consumption profile at (typically) or above
(in good states of the world) the reference level of consumption, rather than, e.g., a rate
of return guarantee. Only in very bad states of the world, consumption falls below the
reference level. Traditional life cycle models (see, e.g., Merton, 1969) cannot explain the
demand for “guarantee like” features in the consumption profile.
We combine our model of loss aversion with an endogenous reference level that is
a arithmetic function of past consumption choices (Constantinides, 1990). However
different from traditional habit formation models, we allow consumption to fall below the
reference level (see also Detemple and Karatzas, 2003). Under our endogenous updating
mechanism of the reference level, consumption responds gradually to financial shocks.
Shocks are absorbed in not only the level of consumption but also future growth rates
of consumption.
Building on their earlier work, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) explore a model that
embeds loss aversion and reference dependence into a discrete-period model. In their
model, the agent receives utility from the difference between current consumption and
last period’s expectation of current consumption (“contemporaneous gain-loss utility”)
and from changes in expectations regarding future consumption (“prospective gain-loss
utility”). The agent is loss averse in the sense that losses loom larger than same-sized
gains. Also, a contemporaneous loss is more painful than a prospective loss. Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009) find that the agent has a first-order precautionary savings motive:
the agent increases savings to reduce the marginal utility associated with a future loss.
Furthermore, the fact that news about future consumption affects current utility less
than news about current consumption creates an immediate incentive to overconsume
relative to his optimal pre-committed consumption path. The agent of Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009) thus behaves inconsistently while our agent is time consistent.
Pagel (2012) shows that the model of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) can explain a number
of stylized facts about consumption. First, she finds that the precautionary saving motive
together with the tendency to overconsume can produce a realistic hump-shaped profile
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of consumption over the lifetime. Second, she finds that the model of Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009) generates excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption (i.e., consumption
adjusts gradually to financial shocks). Intuitively, unexpected losses today are more
painful than expected losses tomorrow. Our model is also able to generate a hump-shaped
pattern of consumption as a result of two competing effects: the endogeneity of the
reference level (which causes a precautionary savings motive) and an uncertain lifetime
(which causes a tendency to consume early in life). Excess smoothness and sensitivity
in consumption are also present in our model.
2.3. The Economy
We define a continuous-time financial market following Karatzas and Shreve (1998) and
Back (2010). Let T > 0 be a fixed finite terminal time. The uncertainty in the economy
is represented by a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), on which is defined a standard
N -dimensional Brownian motion {Zt}t∈[0,T ]. Let the filtration F ≡ {Ft}t∈[0,T ] be the
augmentation under P of the natural filtration generated by the standard Brownian
motion {Zt}t∈[0,T ]. Throughout, (in)equalities between random variables are meant to
hold P-almost surely.
The financial market consists of an instantaneously risk-free asset and N risky stocks,
which are traded continuously on the time horizon [0, T ]. The price of the risk-free asset,
B, evolves according to
dBt
Bt
= rt dt, B0 = 1.
The scalar-valued risk-free rate process, r, is assumed to be Ft-progressively measurable
and uniformly bounded. The N -dimensional vector of risky stock prices, S, satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation:
dSt
St
= µt dt+ σt dZt, S0 = 1N .
Here, 1N denotes an N -dimensional vector of all ones. The N -dimensional mean rate of
return process, µ, and the (N×N)-matrix-valued volatility process, σ, are both assumed
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to be Ft-progressively measurable and uniformly bounded.
We assume that, for some positive ε,
ϑ>σtσ
>
t ϑ ≥ ε||ϑ||2, for all ϑ ∈ RN . (2.3.1)
Here, > denotes the transpose sign. The strong non-degeneracy condition (2.3.1) implies
that the inverse of σt exists and is bounded. The Ft-progressively measurable market
price of risk process, λ, solves the following equation:
σtλt ≡ µt − rt1N .

















The economy is populated by a single price-taking agent endowed with initial wealth
W0 ≥ 0. The agent’s objective is to choose an Ft-progressively measurableN -dimensional
process π, referred to as the portfolio process and representing the dollar amounts
invested in the N risky stocks, and an Ft-progressively measurable process c, referred to
as the consumption process, so as to maximize the expectation of lifetime utility.15 We
impose the following integrability conditions, which we assume throughout to be satisfied





t πt dt <∞,
∫ T
0





The wealth process, W , associated with a consumption and portfolio strategy (c, π)





t σtλt − ct
)
dt+ π>t σt dZt, W0 ≥ 0 given. (2.3.2)
Equation (2.3.2) reveals that the agent’s wealth equals initial wealth, plus trading gains,
minus cumulative consumption. The total dollar amount invested in the risk-free asset
at time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by Wt − π>t 1N . We call a consumption and portfolio strategy
15The agent’s utility function is introduced in the next section.
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admissible if the associated wealth process is uniformly bounded from below. Then the
static budget constraint is also satisfied; see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1998, p. 91-92)
for further details.
2.4. The Agent’s Utility Function
This section introduces the agent’s (instantaneous) utility function u (ct; θt). Here, θt
represents the agent’s reference level to which consumption is compared. We assume that
the agent derives utility from the difference between consumption ct and the reference
level θt. Specifically, following the prospect theory literature (see, e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), we assume that the agent’s utility function u (ct; θt) is represented by
the two-part power utility function:
u (ct; θt) = v (ct − θt) ≡
−κ (θt − ct)
γ1 , if ct < θt;
(ct − θt)
γ2 , if ct ≥ θt.
(2.4.1)
Here, γ1 > 0 and γ2 ∈ (0, 1) are curvature parameters, and κ ≥ 1 stands for the loss
aversion index. If consumption is larger (smaller) than the reference level, then the agent
experiences a gain (loss).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) for γ1 = 1.3 (solid
line) and γ1 = 0.7 (dash-dotted line). The figure shows that the two-part power utility
function exhibits a kink at the reference level. The kink is due to the different treatment
of gains and losses. We note that even in the case of κ = 1, the agent’s utility function
displays a kink at the reference level whenever γ1 6= γ2.
A simple calculation shows that the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) is convex
below the agent’s reference level if γ1 ≤ 1, and concave otherwise. Convexity corresponds
to risk-seeking behavior and concavity to risk-averse behavior.16 Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) found that the agent’s utility function is convex in the loss domain. Table 2.1
reviews the empirical literature regarding the shape of the utility function for losses. The
16This statement is not true if probabilities are distorted (see Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994). For
example, an S-shaped utility function and overweighting of small probabilities can together explain
the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk-averse behavior when gains have large probabilities and
losses have small probabilities, and risk-seeking behavior when losses have large probabilities and
gains have small probabilities.
19
Chapter 2. Optimal Choice under Loss Aversion and Endogenous Updating
Figure 2.1.
















γ 1 = 1.3
γ 1 = 0.7
The figure illustrates the two-part power utility function for γ1 = 1.3 (solid line) and γ1 = 0.7
(dash-dotted line). The agent’s reference level is set equal to 10, the loss aversion index κ to
2.5 and γ2 to 0.5.
table shows that the literature is inconclusive as to whether the utility function is convex
below the reference level. Among the mentioned studies, Etchart-Vincent (2004) explored
the sensitivity of the agent’s utility function to the magnitude of the underlying payoffs.
She found that a larger proportion of the subjects exhibited concavity when facing large
losses than when facing small losses. Etchart-Vincent (2004) argued that this finding
may be due to the size of the losses at stake. Therefore, the current chapter considers
not only the case of a convex utility function in the loss domain (0 < γ1 ≤ 1), but also
the case of a concave utility function in the loss domain (γ1 > 1).
Motivated by the literature on internal habit formation (see, e.g., Constantinides,
1990; Detemple and Zapatero, 1992; Detemple and Karatzas, 2003), we assume that the
agent’s reference level evolves according to:
dθt = (βct − αθt) dt, θ0 ≥ 0 given.
Here, θ0 denotes the agent’s initial reference level, α ≥ 0 corresponds to the depreciation
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Table 2.1.
Classification of the utility function for losses
Shape of the utility function for losses
Study Convex Concave Linear Mixed
Abdellaoui (2000) 42.5 20.0 25.0 12.5
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) 24.4 22.0 22.0 31.7
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) 68.8 8.3 22.9 -
Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) 47.1 22.5 30.4 -
Etchart-Vincent (2004)∗ 37.1 25.7 25.7 11.4
∗The reported results are for the case of large losses.
The table reviews the empirical literature regarding the shape of the utility function for losses.
Numbers are expressed as a percentage of total subjects. All the mentioned studies use the
trade-off method (see Wakker and Deneffe, 1996) to elicit the utility functions of the subjects.
(or persistence) parameter, and β ≥ 0 indexes the extent to which the current reference
level responds to current consumption. The agent’s reference level exhibits a low degree
of depreciation (or a high degree of persistence) if α is low. The impact of current
consumption on the current reference level increases as β increases. We can explicitly




exp {−α(s− u)} cu du+ exp {−α(s− t)} θt, s ≥ t ≥ 0. (2.4.2)
Equation (2.4.2) shows that the reference level can be decomposed into two components:
a stochastic and a deterministic component. The parameter β measures the importance
of the stochastic component relative to the deterministic component. In what follows,
we refer to β as the endogeneity parameter. The stochastic component becomes more
important as β increases. The first component on the right-hand side of equation (2.4.2)
is an exponentially weighted integral of the agent’s own past consumption choices (i.e.,
the reference level is backward-looking). We observe that the current reference level
depends more on consumption in the recent past than on consumption in the distant
past. The second component on the right-hand side of equation (2.4.2) is independent
of past consumption choices and decreases exponentially at a rate of α.
The two-part utility function (see equation (2.4.1)) is a member of the class of
reference-dependent preferences introduced by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). They
assume that the agent’s instantaneous utility function can be decomposed into two
21
Chapter 2. Optimal Choice under Loss Aversion and Endogenous Updating
components. The first component represents classical utility from consumption; that
is, utility derived from absolute levels of consumption. The second component captures
reference-dependent gain-loss utility; that is, utility derived from the difference between
classical consumption utility and the reference level of utility. Specifically, Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) consider the following agent’s utility function:
u (ct; θt) = η ·m (ct) + (1− η) · w (m (ct)−m (θt)) . (2.4.3)
Here, m stands for the classical consumption utility function, w denotes the gain-loss
utility function and η ∈ [0, 1] is a weight parameter controlling the relative importance
of the two components. The two-part utility function (2.4.1) emerges as a special case
of (2.4.3) if the gain-loss utility function w is represented by the two-part power utility
function (2.4.1), the weight parameter η is set equal to zero and m (ct) = ct. Section
2.7 considers another special case of (2.4.3), where the weight parameter η is unequal to
zero. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) do not assume that the agent’s reference level is
a weighted integral of past consumption choices. Instead, they assume that the agent’s
reference level represents an expectation. Both Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and our
model assume that the reference level is chosen endogenously.17
The two-part power utility function (2.4.1) displays loss aversion in the sense that
the disutility of a loss of one unit is κ times larger than the utility of a gain of one
unit.18 There is, however, no agreed-upon definition of loss aversion in the literature.
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion refers to the fact that losses
loom larger than same-sized gains, i.e., −w(−x) > w(x) for all x > 0. A loss aversion
index can then be defined as the mean or median value of −w(−x)/w(x) over relevant x
(see Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008). Köbberling and Wakker (2005) define
the loss aversion index as the ratio between the left-hand and right-hand derivative of
the gain-loss utility function at the reference level. The loss aversion index κ is equal to
the loss aversion index proposed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005) if γ1 = γ2.
Finally, we note that the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) with reference level
dynamics given by (2.4.2) includes several important special (limiting) cases. The
17Yogo (2008) analyzes asset pricing implications of reference-dependent preferences, with an
exogenously given reference level.
18As pointed out by Wakker (2010, p. 267), the degree of loss aversion depends on the monetary unit.
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internal habit formation model studied by Constantinides (1990) arises as a special case
if the agent is infinitely loss averse. The assumption of infinite loss aversion implies
that consumption is not allowed to fall below the reference level. If the reference level
is also assumed to be exogenous, then the two-part power utility function reduces to a
utility function with an exogenous minimum consumption level. Such a utility function
has been studied by Deelstra, Grasselli, and Koehl (2003). The constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function emerges as a special case if the reference level is equal
to zero and consumption is non-negative. The CRRA utility function has been widely
explored in the economics literature since at least Merton (1969).
2.5. The Consumption and Portfolio Choice Problem
This section derives the agent’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice. Section 2.5.1
formulates the agent’s maximization problem. To determine the optimal consumption
and portfolio choice, we transform the agent’s (primal) maximization problem into a
dual problem. The technique that solves this dual problem is outlined in Section 2.5.2.
Section 2.5.3 presents the optimal consumption choice and Section 2.5.4 gives the optimal
portfolio choice.
2.5.1. The Agent’s Maximization Problem
The agent’s dynamic consumption and portfolio choice problem of Section 2.3 with the
agent’s utility function given in Section 2.4 can, by virtue of the martingale approach
(Pliska, 1986; Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve, 1987; Cox and Huang, 1989, 1991), be













≤ W0, dθt = (βct − αθt) dt,
ct ≥ θt − Lt for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.5.1)
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Here, δ ≥ 0 stands for the subjective rate of time preference. We require that consumption
is not allowed to fall more than Lt ≥ 0 below the agent’s reference level θt.19 In addition,
we assume that Lt only depends on time t (and not on the state of nature ω ∈ Ω).20 If
Lt = exp {−αt} θ0, then consumption is guaranteed to be non-negative. We can view
θt − Lt as the agent’s minimum consumption level.
2.5.2. The Dual Technique
To derive the optimal consumption and portfolio choice in our model, we first apply the
solution technique proposed by Schroder and Skiadas (2002). These authors show that
a generic consumption and portfolio choice model with linear internal habit formation
can be mechanically transformed into a dual consumption and portfolio choice model
without linear internal habit formation.21 Hereinafter, we refer to the solution technique
considered by Schroder and Skiadas (2002) as the dual technique. This section sketches
the basic ideas underlying the dual technique. The Appendix provides more details.
The dual consumption and portfolio choice model (see (2.9.1) in the Appendix) is
solved in a dual financial market. This dual financial market is characterized by the dual
state price density M̂t, the dual (instantaneously) risk-free rate r̂t, the dual volatility σ̂t
and the dual market price of risk λ̂t:
M̂t ≡Mt (1 + βAt) ,










exp {−(α− β)(s− t)}Pt,sΨt,s ds.
Here, Pt,s corresponds to the time t price of a default-free unit discount bond that matures
at time s ≥ t ≥ 0, and Ψt,s stands for the time t volatility of the instantaneous return
19In the case of risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain, the agent’s maximization problem is ill-posed
if consumption is not bounded from below (a maximization problem is called ill-posed if its supremum
is infinite).
20One could argue that Lt should also depend on the agent’s past consumption choices. However, this
would complicate the agent’s maximization problem considerably. We leave it for future research to
explore the impact of an endogenous Lt on the agent’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice.
21The consumption and portfolio choice model considered in the current chapter features a utility
specification that incorporates linear internal habit formation.
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on such a bond (both in the primal financial market). We can view At ≥ 0 as the time







Ms exp {−(α− β)(s− t)} ds
]
.
In case the investment opportunity set is constant, At only depends on time t. As a
consequence, the optimal portfolio choice can be computed explicitly in this case (see
Section 2.5.4).





t σ̂tλ̂t − ĉt
)




Here, ĉt ≡ ct − θt stands for the agent’s surplus consumption choice and π̂t denotes the
dual portfolio choice. Dual wealth Ŵt is equal to the discounted value of future surplus
consumption choices. Hence, we can view Ŵt as wealth needed to finance future gains
and losses. In what follows, we refer to Ŵt as surplus wealth.
The condition of consumption being bounded from below in (2.5.1) implies that the
agent’s initial wealth W0 must be sufficiently large to ensure the existence of an optimal
















The right-hand side of equation (2.5.3) corresponds to initial wealth that is required
to finance the minimum consumption stream {θt − Lt}t∈[0,T ]. We note that W0 is also
required to be non-negative; see equation (2.3.2).
2.5.3. The Optimal Consumption Choice
This section derives the optimal consumption choice. We obtain the optimal consumption
choice as follows. First, the agent’s maximization problem (2.5.1) is converted into its
dual problem (Section 2.5.2). The dual utility function is time-additive and separable.
This fact facilitates the derivation of the optimal consumption and portfolio choice.
Second, the dual problem is solved using martingale techniques and by adapting to our
setting with intertemporal consumption the solution technique as described by Basak
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and Shapiro (2001) and Berkelaar et al. (2004). The central idea of the latter solution
technique is to split the agent’s (dual, in our case) problem into two maximization
problems: a gain part problem and a loss part problem. The optimal solution to each
problem represents a local maximum of the dual problem. The global maximum of the
dual problem is determined by comparing, in a particular way, the two local maxima.
Finally, the optimal surplus consumption choice ĉ ∗t is translated back into the agent’s
optimal consumption choice c∗t . Theorem 1 below presents the optimal consumption
choice c∗t . We note that the theorem distinguishes between risk-averse and risk-seeking
behavior in the loss domain. Indeed, in the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss
domain, the utility function is concave below the reference level, whereas in the case of
risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain, the utility function is convex in the loss domain.
Theorem 1. Consider an agent with the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) and
reference level dynamics (2.4.2) who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem
(2.5.1). Let θ∗ be the agent’s optimal reference level implied by substituting the (past)
optimal consumption choice in (2.4.2) and let y be the Lagrange multiplier associated









• If the agent is risk-averse in the loss domain, the optimal consumption choice c∗t














, if M̂t > ξt.
The threshold ξt is determined in such a way that f (ξt) = 0 where the function f
is defined as follows:
f(x) ≡ exp {−δt} (1− γ2) (ktx)
γ2
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• If the agent is risk-seeking in the loss domain, the optimal consumption choice c∗t







γ2−1 , if M̂t ≤ ξt;
θ∗t − Lt, if M̂t > ξt.
The threshold ξt is determined in such a way that g (ξt) = 0 where the function g
is defined as follows:
g(x) ≡ exp {−δt} (1− γ2) (ktx)
γ2
γ2−1 + κ exp {−δt}Lγ1t − yxLt. (2.5.5)
The Lagrange multiplier y is chosen such that the static budget constraint holds with
equality.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the agent optimally chooses to divide the states of the
economy into two categories: insured states (good to intermediate economic scenarios
or, equivalently, low to intermediate state prices) and uninsured states (bad economic
scenarios or high state prices). In insured states, consumption is guaranteed to be larger
than the reference level, while in uninsured states, consumption is smaller than the
reference level. The optimal consumption choice is, however, never equal to the reference
level. Section 2.6 further explores the properties of the optimal consumption choice.
2.5.3.1. Comparative Statics
The threshold ξt and the Lagrange multiplier y depend on the preference parameters.
Proposition 1 summarizes the impact of an increase in the agent’s preference parameters
on the threshold ξt and the Lagrange multiplier y, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 1. Consider an agent with the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) and
reference level dynamics (2.4.2) who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem
(2.5.1). Then:
• All else being equal, if the loss aversion index κ increases, then both the threshold
ξt and the Lagrange multiplier y increase.
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• All else being equal, if the agent’s initial reference level θ0 increases, then the
threshold ξt decreases and the Lagrange multiplier y increases.
Suppose that initial surplus wealth Ŵ0 is non-negative.
• All else being equal, if the depreciation parameter α increases, then the threshold
ξt increases and the Lagrange multiplier y decreases.
• All else being equal, if the endogeneity parameter β increases, then the threshold ξt
decreases and the Lagrange multiplier y increases.
Proposition 1 shows that when the agent becomes more afraid of incurring losses, the
probability of consumption falling below the reference level decreases. At the same
time, the agent must give up some upward potential to finance the new consumption
profile. When the agent’s initial reference level increases (or the depreciation parameter
α decreases or the endogeneity parameter β increases), more wealth is required to finance
future reference levels. As a consequence, the probability of incurring a loss increases.
2.5.4. The Optimal Portfolio Choice
To derive the optimal portfolio choice, we first need to derive the agent’s optimal wealth
W ∗t . As pointed out in the Appendix (see Proposition 4), the agent’s optimal wealth W
∗
t
can be decomposed as follows:





Here, Ŵ ∗t denotes optimal surplus wealth, and W̃
∗
t stands for wealth required to finance
future optimal reference levels. We refer to W̃ ∗t as optimal required wealth. Optimal
surplus wealth Ŵ ∗t and optimal required wealth W̃
∗
t can be further decomposed as follows:











Here, ŴG∗t denotes wealth required to finance future optimal gains, Ŵ
L∗
t corresponds to
wealth required to finance future optimal losses, βAtŴ
∗
t stands for wealth required to
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required to finance the deterministic part of future optimal reference levels. Figure 2.2
illustrates the decomposition of the agent’s optimal wealth W ∗t .
Figure 2.2.
Decomposition of the agent’s optimal wealth W ∗t
Optimal wealth W ∗t










The figure illustrates the decomposition of the agent’s optimal wealth W ∗t .
Proposition 2 below presents ŴG∗t and Ŵ
L∗
t for the case of a constant investment
opportunity set (i.e., rt = r, σt = σ and λt = λ). The general expressions for Ŵ
G∗
t
and ŴL∗t are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Consider an agent with the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) and
reference level dynamics (2.4.2) who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem
(2.5.1) assuming a constant investment opportunity set. Let N denote the cumulative
distribution function of a standard normal random variable. Define Γu, Πu, d1(x), d2(x)
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LsN [−d1 (ζs ∨ ξs)] ds.
Here, ζs ≡ exp {δs} γ1κLγ1−1s y−1. The threshold ξs is determined in such a way
that f (ξs) = 0 where the function f is given by equation (2.5.4).


























LsN [−d1 (ξs)] ds.
The threshold ξs is determined in such a way that g (ξs) = 0 where the function g
is given by equation (2.5.5).
When the dual state price density tends to zero (so that the probability of the dual state
price density M̂s being smaller than the threshold ξs approaches one), optimal surplus
wealth Ŵ ∗t converges to the optimal wealth of an agent with CRRA utility. Hence, in
good economic scenarios, the agent behaves like a CRRA agent.
The optimal dual portfolio choice can be constructed using hedging arguments. We
explicitly determine the optimal dual portfolio choice for the case of a constant investment
opportunity set. To this end, it is convenient to express Ŵ ∗t as a function of time t and






for some (regular) function h.
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Comparing the diffusion part of the dynamic budget constraint (2.5.2) with the diffusion


















Here, π̂G∗t denotes the optimal dual portfolio choice that finances gains, and π̂
L∗
t is the
optimal dual portfolio choice that finances losses. Theorem 2 below presents π̂G∗t and
π̂L∗t for the case of a constant investment opportunity set. This theorem follows from
application of equation (2.5.9). The optimal primal portfolio choice then follows from
equation (2.5.10).
Theorem 2. Consider an agent with the two-part power utility function (2.4.1) and
reference level dynamics (2.4.2) who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem
(2.5.1) assuming a constant investment opportunity set. Let φ denote the standard
normal probability density function. Then:


































































































































Theorem 2 reveals that in good economic scenarios, the optimal dual portfolio strategy
π̂∗t can be approximated by λ̂
>σ̂−1/ (1− γ2) Ŵ ∗t . In these economic scenarios, the agent
behaves like a CRRA agent and invests a constant proportion of surplus wealth in
risk-bearing assets.
2.6. Analysis of the Solution
With the analytical solutions and comparative statics to the general consumption and
portfolio choice problem provided in Section 2.5 (and the Appendix), we proceed in this
section to their numerical analysis. Section 2.6.1 introduces the underlying assumptions
and discusses the key parameter values used in the numerical analysis. Section 2.6.2
illustrates the agent’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice. Finally, Section 2.6.3
conducts a welfare analysis.
2.6.1. Assumptions and Key Parameter Values
We allow the agent to invest his wealth in a risk-free asset and a single risky stock. The
investment opportunity set is assumed to be constant (i.e., rt = r, σt = σ and λt = λ).
The equity premium σλ = µ− r is set at 4%. The risk-free rate r is set at 1%, and the
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volatility of innovations to the risky stock price σ is set at 20%. These estimates coincide
with the estimates reported by Gomes et al. (2008).
The terminal time T equals 20 years. We view T as the total number of years
of retirement. Initial wealth W0 can be viewed as total pension wealth at the age of
retirement.22 For the ease of illustration, we assume that the agent retires at 65.
The loss aversion index κ is set equal to 2.5. The estimates of the median loss aversion
index reported in the literature vary from 1 to 5 (see, e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2008). The
degree of loss aversion largely differs among individuals, and typically depends on the
model. In the welfare analysis, we consider, among other things, the impact of a change
in the loss aversion index κ on the agent’s welfare. Finally, the subjective rate of time
preference δ is set equal to 1%.
2.6.2. The Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice
2.6.2.1. Loss Aversion Only
This section illustrates the optimal consumption and portfolio choice of a loss averse
agent without endogenous updating of the agent’s reference level (i.e., the endogeneity
parameter β is set equal to zero). In addition, we assume that the agent’s reference
level is constant (i.e., the depreciation parameter α is also set equal to zero). Inspired
by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), the agent’s constant reference level θt = θ is
assumed to be equal to the level of consumption that would be obtained if the agent’s
initial wealth W0 was kept in the money market account for the entire retirement phase.
23
The assumption here is that the agent is likely to be disappointed if consumption is less
than the payment he would receive from a fixed annuity. The agent’s constant reference




exp {−rt} dt ≡ θA0. (2.6.1)




is equal to 1/5.5% ≈ 18 < T = 20. Equation (2.6.1) implies that initial surplus wealth
22In the analysis, W0 equals 500 (×1,000 dollars) units, and we report our results relative to W0.
23Barberis et al. (2001) argue that the risk-free interest rate serves as a natural benchmark for evaluating
gains and losses. In our context, this assumption implies that the agent is likely to be disappointed if
consumption is less than the payment he would receive from a fixed annuity.
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Ŵ0 ≡ ŴG0 − ŴL0 is equal to zero. This assertion follows from equations (2.5.6) and
(2.5.7) with α = β = 0%. Put differently, initial wealth required to finance future gains
ŴG0 is equal to initial wealth required to finance future losses Ŵ
L
0 . We note that Ŵ
G
0
and ŴL0 are not equal to zero unless the agent is infinitely loss averse.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the
agent’s initial wealth W0) at age 70 (i.e., t = 5) as a function of the then-current log state
price density for the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain. Here, consumption is
constrained to be non-negative; that is, L = θ. Under the optimal choice, the loss averse
agent seeks protection against consumption losses due to financial shocks, thus inducing
a (soft) guarantee on consumption. The agent optimally desires to maintain consumption
above the reference level, but under really adverse circumstances this (soft) guarantee on
consumption cannot be maintained. As a direct consequence, we can divide the states of
the economy into two categories: good to intermediate states (i.e., logMt ≤ log ξt) and
bad states (i.e., logMt > log ξt). In good to intermediate states, optimal consumption is
guaranteed to be larger than the reference level, while in bad states, optimal consumption
is smaller than the reference level. The dotted line shows the probability density function
(PDF) of the then-current log state price density conditional upon information available
at the age of retirement. The probability of consumption being smaller than the reference
level can be controlled by choosing appropriate values for the preference parameters. We
observe that the optimal consumption profile displays a 90◦ rotated S-shaped pattern
with a discontinuity at the point logMt = log ξt. Hence, optimal consumption is never
equal to the reference level. The dash-dotted line illustrates the consumption choice of
an agent with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion coefficient γ is set equal to two.
The (log) consumption choice of a CRRA agent varies linearly with the (log) state price
density. As a consequence, for typical values of the relative risk aversion coefficient γ,
a CRRA agent incurs more frequently a loss than a loss averse agent (where we define
gains and losses relative to the reference level).
Next, Figure 2.4 displays the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage
of the agent’s initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price
density for the case of risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain. Here, consumption is
allowed to fall 2% point below the (normalized) reference level θ/W0. We observe again
that, because of loss aversion, the agent has a strong preference to maintain consumption
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Figure 2.3.







































The figure shows the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The
curvature parameter γ1 (γ2) is set equal to 1.2 (0.7). Consumption is constrained to be
non-negative by taking L = θ. The dashed line corresponds to the agent’s reference level
(expressed as a percentage of W0). The dotted line shows the probability density function
(PDF) of the then-current log state price density conditional upon information available at
the age of retirement. The dash-dotted line illustrates the consumption choice (expressed as a
percentage of W0) of an agent with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion coefficient γ is set
equal to two.
above the reference level. As in the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain, we
can divide the states of the economy into two categories: good to intermediate states
(i.e., logMt ≤ log ξt) and bad states (i.e., logMt > log ξt). In good to intermediate
states, optimal consumption is guaranteed to be larger than the reference level, while
in bad states, optimal consumption is equal to the minimum consumption level θ − L.
We also observe that at the threshold logMt = log ξt, optimal consumption jumps to
the lower bound θ − L. This behavior can be explained by the fact that the agent is
risk-seeking in the loss domain.
Figure 2.5 shows the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested
in the risky stock) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density
for the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain. The optimal portfolio choice
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Figure 2.4.







































The figure shows the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The
curvature parameter γ1 (γ2) is set equal to 0.8 (0.6). Consumption is allowed to fall 2% point
below the (normalized) reference level θ/W0. The dashed line corresponds to the agent’s
reference level (expressed as a percentage of W0). The dotted line shows the probability
density function (PDF) of the then-current log state price density conditional upon information
available at the age of retirement. The dash-dotted line illustrates the consumption choice
(expressed as a percentage of W0) of an agent with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion
coefficient γ is set equal to two.
is expressed as a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0. We observe that the
optimal portfolio profile displays a U-shaped pattern: the total dollar amount invested
in the risky stock will be lower in intermediate economic scenarios than in good or bad
economic scenarios. When the (non-log) state price density tends to zero, the fraction of
surplus wealth Ŵ ∗t invested in the risky stock converges to the constant λ/ [σ (1− γ2)].
Hence, in good economic scenarios, the optimal portfolio choice behaves in a similar
fashion as the portfolio choice of a CRRA agent.24 We note that W ∗t − Ŵ ∗t = Atθ is
fully invested in the money market account. When the state price density is relatively
high, the fraction of surplus wealth invested in the risky stock can be approximated by
24This is not directly visible in Figure 2.5, where the portfolio choice of the CRRA agent does not match
the portfolio choice of the loss averse agent in good (or bad) states, because the relative risk aversion
coefficient γ (CRRA agent) differs from its counterpart 1 − γi (loss averse agent) specified by the
curvature parameters γi, i = 1, 2, and because total wealth differs from surplus wealth.
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the constant λ/ [σ (1− γ1)] < 0.25 Not only in good but also in bad economic scenarios,
a loss averse agent behaves like a CRRA agent. In intermediate economic scenarios, the
total dollar amount invested in the risky stock is relatively small.
Figure 2.5.
Portfolio profile for the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain































The figure shows the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested in the risky
stock) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The portfolio choice
is expressed as a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0. The curvature parameter γ1 (γ2)
is set equal to 1.2 (0.7). Consumption is constrained to be non-negative; that is, L = θ. The
dash-dotted line illustrates the portfolio choice (expressed as a percentage of W0) of an agent
with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion coefficient γ is set equal to two. The increasing
dotted line represents π̂L∗t /W0 while the decreasing dotted line corresponds to π̂
G∗
t /W0.
Figure 2.6 shows the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested in
the risky stock) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density for
the case of risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain. The portfolio choice is expressed as
a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0. As in the case of risk-averse behavior in
the loss domain, the optimal portfolio profile displays (primarily) a U-shaped pattern.
When the state price density tends to zero, the fraction of surplus wealth invested in the
risky stock converges to the constant λ/ [σ (1− γ2)]. Hence, in good economic scenarios,
the portfolio choice of a loss averse agent behaves in a similar fashion as the portfolio
25We note that in bad states (i.e., high state prices), surplus wealth is negative.
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choice of a CRRA agent. When the state price density tends to infinity, the fraction of
surplus wealth invested in the risky stock ultimately converges to zero. Indeed, in bad
economic scenarios, the minimum consumption level θ − L must be guaranteed.
Figure 2.6.
Portfolio profile for the case of risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain































The figure shows the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested in the risky
stock) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The portfolio choice is
expressed as a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0. The curvature parameter γ1 (γ2) is
set equal to 0.8 (0.6). Consumption is allowed to fall 2% point below the (normalized) reference
level θ/W0. The dash-dotted line illustrates the portfolio choice (expressed as a percentage of
W0) of an agent with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion coefficient γ is set equal to two.
The increasing dotted line represents π̂L∗t /W0 while the decreasing dotted line corresponds to
π̂G∗t /W0.
Figure 2.7 shows the optimal portfolio choice measured as a fraction of total wealth
invested in the risky stock at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price
density. We recall that Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the optimal portfolio choice measured
as a fraction of initial wealth invested in the risky stock. We observe that the optimal
portfolio profile still displays (primarily) a U-shaped pattern. The portfolio choice of a
CRRA agent is no longer a decreasing line but a straight line: a CRRA agent always
invests a constant fraction λ/ (σγ) of total wealth in the risky stock, irrespective of the
state of the economy.
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Figure 2.7.
Fraction of total wealth invested in the risky stock































(a) γ1 = 1.2 and γ2 = 0.7































(b) γ1 = 0.8 and γ2 = 0.6
The figure shows the optimal portfolio choice measured as a fraction of total wealth invested
in the risky stock at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. Panel (a)
displays the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain (taking, as before, γ1 = 1.2 and
γ2 = 0.7), while panel (b) displays the case of risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain (taking,
as before, γ1 = 0.8 and γ2 = 0.6). The dash-dotted line illustrates the portfolio choice of a
CRRA agent. The relative risk aversion coefficient γ is set equal to two.
2.6.2.2. Loss Aversion and Endogenous Updating
This section considers the case where the loss averse agent endogenously updates his
reference level over time. We assume that the endogeneity parameter β as well as the
depreciation parameter α are equal to 20%. Also, we assume that the initial reference
level θ0 equals 5.5% of initial wealth W0, and Lt equals the initial reference level (i.e.,
Lt = L = θ0). These parameter values imply that initial surplus wealth Ŵ0 equals zero.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the impact of a positive shock in initial wealth on median
consumption for the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain. The left panel
applies to the case in which the loss averse agent endogenously updates his reference level
over time (i.e., α = β = 20%), while the right panel displays the case of no endogenous
updating (i.e., α = β = 0%). The dash-dotted lines in both panels represent the agent’s
median consumption choice with the shock in initial wealth. We observe that with
endogenous updating a financial shock is gradually absorbed into future consumption
(i.e., consumption adjusts sluggishly to financial shocks): the impact of a financial shock
on consumption is smoothed over time, having a larger impact in the distant future
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than in the near future. By contrast, in the case of no endogenous updating, a financial
shock is directly absorbed into future consumption, leading to an even distribution of
the shock’s impact on future consumption choice.
Figure 2.8.
Gradual adjustment to financial shocks




































(a) With endogenous updating




































(b) No endogenous updating
The figure illustrates the impact of a positive shock in initial wealth on median consumption
(expressed as a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0) for the case of risk-averse behavior
in the loss domain (i.e., γ1 = 1.2). The curvature parameter γ2 is set equal to 0.7 as before,
and L to θ0. The right panel displays the case of no endogenous updating (i.e., α = β = 0%),
while the left panel presents the case in which the agent endogenously updates the reference
level over time (i.e., α = β = 20%). The dash-dotted lines in both panels represent the agent’s
median consumption choice with a shock in initial wealth from 500 to 750 (×1,000 dollars)
units.
Figure 2.9 shows the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density
and the then-current reference level. Indeed, we note that the optimal consumption
profile depends not only the then-current state price density but also on the then-current
reference level (i.e., the optimal consumption profile is path-dependent). The threshold ξt
is however state independent. The agent is assumed to be risk-averse in the loss domain.
The figure shows that the optimal consumption choice increases with the reference level,
and decreases with the state price density. Compared to the case of loss aversion only as
in the previous subsection, endogeneity of the reference level has the reinforcing effect
that the agent gives up even more upward potential in then-current consumption to
guarantee consumption above the reference level. At the same time, the agent is also
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willing to accept somewhat larger consumption losses if the state of the economy is really
adverse.
Figure 2.9.
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The figure illustrates the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density and the
then-current reference level. The curvature parameter γ1 (γ2) is set equal to 1.2 (0.7).
Figure 2.10 illustrates the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested
in the risky stock expressed as a percentage of the agent’s initial wealth W0) at age 70 as
a function of the then-current log state price density for the case of risk-averse behavior
in the loss domain. As in the case of loss aversion only, the optimal portfolio profile is
U-shaped. While the then-current reference level affects the optimal consumption profile
(see Figure 2.9), it does not impact the optimal portfolio profile. However, because of
endogenous updating, optimal required wealth W̃ ∗t (i.e., wealth required to finance future
optimal reference levels) is partly invested in the risky stock. Put differently, the dual
portfolio choice no longer coincides with the agent’s optimal (primal) portfolio choice.
By contrast, in the case of no endogenous updating as in the previous subsection, optimal
required wealth W̃ ∗t is fully invested in the money market account. Since the reference
level depends on the agent’s own past consumption choices (i.e., the reference level is
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path-dependent), the agent typically invests more in the risky stock under endogenous
updating.
Figure 2.10.
Portfolio profile for the case of risk-averse behavior in the loss domain





































The figure illustrates the optimal portfolio choice (i.e., the total dollar amount invested in the
risky stock) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The curvature
parameter γ1 (γ2) is set equal to 1.2 (0.7). The dash-dotted line represents the optimal dual
portfolio choice π̂∗t /W0.
Figure 2.11 illustrates the median optimal portfolio choice measured as a fraction of
total wealth invested in the risky stock as a function of the horizon, which represents the
number of years spent in retirement. We observe that the agent implements a life cycle
investment strategy (i.e., the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock, on average,
decreases as the agent ages). Indeed, since the agent has less time to absorb financial
shocks as he grows older, the equity risk exposure, on average, decreases over the life
cycle.26
2.6.3. Welfare Analysis
This section conducts a welfare analysis. Section 2.6.3.1 reports the welfare losses
(in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption) associated with
26The slight increase in median optimal portfolio choice towards the end of the life span can be explained
from the fact that the median optimal dual portfolio choice, which dictates the median optimal (primal)
portfolio choice, displays a U-shaped pattern as a function of the horizon. This, in turn, is due to the
fact that the absolute difference between optimal median consumption and the reference level as a
function of the horizon is U-shaped, being smaller for intermediate horizons than for large and small
horizons.
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Figure 2.11.
Median portfolio choice












































The figure illustrates the median optimal portfolio choice measured as a fraction of total wealth
invested in the risky stock as a function of the horizon. The curvature parameter γ1 (γ2) is set
equal to 1.2 (0.7). The dash-dotted line represents the optimal dual portfolio choice π̂∗t /W0.
incorrect values of the agent’s preference parameters.27 Precisely, we compute the
welfare losses due to implementing suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies
derived by solving the agent’s maximization problem on the basis of wrong values of
the loss aversion index κ, the depreciation parameter α and the endogeneity parameter
β. Section 2.6.3.2 reports the welfare losses associated with implementing alternative
(simpler) consumption and portfolio strategies. Throughout the welfare analysis, we
assume that the agent’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice is characterized by
the following (“true”) values of the preference parameters: θ0 = 5.5% · W0, κ = 2.5,
α = β = 20%, γ1 = 1.2 and γ2 = 0.7. Thus, the agent is risk-averse in the loss
domain. The welfare losses are computed relative to the agent’s optimal consumption
and portfolio strategy. The Appendix outlines the numerical procedure employed to
compute the welfare losses. This procedure is non-standard due to the endogeneity
of the reference level. The numerical procedure is implemented with ∆t = 1/8 and
27We define the certainty equivalent of an uncertain consumption strategy to be the constant, certain
consumption level that yields indifference to the uncertain consumption strategy.
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S = 1, 000, 000. Here, ∆t denotes the time step and S represents the total number of
simulations.
2.6.3.1. Welfare Losses Due to Incorrect Parameter Values
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report welfare losses due to implementing suboptimal consumption
and portfolio strategies derived on the basis of wrong values of the loss aversion index κ,
the depreciation parameter α and the endogeneity parameter β. In Table 2.2 we assume
that the agent’s initial surplus wealth is equal to zero, while in Table 2.3 we assume that
the agent has positive initial surplus wealth.28 Table 2.2 shows that the welfare losses
associated with incorrectly assuming a constant reference level (i.e., α = β = 0%) are
substantial. Specifically, the welfare loss is about 30%. If the agent has positive initial
surplus wealth, as in Table 2.3, this welfare loss is even larger. More generally, the tables
reveal that consumption and portfolio strategies based on a constant exogenous reference
level or on a very limited degree of endogeneity, thus implying no or only very limited
smoothing of financial shocks, substantially reduce welfare. At the same time we observe
that the impact of a change in the loss aversion index κ is larger when the agent’s initial
surplus wealth is equal to zero than when the agent’s initial surplus wealth is positive.
Indeed, κ determines the multiplicity of states in which consumption falls below the
reference level. As a consequence, the impact of a change in κ is more pronounced when
initial surplus wealth is small.
Table 2.2.
Welfare losses due to incorrect parameter values (zero initial surplus wealth)
Loss aversion index (κ) Endogeneity parameter (β)
0 0.05 0.10 0.20
2.5 31.93 17.50 8.25 0
5 28.58 22.56 18.33 11.85
10 28.00 25.99 24.87 22.40
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies derived
on the basis of wrong values of the loss aversion index κ, the depreciation parameter α, and
the endogeneity parameter β. The depreciation parameter α always equals the endogeneity
parameter β. The agent has zero initial surplus wealth. The numbers represent a percentage.
28More specifically, Table 2.2 assumes that the agent’s initial wealth W0 equals 500 (×1,000 dollars)
units, while Table 2.3 assumes that W0 is equal to 750 (×1,000 dollars) units.
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Table 2.3.
Welfare losses due to incorrect parameter values (positive initial surplus wealth)
Loss Aversion Index (κ) Endogeneity Parameter (β)
0 0.05 0.10 0.20
2.5 89.33 13.32 0.93 0
5 88.97 13.22 1.14 0.42
10 88.86 13.20 1.17 0.51
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies derived
on the basis of wrong values of the loss aversion index κ, the depreciation parameter α, and
the endogeneity parameter β. The depreciation parameter α always equals the endogeneity
parameter β. The agent has positive initial surplus wealth. The numbers represent a
percentage.
2.6.3.2. Welfare Losses Due to Alternative Strategies
Table 2.4 reports the welfare losses, compared to the optimal strategies of a loss averse
agent who endogenously updates his reference level, due to implementing the consumption
and portfolio strategy of an agent with CRRA utility (i.e., the Merton strategy). The
welfare losses are reported for various values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ underlying the Merton strategy. The implementation of the Merton strategy, under
which log consumption varies linearly with the log state price density and financial shocks
are directly absorbed into future consumption, leads to substantial welfare losses of about
40%. The welfare losses are minimal for intermediate values of γ (γ = 5 in the table).
We note that γ =∞ corresponds to a risk-free strategy.
Table 2.4.
Welfare losses due to implementing the Merton strategy
Relative Risk Aversion Coefficient (γ)
1 2 5 10 ∞
44.11 37.47 37.39 38.87 40.11
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing the consumption and portfolio strategy of an agent with
CRRA utility (i.e., the Merton strategy). The table reports the welfare losses for various values
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ underlying the Merton strategy. The agent has zero
initial surplus wealth. The numbers represent a percentage.
Finally, we consider the following practical consumption and portfolio strategy: we
assume that the agent consumes a fraction 1/(T − t) of wealth Wt. Furthermore,
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we assume that a constant fraction of wealth is invested in the risky stock (i.e., we
assume πt/Wt to be constant), as under the Merton strategy. Table 2.5 reports the
welfare losses for various values of the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock. We
observe that the welfare losses are again substantial, but smaller than when implementing
the Merton consumption rule. Indeed, our numerical results reveal that the Merton
strategy generates a more volatile consumption profile, with consumption falling below
the reference level more often than when implementing the 1/(T − t) consumption rule.
Thus, from the perspective of a loss averse agent, who strongly prefers to maintain
consumption above the reference level, the 1/(T − t) consumption rule is less suboptimal
than the Merton consumption rule. Furthermore, the welfare losses in Table 2.5 are
relatively insensitive to changes in πt/Wt. The welfare losses are minimal for relatively
low fractions of wealth invested in the risky stock (πt/Wt = 10% in the table). We
also computed, under the 1/(T − t) consumption rule, the welfare losses associated with
implementing various state-independent life cycle investment strategies. We find that
the welfare losses do not substantially reduce when implementing a state-independent
life cycle investment strategy.
Table 2.5.
Welfare losses due to implementing a practical alternative consumption and portfolio
strategy
Fraction of Wealth Invested in the Risky Stock
0 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
30.03 28.71 28.73 29.64 30.90
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing a practical alternative consumption and portfolio strategy.
The table reports the welfare losses for various values of the fraction of wealth invested in the
risky stock (i.e., πt/Wt). The agent has zero initial surplus wealth. The numbers represent a
percentage.
2.7. An Alternative Utility Function
This section explores, as a robustness check, the agent’s optimal consumption and
portfolio choice under an alternative specification of the agent’s instantaneous utility
function. More specifically, we assume that the agent’s utility function is represented
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by the kinked HARA utility function. The kinked HARA utility function emerges as a
special case of (2.4.3) if (i) classical consumption utility m is represented by the HARA
utility function and (ii) the gain-loss utility function w equals the two-part power utility











Here, ϕ ∈ (0,∞)\{1}, ρ > 0 and ψ ≥ 0 are preference parameters.
Figure 2.12 illustrates the kinked CRRA utility function, which appears as a special
case when ρ = ϕ and ψ = 0, for κ = 2.5 and κ = 5. The figure shows that the
kinked CRRA utility function has a kink at the reference level, with the slope of the
utility function over losses being steeper than the slope of the utility function over gains.
Furthermore, we observe that the kinked CRRA utility function is concave everywhere.
Hence, the agent exhibits risk averse behavior in both the gain and the loss domain.
Unfortunately, the kinked HARA utility function cannot be expressed in terms of the
agent’s surplus consumption choice ĉt ≡ ct − θt. As a direct consequence, the solution
technique of Schroder and Skiadas (2002) is not applicable here. However, we can still
obtain an analytical solution to the optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem
if the agent’s reference level is exogenously given. The assumption of an exogenous
reference level implies that the agent’s own (past) consumption choices do not affect the
reference level. However, factors beyond the control of the agent are allowed to influence
the reference level. Hence, the consumption and portfolio choice model considered in
this section can be viewed as an external, rather than an internal, habit formation model
(see, e.g., Abel, 1990). In what follows, the reader should keep in mind that the reference
level is independent of the agent’s own (past) consumption choices.
Theorem 3 below presents the optimal consumption choice for an agent with the
kinked HARA utility function.
29The HARA class of utility functions contains several important special cases. With suitable choice
of preference parameters, the HARA utility function can exhibit increasing, decreasing or constant
relative risk aversion. Important special cases are the commonly used CRRA (ρ = ϕ and ψ = 0),
exponential (ψ = 1 and ϕ→∞) and logarithmic (ρ = 1 and ϕ→ 1) utility functions.
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Figure 2.12.














The figure illustrates the kinked CRRA utility function (i.e., ρ = ϕ and ψ = 0) for κ = 2.5
(solid line) and κ = 5 (dash-dotted line). The reference level θt is set equal to 10, the weight
parameter η to 0 and the curvature parameter ϕ to 5.
Theorem 3. Consider an agent with the kinked HARA utility function and an exogenously
given reference level process θ who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem,
with consumption constrained to be non-negative. Then the optimal consumption c∗t at











, if Mt < ξt;










∨ 0, if Mt > ξt.
Here, κ̄ ≡ η+ (1−η)κ stands for the adjusted loss aversion index. The thresholds ξ
t
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An Alternative Utility Function
The Lagrange multiplier y is chosen such that the static budget constraint holds with
equality.
Theorem 3 shows that the state price density can be divided into three regions. In good
scenarios (i.e., low state prices), consumption is (strictly) larger than the reference level;
in these scenarios, the agent can afford to consume above the reference level. Next, in
intermediate economic scenarios (i.e., intermediate state prices), consumption is equal
to the reference level. The adjusted loss aversion index κ̄ determines the multiplicity
of states in which consumption is equal to the reference level. Finally, in bad economic
scenarios (i.e., high state prices), the agent’s wealth is insufficient to finance consumption
at the reference level. In the case of two-part power utility (see Section 2.5), similarly,
the optimal consumption choice also falls below the reference level in bad states of the
world. Figure 2.13 illustrates the optimal consumption profile of an agent with kinked
CRRA utility. We observe that, as before, the optimal consumption choice as a function
of the log state price density is 90◦ rotated S-shaped, thus confirming the impact of loss
aversion on the optimal consumption profile. We also observe that c∗t is a continuous
function of the state price density. In particular, the optimal consumption profile does
not exhibit a jump at the reference level. Indeed, marginal utility at the reference level
is finite.
The agent’s optimal wealth W ∗t can be decomposed in the same way as in Section
2.5:















t for the case of a constant investment opportunity
set (i.e. rt = r, σt = σ and λt = λ).
Proposition 3. Consider an agent with the kinked HARA utility function and a reference
level process θ who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem, with consumption
constrained to be non-negative and assuming a constant investment opportunity set. Let
N be the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. Define
C, d1(x) and d2(x) as follows:















































































































































The agent’s optimal portfolio choice π∗t can be computed in a similar way as in Section
2.5. Figure 2.14 illustrates the optimal portfolio profile of an agent with kinked CRRA
utility. We observe that the optimal portfolio profile displays again a U-shaped pattern.
In good as well as in bad states, the agent behaves like a CRRA agent. In particular, in
these states, the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock is equal to the constant
λ/ (σϕ).
2.8. Conclusion
We have derived the optimal consumption and portfolio choice under the two-part
power utility function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) while allowing the agent to
endogenously update his reference level over time. We have shown that loss aversion
gives rise to a nonlinear consumption profile, inducing a (soft) guarantee on consumption,










































The figure shows the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The
curvature parameter ϕ is set equal to 4. The remaining parameter values are the same
as in Section 2.6. The dashed line corresponds to the agent’s reference level (expressed
as a percentage of W0). The dotted line shows the probability density function (PDF) of
the then-current log state price density conditional upon information available at the age of
retirement.
We have assumed that agents can objectively evaluate the probabilities associated with
future outcomes. A large body of research suggests that agents subjectively weight
probabilities and e.g., have a tendency to overweight unlikely extreme outcomes (see,
e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000). Jin and Zhou (2008) and He and Zhou (2011, 2014) consider
optimal portfolio choice under subjective probability weighting; see also Laeven and
Stadje (2014). However, these authors do not consider intertemporal consumption or
endogenous updating of the reference level. In future work we intend to extend our
setting with intertemporal consumption and endogenous updating of the reference level
to explore the impact of probability weighting on the optimal consumption and portfolio
choice. Interestingly, as already shown by He and Zhou (2014), probability weighting
may generate an endogenous insurance if small probabilities are sufficiently overweighted.
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Figure 2.14.
Optimal portfolio profile of an agent with kinked CRRA utility




























The figure shows the optimal portfolio choice measured as a fraction of total wealth invested in
the risky stock at age 70 as a function of the then-current log state price density. The curvature
parameter ϕ is set equal to 4. The remaining parameter values are the same as in Section 2.6.
2.9. Appendix
2.9.1. The Dual Technique
Schroder and Skiadas (2002) show that a generic consumption and portfolio choice
model with linear internal habit formation can be mechanically transformed into a dual
consumption and portfolio choice model without linear internal habit formation. The
dual technique can be applied to an arbitrary utility function, including the two-part
power utility function v (see expression (2.4.1)). To formulate the dual consumption and
portfolio choice model, let us define the agent’s surplus consumption choice ĉt as the
agent’s consumption choice ct minus the agent’s reference level θt; that is, ĉt ≡ ct − θt.
We can view ĉ as a gain process.30 The agent’s maximization problem (2.5.1) is now
30We note that a negative gain corresponds to a (positive) loss.
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≤ Ŵ0 (1 + βA0) , ĉt ≥ −Lt for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.9.1)
Here, M̂t and Ŵ0 represent the dual counterparts of the state price density Mt and the
agent’s initial wealth W0, respectively.
The relationship between the agent’s maximization problem (2.5.1) and the dual







Ms exp {− (α− β) (s− t)} ds
]
.
We can view At as the time t price of a bond paying a continuous coupon. In case
the investment opportunity set is constant, At only depends on time t. As a direct
consequence, the optimal portfolio choice can be computed explicitly in this case. The
dual state price density M̂t and the dual initial wealth Ŵ0 are given by








exp {− (α− β) (s− u)} ĉu du+ exp {− (α− β) (s− t)} θ̂t, s ≥ t ≥ 0,
is equal to the agent’s reference level θs.










Surplus wealth Ŵt is invested in a dual financial market that is characterized by the dual
risk-free rate r̂t, the dual volatility σ̂t and the dual market price of risk λ̂t:
r̂t ≡ β +
rt − αβAt
1 + βAt
, σ̂t ≡ σt,
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exp {−(α− β)(s− t)}Pt,sΨt,s ds.
Here, Pt,s corresponds to the time t price of a default-free unit discount bond that matures
at time s ≥ t and Ψt,s stands for the time t volatility of the instantaneous return on
such a bond (all in the primal financial market). The optimal dual portfolio choice π̂∗t is
determined such that it finances the optimal surplus consumption choice ĉ ∗t .
The next proposition is adapted from Schroder and Skiadas (2002).
Proposition 4. Suppose that we have solved the dual problem (2.9.1). Let us denote
the optimal surplus consumption choice by ĉ ∗t , the optimal dual reference level by θ̂
∗
t , the
optimal surplus wealth by Ŵ ∗t and the optimal dual portfolio choice by π̂
∗
t . Then:






• The optimal wealth for the agent at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T is given by






















exp {−(α− β)(s− t)}Pt,sΨt,s ds.
Proposition 4 shows how to transform the optimal solution to the dual problem (2.9.1)
back into the optimal solution to the agent’s maximization problem (2.5.1).
2.9.2. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof uses some of the techniques developed by Basak and Shapiro (2001) and
Berkelaar et al. (2004) to deal with pseudo-concavity and non-differentiability aspects of
the problem and adapts these to our setting with intertemporal consumption.
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≤ Ŵ0 (1 + βA0) , ĉt ≥ −Lt for all t ∈ [0, T ].


















exp {−δt} v (ĉt)− yM̂tĉt
]
dt+ yŴ0.
Here, y denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint. The
agent wishes to maximize exp {−δt} v (ĉt)− yM̂tĉt subject to ĉt ≥ −Lt. Denote the part
of the two-part power utility function with domain below zero by v1, and the part with
domain above zero by v2. Let us denote by c
∗
1t the agent’s optimal surplus consumption
choice for utility function v1, and by c
∗
2t the agent’s optimal surplus consumption choice
for utility function v2.
We first consider the case where the agent is risk-averse in the loss domain. Due to















= 0, xjt ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2.
Here, xjt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint on surplus

















31The derivative of a function f at a point a is denoted by f ′(a).
55
Chapter 2. Optimal Choice under Loss Aversion and Endogenous Updating





= exp {−δt} v (c∗2t)− yM̂tc∗2t −
[
exp {−δt} v (c∗1t)− yM̂tc∗1t
]























≥ 0; and equals c∗1t otherwise. It





















has one zero in
the interval (0,∞). Define ξt to be such that f (ξt) = 0. The global maximum ĉ ∗t is
equal to c∗2t if M̂t ≤ ξt; and equals c∗1t otherwise.
We now consider the case where the agent is risk-seeking in the loss domain. Due
to the concavity of v2, the optimal surplus consumption choice c
∗






= yM̂t − x2t, c∗2t ≥ −Lt,
x2t (c
∗
2t + Lt) = 0, x2t ≥ 0.






Due to the convexity of v1, the optimal surplus consumption choice c
∗
1t lies at a corner
point of the feasible region. Hence, the only two possible candidates for c∗1t are −Lt and
0.





= exp {−δt} v (c∗2t)− yM̂tc∗2t −
[
exp {−δt} v (c∗1t)− yM̂tc∗1t
]
.






≥ 0; and equals c∗1t otherwise. We
distinguish between the following two cases:
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> 0 for all M̂t. We conclude
that c∗1t = 0 is never optimal.













γ2−1 + exp {−δt}κLγ1t − yM̂tLt.




> 0 for all M̂t ≤ κy exp {−δt}L
γ1−1

























ξt to be such that g (ξt) = 0. It follows that the global maximum ĉ
∗
t is equal to c
∗
2t
if M̂t ≤ ξt; and equals c∗1t otherwise.
A standard verification (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, p. 103) that the optimal
solutions obtained from the Lagrangian are the optimal solutions to the dual problem
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
We distinguish between the following two cases:
• Risk-averse behavior in the loss domain. Define the following function:



























= 0. It follows that ξ̃t = y exp {δt} ξt. The quantity ξ̃t
increases as the loss aversion index κ increases. Furthermore, initial surplus wealth
Ŵ0 decreases with the initial reference level θ0, increases with the depreciation
parameter α (provided that Ŵ0 is non-negative), and decreases with the endogeneity
parameter β (provided that Ŵ0 is non-negative).
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• Risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain. Define the following function:






+ κLγ1t − xLt.




= 0. It follows that ξ̃t = y exp {δt} ξt. The quantity ξ̃t
increases as the loss aversion index κ increases. Furthermore, initial surplus wealth
Ŵ0 decreases with the initial reference level θ0, increases with the depreciation
parameter α (provided that Ŵ0 is non-negative), and decreases with the endogeneity
parameter β (provided that Ŵ0 is non-negative).
The proposition now follows straightforwardly from Berkelaar et al. (2004). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2












We first consider the case where the agent is risk-averse in the loss domain. Substituting









































































Here, ζs ≡ exp {−δs} γ1κy L
γ1−1
s . The closed-form expression for Ŵ
∗
t can be determined























































Here, N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable,















































Substituting the conditional expectations (2.9.4), (2.9.5) and (2.9.6) into equation (2.9.3)
yields the optimal surplus wealth.
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We now consider the case where the agent is risk-seeking in the domain of losses.













































The closed-form expression for Ŵ ∗t can be determined by computing the conditional






























N [d2 (ξs)] . (2.9.9)
Substituting the conditional expectations (2.9.8) and (2.9.9) into equation (2.9.7) yields
the optimal surplus wealth. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof uses some of the techniques developed by Basak and Shapiro (2001) and
Berkelaar et al. (2004) and adapts these to our setting with intertemporal consumption.













≤ W0, ct ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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E [exp {−δt}u (ct; θt)− yMtct] dt+ yW0.
Here, y denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint.
The agent wishes to maximize exp {−δt}u (ct; θt)− yMtct subject to ct ≥ 0. Denote the
part of the utility function with domain below zero by u1, and the part with domain
above zero by u2. Let us denote by c
∗
1t the agent’s optimal consumption choice for utility
function u1, and by c
∗
2t the agent’s optimal consumption choice for utility function u2.










= yMt − xjt, c∗jt ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2,
xjtc
∗
jt = 0, xjt ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2.
Here, xjt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint

































Here, κ̄ ≡ η + (1− η) · κ.
To determine the global maximum c∗t , we introduce the following function:
f (Mt) = exp {−δt}u (c∗2t; θt)− yMtc∗2t − [exp {−δt}u (c∗1t; θt)− yMtc∗1t] .
The global maximum is equal to c∗2t if f (Mt) ≥ 0; and equals c∗1t otherwise. It follows that



















We consider the following three cases:
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• ξ
t
≤ Mt ≤ ξt. It follows that θt is the only candidate solution. We conclude that
c∗t = θt is the global maximum.























and f ′′ (Mt) < 0 for all Mt > ξt. Hence, f (Mt) < 0 for all Mt > ξt. We conclude
that c∗t = c
∗
1t is the global maximum.
• Mt < ξt. We compare the candidate solutions c
∗




























> 0 for all Mt < ξt. Hence, f (Mt) > 0 for all Mt < ξt. We conclude that
c∗t = c
∗
2t is the global maximum.
A standard verification (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, p. 103) that the optimal
solution obtained from the Lagrangian is the optimal solution to the static maximization
problem completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3






















































































































































y exp{δt} . The closed-form expression for W
∗
t can be determined by computing























































































































Here, N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable,
and C, d1(x) and d2(x) are defined as follows:
C =





























Substituting the conditional expectations (2.9.12) – (2.9.16) into equation (2.9.11) yields
the optimal wealth. Q.E.D.
2.9.3. Welfare Analysis
This appendix describes a numerical procedure for computing welfare losses. This
procedure is based on the assumptions that the investment opportunity set is constant
and the agent can only invest in one risky stock. We introduce the following notation:
• ∆t: time step;






• S: total number of simulations.
The floor operator b·c rounds a number downward to its nearest integer.
To compute the welfare loss associated with a suboptimal consumption strategy ct,
we apply the following steps:
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1. We generate S trajectories of the pricing kernel:
M stn+1 = M
s
tn









, s = 1, ...,S.
Here, εstn is a standard normally distributed random variable.






s = 1, ...,S. We note that the optimal surplus consumption choice ĉ ∗stn is a function



























The right-hand side of (2.9.17) approximates of E
[∫ T
0
exp {−δt} v (c∗t − θ∗t ) dt
]
.


























θ∗tn = θ0 exp {−αtn}+ β
n−1∑
i=0
exp {−α (tn − ti)} ce∗∆t.
4. We compute the suboptimal consumption strategy ĉ stn ≡ c
s
tn
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where
θtn = θ0 exp {−αtn}+ β
n−1∑
i=0
exp {−α (tn − ti)} ce∆t.










This chapter explicitly derives the optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio choice
of an agent with cumulative prospect theory preferences. Specifically, the agent is loss
averse, distorts probabilities, and endogenously updates his reference level over time. The
optimal strategy seeks to mitigate large year-on-year fluctuations in consumption and
aims to provide protection against downside risk. The first effect is due to endogenous
updating of the reference level while the second effect is due to loss aversion and probability
weighting. We show that if small probabilities are sufficiently overweighted, our model
generates an endogenous floor on consumption.
3.1. Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969), optimal consumption
and portfolio choice over the life cycle has been extensively studied in the economics and
finance literature. Most authors assume that preferences over consumption choices are
represented by CRRA utility (see, e.g., Wachter, 2002; Liu, 2007), by Epstein-Zin utility
(see, e.g., Chacko and Viceira, 2005; Gomes and Michaelides, 2008) or by habit formation
utility (see, e.g., Gomes and Michaelides, 2003; Munk, 2008). However, an extensive body
of literature in behavioral economics and finance documents experimentally as well as
empirically departures from the key assumptions underlying these preference models, in
a wide variety of risky choice situations. In response, the literature has developed several
32This chapter is co-authored with Roger Laeven.
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alternative theories of decision making under risk. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT
for short), introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), is currently perhaps the most
promising descriptive theory of decision making under risk. This chapter derives and
analyzes the optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio choice of an agent with CPT
preferences.
Specifically, we consider an agent that derives value from the difference between
consumption and a so-called reference level. If consumption exceeds the reference level,
the agent experiences a gain, while if consumption falls short of the reference level, the
agent experiences a loss. CPT is silent on how to update the reference level over time.
We follow the (internal) habit formation literature (see, e.g., Constantinides, 1990) and
assume that the reference level depends on the agent’s own past consumption choices.33
As a direct consequence, consumption responds gradually to financial shocks (see Chapter
2). Our agent has a two-part power utility function and two inverse S-shaped probability
weighting (or distortion) functions (one for gains and one for losses). The utility function
incorporates loss aversion (i.e., losses hurt more than gains satisfy), and the probability
weighting functions overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities.34
The literature on optimal consumption and portfolio choice under CPT preferences
is still immature.35 Gomes (2005) explores the optimal portfolio choice of a loss averse
agent in an economy with two states of nature, and analyzes the impact of loss aversion
on trading volume. Berkelaar et al. (2004) examine the optimal portfolio choice of a
loss averse agent in a setting with terminal wealth and a continuum of states of nature.
Chapter 2 includes intertemporal consumption choice in this setting and allows the agent
to endogenously update his reference level over time. The model of Chapter 2 does,
however, not accommodate probability weighting. Jin and Zhou (2008) and He and
Zhou (2011) study the optimal portfolio choice of an agent that maximizes CPT value of
terminal wealth. Although these authors take probability weighting into consideration,
they do not consider intertemporal consumption choice and an endogenous reference
level. The present chapter considers a preference model that encompasses intertemporal
33The reference level is backward-looking and not forward-looking as in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007,
2009).
34An extensive body of literature shows that individuals overweight low probabilities and underweight
large probabilities (see, e.g., Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000).
35Several authors use CPT preferences to explain interesting features observed in financial data. For




consumption choice, an endogenous reference level, as well as probability weighting.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the agent divides the
state of the economy into two categories: good states and bad states. In good states,
consumption is larger than the reference level, while in really bad states, consumption is
smaller than the reference level. The consumption profile (i.e., consumption as a function
of the log state price density) displays a 90◦ rotated S-shaped pattern. Second, the two
inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions impede the sensitivity of the optimal
consumption choice to the state of the economy, inducing endogenous guarantees. In
particular, both the occurrence of really bad states and of fairly good states impact the
optimal consumption choice only to a limited degree. Thus, under probability weighting,
optimal consumption is fairly unresponsive to a wide range of shocks to the economy.
Finally, if small probabilities are sufficiently overweighted, our preference model generates
an endogenous floor level. We explicitly derive the level of this floor on consumption.
Probability weighting may thus explain why some individuals buy financial products
with minimum guaranteed payments.
The optimal portfolio profile (i.e., the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock
as a function of the log state price density) displays a U-shaped pattern if probabilities
are not distorted (see Chapter 2): the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock is
relatively low in economic scenarios where consumption is close to the reference level
(i.e., intermediate economic scenarios). If the agent overweights probabilities of bad
outcomes, then the fraction of assets invested in the risky stock is relatively low in not
only intermediate economic scenarios but also bad economic scenarios.
We conduct a welfare analysis to investigate the impact of implementing alternative
(suboptimal) consumption strategies on the agent’s welfare. More specifically, all else
equal, we compute welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) associated with incorrect probability weighting functions. We still assume
that the (incorrectly specified) probability weighting functions are inverse S-shaped. Our
results show that welfare losses can be (relatively) modest. This is so because, due to loss
aversion, consumption already displays a 90◦ rotated S-shaped pattern, and the inverse
S-shaped probability weighting functions, whether correctly or incorrectly specified, make
this pattern even more pronounced.
To obtain the optimal consumption and portfolio choice, we first invoke the solution
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technique proposed by Schroder and Skiadas (2002). With this method, we are able to
convert our consumption and portfolio choice model with endogenous updating into a
dual consumption and portfolio choice model without endogenous updating. Then, we
solve the dual problem by extending to our setting the quantile method introduced
by Jin and Zhou (2008) and He and Zhou (2011). These authors show that in a
setting with terminal wealth and no endogenous updating of the reference level, the
agent’s maximization problem can be transformed into a quantile formulation. As a
result, conventional techniques (such as the Lagrange method) can be used to obtain
the optimal solution. We adapt the quantile method to our setting with intertemporal
consumption choice. By using the equivalence relationship between the dual model and
the primal model, we finally obtain explicit closed-form solutions to our initial problem
under consideration.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
economy. The agent’s preferences are introduced in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 formulates
the agent’s maximization problem. This section also outlines the dual technique and
splits the dual problem into three related sub-problems. Section 3.5 solves the agent’s
maximization problem. An illustration of the optimal strategies is presented in Section
3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2. The Economy
Let T > 0 be a fixed terminal time. The randomness in the economy is represented by a
filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P). We define on this space a standard N -dimensional
Brownian motion {Zt}t∈[0,T ]. The filtration F ≡ {Ft}t∈[0,T ] is the augmentation under P of
the natural filtration generated by the standard Brownian motion {Zt}t∈[0,T ]. Throughout,
(in)equalities between random variables hold P-almost surely.
We consider a financial market consisting of an instantaneously risk-free asset and N
risky stocks. We assume that trading takes place continuously over [0, T ] and transaction
costs are absent. The price of the risk-free asset, B, satisfies
dBt
Bt
= rt dt, B0 = 1. (3.2.1)
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The scalar-valued risk-free rate process, r, is assumed to be Ft-progressively measurable
and uniformly bounded. The N -dimensional vector of risky stock prices, S, obeys the
following stochastic differential equation:
dSt
St
= µt dt+ σt dZt, S0 = 1N . (3.2.2)
Here, 1N represents an N -dimensional vector consisting of all ones. The N -dimensional
mean rate of return process, µ, and the (N ×N)-matrix-valued volatility process, σ, are
both assumed to be Ft-progressively measurable and uniformly bounded.
We impose the following condition on σt. For some ε > 0,
ζ>σtσ
>
t ζ ≥ ε||ζ||2, for all ζ ∈ RN , (3.2.3)
where > is the transpose sign. This condition implies that σt is invertible and bounded.
The Ft-progressively measurable market price of risk process, λ, satisfies
σtλt ≡ µt − rt1N . (3.2.4)
The unique positive-valued state price density process, M , is defined as follows (see, e.g.,

















The economy consists of a single agent endowed with initial wealth W0 ≥ 0. The agent
chooses an Ft-progressively measurable N -dimensional portfolio process π (representing
the dollar amounts invested in the N risky stocks) and an Ft-progressively measurable
consumption process c in order to maximize the CPT value of consumption.36 We impose





t πt dt <∞,
∫ T
0






36We introduce the agent’s preferences in Section 3.3.
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t σtλt − ct
)
dt+ π>t σt dZt, W0 ≥ 0 given. (3.2.7)
A consumption-portfolio pair (c, π) is said to be admissible if the associated wealth
process is uniformly bounded from below.
3.3. Preferences
This section describes the preferences. Denote by θt the agent’s reference level at time t.
The instantaneous preferences are defined over gains and losses relative to this reference
level. Inspired by CPT, we assume that the instantaneous preferences over gains and
losses ĉt ≡ ct − θt are given by






















































Equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) show that the agent’s preferences consist of various elements:
two probability weighting functions w+ (·;ϑt) and w− (·;ϑt) (one for gains and one for
losses), an endogenous reference level θt, and two instantaneous utility functions v+ (·)
and v− (·) (one for gains and one for losses). Here ϑt is a vector of (time-varying)
parameters affecting the shape of the probability weighting functions. Indeed, since
uncertainty changes over time, the agent may want to change the shape of the probability
weighting functions as time passes.
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3.3.1. Probability Weighting Functions
The probability weighting function w+ (·;ϑt) transforms the decumulative distribution




(·) of gains ĉ+t whereas the probability weighting function w− (·;ϑt)




(·) of losses ĉ−t . Throughout,
we impose the following conditions on w+ (·;ϑt) and w− (·;ϑt):
Assumption 1. Let Θ be the parameter space. For all t ∈ [0, T ] and all ϑt ∈ Θ,
w+ (·;ϑt) and w− (·;ϑt) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] are strictly increasing and differentiable, with
w+ (0;ϑt) = w− (0;ϑt) = 0 and w+ (1;ϑt) = w− (1;ϑt) = 1.







. Hence, expected utility maximization emerges as a special case
of (3.3.1).
3.3.2. Utility Functions
This section introduces the utility function for gains v+ (·) and the utility function for


















where γ1 > 0 and γ2 ∈ (0, 1) are curvature parameters, and κ ≥ 1 denotes the loss
aversion index. Figure 3.1 shows the two-part power utility function









for γ1 = 1.3 (solid line) and γ1 = 0.7 (dash-dotted line). The figure shows that the
two-part power utility function has a kink at the reference level, even in the case of
κ = 1.
73
Chapter 3. Optimal Choice under Cumulative Prospect Theory
Figure 3.1.
















γ 1 = 1.3
γ 1 = 0.7
The figure shows the two-part power utility function for γ1 = 1.3 (solid line) and γ1 = 0.7
(dash-dotted line). The agent’s reference level is set equal to 10, the loss aversion index κ to
2.5 and γ2 to 0.5.
3.3.3. Reference Level
This section describes the dynamics of the reference level θt. Motivated by the literature
on internal habit formation (see, e.g., Constantinides, 1990; Detemple and Zapatero,
1992; Detemple and Karatzas, 2003), we assume that the agent’s reference level satisfies
dθt = (βct − αθt) dt, θ0 ≥ 0 given. (3.3.7)
Here θ0 represents the agent’s initial reference level, α ≥ 0 indexes the rate at which the
reference level depreciates over time, and β ≥ 0 measures the sensitivity of the current
reference level to current consumption. We can explicitly write the agent’s reference level




exp {−α(s− u)} cu du+ exp {−α(s− t)} θt. (3.3.8)
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The first component on the right-hand side of equation (3.3.8) is an exponentially
weighted integral of the agent’s own past consumption choices. Hence, the agent’s
reference level is backward-looking and not forward-looking as in Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). The second component does not depend on the agent’s past consumption
choices and decreases exponentially at a rate of α.
3.4. Problem Formulation
This section formulates the agent’s maximization problem. The agent aims to maximize
∫ T
0
e−δtV (ct − θt) dt, (3.4.1)
over all admissible consumption-portfolio pairs (c, π) subject to the dynamic budget
constraint (3.2.7) and the reference level process (3.3.7). Here δ stands for the subjective
rate of time preference. By virtue of the martingale approach (Pliska, 1986; Karatzas
et al., 1987; Cox and Huang, 1989, 1991), we can transform the dynamic consumption











≤ W0, dθt = (βct − αθt) dt.
(3.4.2)
The optimal portfolio strategy π∗t is determined in such a way that it finances the optimal
consumption strategy c∗t .
3.4.1. A Dual Problem
This section transforms the agent’s maximization problem (3.4.2) into a dual (equivalent)
maximization problem. Specifically, by invoking the method used in Schroder and
Skiadas (2002), we can transform the agent’s maximization problem (3.4.2) into the
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≤ Ŵ0 (1 + βA0) , dθ̂t =
(




Here the dual state price density M̂t and dual wealth Ŵt are defined as follows:












Ms exp {− (α− β) (s− t)} ds
]
. (3.4.6)




exp {− (α− β) (s− u)} ĉu du+ exp {− (α− β) (s− t)} θ̂t. (3.4.7)
and equals the (primal) reference level θs. The agent invests his dual (or surplus) wealth
Ŵt in a dual financial market. This dual market is characterized by the dual risk-free
rate r̂t, the dual volatility σ̂t and the dual market price of risk λ̂t:




σ̂t ≡ σt, (3.4.9)





exp {−(α− β)(s− t)}Pt,sΨt,s ds, (3.4.10)
where Pt,s represents price at time t of a zero-coupon bond that matures at time s ≥ t,
and Ψt,s denotes the volatility at time t of the instantaneous return on a zero-coupon
bond with maturity date s ≥ t.
The optimal dual portfolio choice π̂∗t is determined such that it finances the optimal
dual consumption choice ĉ ∗t . The optimal dual reference level θ̂
∗
t can be computed from
substituting the optimal past consumption choices into (3.4.7). The next proposition
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follows from Schroder and Skiadas (2002).
Proposition 5. Denote by ĉ ∗t the optimal dual consumption choice, by θ̂
∗
t the optimal
dual reference level, by Ŵ ∗t optimal dual wealth, and by π̂
∗
t the optimal dual portfolio
choice. Then:






• The optimal wealth for the agent at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T is given by






















exp {−(α− β)(s− t)}Pt,sΨt,s ds.
3.4.2. Three Related Sub-Problems
Jin and Zhou (2008) explore a problem with a similar structure as our dual problem
(3.4.3). However, they do not consider intertemporal consumption choice. Jin and Zhou
(2008) show that their problem can be solved by splitting it into three sub-problems.


















≤ Ŵ+ (1 + βA0) , ĉ+t = 0 if M̂t ≥ ξt.
(3.4.11)
The gain part problem is parameterized by Ŵ+ ≥ Ŵ0 (i.e., initial wealth needed to




is defined to be
the supremum of (3.4.11).37
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(1 + βA0) , ĉ
−
t = 0 if M̂t < ξt.
(3.4.12)





is now defined to be the infimum of (3.4.12).38











subject to Ŵ+ ≥ Ŵ0.
(3.4.13)
The next proposition is adapted from Jin and Zhou (2008).
Proposition 6. Suppose that
(
Ŵ ∗+, {ξ∗t }
)





optimal for problem (3.4.11) with parameters
(







problem (3.4.12) with parameters
(
Ŵ ∗+, {ξ∗t }
)
. Then ĉ ∗t =
(
ĉ+t
)∗ − (ĉ−t )∗ is optimal
for problem (3.4.3).
3.5. Solving the Problem
3.5.1. Quantile Method
This section demonstrates how we can convert the gain part problem (3.4.11) into a
quantile maximization problem.39 In the quantile formulation, the agent chooses the
quantile function (i.e., inverse cumulative distribution function) of dual consumption.
After changing the agent’s decision variable from dual consumption to the quantile
function of dual consumption, the agent’s preference measure reduces to an ordinary
linear expectation. Hence, conventional techniques (such as the Lagrange method) can






39The loss part problem (3.4.12) can be converted into a quantile minimization problem.
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be used to obtain the optimal dual consumption choice.40 He and Zhou (2011) give
a systematic account of the quantile method. The quantile method relies upon the
following three crucial assumptions:
Assumption 2. The agent’s preference measure is law-invariant; that is, if X
d∼ Y ,
then V (X) = V (Y ).
Assumption 3. The agent is strictly better off with more initial dual wealth.





for all a ∈ R+.
The agent’s preference measure in our setting is clearly law-invariant. Assumption 3
holds true if the probability weighting function is strictly increasing (for a proof, see He
and Zhou, 2011). The last assumption is satisfied if, e.g., the investment opportunity set











































































(·) corresponds to the quantile function of negative dual consumption ĉ−t . Let
us denote by F
M̂t
(·) the cumulative distribution function of the dual state price density
M̂t. By Assumptions 3 and 4, we can rewrite the left-hand sides of the static dual
budget constraints as follows (the static dual budget constraints are defined in (3.4.11)
40The optimal solution is typically time-inconsistent. Therefore, we assume that the agent solves the
maximization problem at time 0 and then commits himself to follow the optimal solution during the
rest of his life.
41A quantile function is non-decreasing and continuous from the left.
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. It follows that Z
M̂t
is a uniformly distributed random variable on [0, 1].
Equations (3.5.1) and (3.5.2) hold true for any uniformly distributed random variable
Z, whereas equations (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) are only valid for one particular uniformly
distributed random variable Z
M̂t
.
Define Q to be the set of all quantile functions. The gain part problem (3.4.11) is





















































The quantile maximization problem (3.5.5) is called the quantile formulation. The agent’s
decision variable is the quantile function of positive dual consumption. In a similar

























































The next proposition is adapted from He and Zhou (2011).






























This section summarizes the solution technique for solving the agent’s maximization
problem (3.4.2). The solution procedure consists of the following steps:
1. Solve the quantile problems (3.5.5) and (3.5.6);









3. Solve problem (3.4.13);
4. Use Proposition 6 to obtain the optimal dual consumption choice ĉ ∗t ;
5. Use Proposition 5 to obtain the optimal consumption choice c∗t .
The following sections explore how to solve problems (3.5.5), (3.5.6) and (3.4.13).
3.5.2.1. Solving the Gain Part Problem





. Let us introduce the following assumption:42













is non-increasing in Z
M̂t
∈ [0, 1].
Section 3.6 considers a class of probability weighting functions that satisfy Assumption




































is non-increasing in M̂t. The
Lagrange multiplier y is chosen such that the static budget constraint holds with equality.
42We note that Assumption 5 can be relaxed (see Xia and Zhou, 2014; Xu, 2014).
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Straightforward computations show that the Lagrange multiplier y is given by (substitute
(3.5.8) into the dual budget constraint and solve for y)
y = γ2
[

















































































3.5.2.2. Solving the Loss Part Problem
This section presents the optimal solution to the quantile minimization problem (3.5.6).
The two-part power utility function (3.3.6) is convex below the agent’s reference level
if γ1 ≤ 1, and concave otherwise. The literature is inconclusive about the shape of the
utility function below the reference level (see, e.g., Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Abdellaoui
et al., 2005; Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009). Etchart-Vincent (2004) found that in the
case of large payoffs, the majority of subjects preferred a concave utility function below
the reference level. Therefore, the present chapter considers the case of a concave utility
function in the loss domain (γ1 > 1). In future work, we intend to investigate the case
where the utility function is convex below the reference level. We can apply the Lagrange




. Let us introduce the following assumption:
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is non-increasing in Z
M̂t
∈ [0, 1].
































The Lagrange multiplier y is chosen such that the static budget constraint holds with
equality. Straightforward computations show that the Lagrange multiplier y is given by
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3.5.2.3. Optimal Dual Solution
To determine the optimal dual consumption choice, the agent needs to solve problem



















subject to Ŵ+ ≥ Ŵ0.
(3.5.19)
This problem can be solved numerically.
3.6. Numerical Analysis
3.6.1. Assumptions and Key Parameter Values
The agent invest his wealth in a risk-free asset and a single risky stock. We assume a
constant investment opportunity set. That is, rt = r, σt = σ and λt = λ. The equity
risk premium σλ = µ − r is set at 4%, the risk-free rate r at 1%, and the volatility of
innovations to the risky stock price σ at 20%. These estimates are the same as those
used by Gomes et al. (2008).
The terminal time T is set equal to 4, the agent’s initial wealth to 100, the curvature
parameter γ1 to 1.2, the curvature parameter γ2 to 0.7, the subjective rate of time
preference to 0.01, and the loss aversion index κ to 2.5. The literature reposts that
estimates of the (median) loss aversion index range from 1 to 5 (see, e.g., Abdellaoui





exp {−rt} dt. (3.6.1)
We can view θ0 as the payment from a fixed annuity with a value of W0. The parameters
α and β are set equal to zero. The reference level is thus constant over time. The impact
of an endogenous reference level on the agent’s optimal choice is analyzed in Chapter 2.
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3.6.2. Probability Weighting Functions
Inspired by Jin and Zhou (2008) and He and Zhou (2011), we define the derivatives of















































, if M̂t > QM̂t (p̄−) .
(3.6.3)
Here a+ ≤ 0, a− ≤ 0, 0 ≤ b+ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ b− ≤ 1, p̄+ > 0 and p̄− > 0 are preference
parameters. The parameter restrictions ensure that w+ (·;ϑt) and w− (·;ϑt) satisfy
Assumptions 1, 5 and 6. The expressions for w+ (·;ϑt) and w− (·;ϑt) are given in the
Appendix which also defines ϑt, k+ (ϑt) and k− (ϑt). The parameter p̄+ is called the
inflection point.43 The probability weighting function w+ (·;ϑt) is concave up to p̄+, and
convex beyond p̄+. The parameter a+ ≤ 0 determines the degree of concavity in the
domain 0 ≤ p ≤ p̄+, while the parameter 0 ≤ b+ ≤ 1 determines the degree of convexity
in the domain p̄+ ≤ p ≤ 1. Figure 3.2 illustrates the probability weighting function
w+ (·;ϑt) for various sets of parameter values. The figure shows that the probability
weighting function displays an inverse S-shaped pattern, consistent with CPT.
43It has been reported in the literature that p̄+ and p̄− are about 1/3 (see, e.g., Wu and Gonzalez, 1996;
Abdellaoui, 2000).
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Figure 3.2.
Illustration of probability weighting function





















a+ = −1.5, b+ = 1
a+ = −2.5, b+ = 1
a+ = 0, b+ = 0
The figure illustrates the probability weighting function w+ (·;ϑt) for various sets of parameter
values. We set ϑt equal to (−0.28, 0.16), and p̄+ to 1/3.
3.6.3. Optimal Consumption Choice
The optimal consumption choice for the agent at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T is given by (this follows







1−γ2 if M̂t ≤ min
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1−γ1 if M̂t > max
{





































and θ∗t denotes the optimal reference level implied by substituting the optimal past dual
consumption choice into (3.4.7).
Equation (3.6.4) shows that the agent divides the states of the economy into two
categories: good scenarios (low to intermediate state prices) and bad scenarios (high
state prices). In good scenarios, consumption is larger than the reference level, while in
bad scenarios, consumption is smaller than the reference level. The parameters a+, b+,
a− and b− determine the sensitivity of consumption to the (dual) pricing kernel M̂t. The
sensitivity of consumption to the pricing kernel is (relatively) low in very bad scenarios,
i.e., M̂t > max
{
QM̂t (p̄−) , ξt
}
, and in fairly good scenarios, i.e., QM̂t (p̄+) < M̂t ≤ ξt.
We observe that if b− equals unity, then the agent consumes θt−d4,t in very bad scenarios.
In that case, consumption does not depend on the pricing kernel at all. Figure 3.3 shows
the optimal consumption choice of an agent at time t = 4 as a function of the log dual
pricing kernel for various sets of parameter values. The dashed-dotted lines represent
the optimal ‘Merton’ consumption strategy (see Merton, 1969).
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Figure 3.3.






























































































































































(d) a+ = −1.5, b+ = 1, a− = −2.5 and b− = 1
The figure illustrates the optimal consumption choice (expressed as a percentage of the agent’s
initial wealth W0) of an agent at time t = 4 as a function of the log dual pricing kernel for
various sets of parameter values. We set the inflection points p̄+ and p̄− both equal to 1/3. The
dashed line corresponds to the reference level (expressed as a percentage of W0). The dotted line
shows the probability density function (PDF) of the current log dual pricing kernel conditional
upon information available at time 0. The dash-dotted line illustrates the consumption choice
(expressed as a percentage of W0) of an agent with CRRA utility. The relative risk aversion
coefficient is set equal to two.
3.6.3.1. Welfare Analysis
This section conducts a welfare analysis. We compute the welfare losses (in terms of
the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption) associated with implementing
suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies derived by solving the agent’s problem
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on the basis of incorrect values of a+, b+, a− and b−.
44 We assume that the agent’s optimal
consumption and portfolio choice is characterized by the following ‘true’ parameter
values: a+ = −1.5, b+ = 1, a− = −2.5 and b− = 1. Table 3.1 reports the welfare
losses. This table shows that the welfare losses associated with incorrectly assuming
incorrect parameter values are (relatively) small (all welfare losses are lower than 1%).
Welfare losses are largest for the case where no probability weighting in the loss domain




(a+, b+) (0,0) (-1,0.3) (-1.5,0.7) (-2.5,1)
(0,0) 0.5385 0.3173 0.2691 0.2582
(-0.5,0.3) 0.4846 0.2651 0.2086 0.1887
(-1,0.7) 0.4647 0.1970 0.1162 0.0869
(-1.5,1) 0.6571 0.1713 0.0214 0
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing suboptimal consumption and portfolio strategies derived
on the basis of incorrect values of a+, b+, a− and b−. The numbers represent a percentage.
3.6.4. Optimal Portfolio Choice
The optimal portfolio choice can be derived in closed-form by using standard hedging
methods. Figure 3.4 illustrates the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock (expressed
as a percentage) of an agent at time t = 4 as a function of the log dual pricing kernel for
various sets of parameter values. The figure shows that if consumption is close to the
reference level, the fraction invested in the risky stock is relatively low. In addition, if
the agent overweights unlikely extreme events (see the two panels at the bottom of the
figure), the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock tends to zero as the state of the
economy worsens.
44We define the certainty equivalent of an uncertain consumption strategy to be the constant, certain
consumption level that yields indifference to the uncertain consumption strategy.
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Figure 3.4.




















































































































(d) a+ = −1.5, b+ = 1, a− = −2.5 and b− = 1
The figure illustrates the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock (expressed as a
percentage) of an agent at time t = 4 as a function of the log dual pricing kernel for various sets
of parameter values. We set the inflection points p̄+ and p̄− both equal to 1/3. The dotted line
shows the probability density function (PDF) of the current log dual pricing kernel conditional




We have explored dynamic consumption and portfolio choice of an agent with CPT
preferences. Our agent is loss averse, endogenously updates his reference level over time,
and distorts probabilities. We have shown that the optimal consumption profile displays
a 90◦ rotated S-shaped pattern and that, if probabilities are sufficiently overweighted,
































































+ yŴ+ (1 + βA0) .
Here y ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint.
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Derivation of (3.5.14)


































































(1 + βA0) .
Here y ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint.































≤ ξt. The optimal dual negative consumption choice Q∗ĉ −t














































3.8.2. Probability Weighting Functions
This section specifies the probability weighting function for gains w+ (·;ϑt) and the
probability weighting function for losses w− (·;ϑt):
w+ (p;ϑt) =

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This chapter explores how Baby Boomers should invest and draw-down their accumulated
wealth over the rest of their lives. To answer this question we build a consumption
and portfolio choice model with multiplicative internal habit formation and stochastic
differential utility. We show analytically that after a wealth shock it is optimal to adjust
both the level and future growth rates of consumption, implying gradual response of
consumption to financial shocks. Furthermore, fostering the ability to keep catching up
with the internal habit creates upward pressure on expected consumption growth. Welfare
losses associated with popular alternative investment and draw-down strategies can be
large.
4.1. Introduction
As the first wave of Baby Boomers moves into retirement, their future promises to be
very different from that of their parents who enjoyed resilient Social Security and defined
benefit pension plans. Retirees today face a very different challenge regarding retirement
security, in that they are the first generation where retirement wealth was accumulated
primarily in personal retirement accounts.46 As their nest eggs will not automatically be
45This chapter is co-authored with Lans Bovenberg and Roger Laeven.
46The percentage of total U.S. retirement assets accounted for by individual retirement accounts and
defined contribution pension plans rose from about 18% in 1974 to 54% in 2013 (Investment Company
Institute, 2014).
95
Chapter 4. How to Invest and Draw-Down Wealth? A Utility-Based Analysis
annuitized, Baby Boomers thus confront the important question of how they should invest
and draw-down their accumulated wealth over the rest of their lives. The objective of the
present chapter is to analyze this question from the perspective of a utility maximizing
individual.
Financial advisors commonly recommend to split the investment portfolio into 60%
risky assets and 40% risk-free assets, and to draw-down 4 to 5% of retirement wealth
per year (Polyak, 2005; Whitaker, 2005). Other popular draw-down strategies include
the fixed benefit approach (i.e., the individual withdraws a specified dollar amount each
year until his retirement wealth is depleted), and the remaining lifetime approach (i.e.,
the withdrawal fraction rises with the remaining lifetime); see, e.g., Dus, Maurer, and
Mitchell (2005); Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008). However, these popular
draw-down strategies are arguably ad hoc, and are typically neither founded upon nor
corroborated by the individual’s preferences (MacDonald, Jones, Morrison, Brown, and
Hardy, 2013). Alternatively, retirees can buy annuities. But while fixed annuities are
usually too expensive to be an attractive financial product (especially in low interest
rate regimes), variable annuities often generate volatile fluctuations in payouts (see, e.g.,
Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2011; Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla, and Kartashov,
2013b).47
Thus, the need for a utility-based approach to analyze the investment and draw-down
strategies implemented by Baby Boomers is evident. Expected utility theory with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is the most commonly adopted preference model
to derive an agent’s optimal consumption and portfolio choice. As is well-known at
least since Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969), a CRRA agent fully absorbs a
wealth shock into the level (and not future growth rates) of consumption. Under CRRA,
the year-on-year volatility of consumption thus matches the year-on-year volatility of
wealth. However, evidence of violations of the assumptions underlying CRRA utility –
in our setting, the intertemporal independence assumption in particular – has led authors
to seek for alternative models. The literature has put forward a variety of alternatives,
perhaps most noticeably habit formation utility and (continuous-time) recursive utility
47Insurers have more recently developed variable annuities for which surpluses earned in good years
support payouts in bad years (see, e.g., Guillén et al., 2006; Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin, 2013a;
Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla, and Siegelin, 2014). This rapidly growing form of variable annuities is,
however, opaque and difficult to value.
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or stochastic differential utility (SDU).48 The present chapter proposes and analyzes a
model with internal habit formation and SDU, and derives the resulting investment and
draw-down strategies in closed-form.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we build a rich consumption and portfolio choice
model with multiplicative habit formation, an endogenous internal habit level, and SDU.
Our general model encompasses many interesting special cases such as SDU without
multiplicative internal habit formation, multiplicative internal habit formation without
SDU, multiplicative habit formation with an external (deterministic) habit, and CRRA
utility. Second, we develop an approximation method to accurately solve our general
consumption and portfolio choice problem analytically. Third, we analyze the resulting
optimal investment and draw-down strategies for a Baby Boomer, and conduct a welfare
analysis. We now specify each of our contributions in more detail.
We assume that the agent derives utility from the ratio between consumption and the
habit level. The ratio (or multiplicative) model of habit formation, first analyzed by Abel
(1990), is the only model we know of that allows consumption to fall below the habit
level while simultaneously maintaining the property of constant (i.e., state-independent)
relative risk aversion. A number of authors consider an agent who derives utility from
the difference – rather than the ratio – between consumption and the habit level.49
The optimal consumption choice implied by the difference (or additive) model of habit
formation (Constantinides, 1990) exceeds the habit level in each economic scenario.
This addictive behavior of consumption is, however, doubtful (see, e.g., Detemple and
Karatzas, 2003). Indeed, empirical evidence showing significant declines in consumption
levels during recessions contradicts the addictive property. Furthermore, in the difference
model of habit formation, relative risk aversion depends on (surplus) wealth. This may
be undesirable from a normative point of view as it leads to very low equity holdings
in bad economic scenarios.50 Also, in our ratio model of habit formation, the portfolio
48The notion of SDU was introduced by Duffie and Epstein (1992) as a continuous-time limit of the
preference models studied by Epstein and Zin (1989) and by Kreps and Porteus (1978). Life cycle
models with Epstein-Zin preferences or internal habit formation have been widely studied in the
literature. For Epstein-Zin preferences, see, e.g., Chacko and Viceira (2005); Gomes and Michaelides
(2008); for the ratio model of habit formation, see, e.g., Gomes and Michaelides (2003).
49See, e.g., Constantinides (1990); Detemple and Zapatero (1991, 1992); Schroder and Skiadas (2002);
Bodie, Detemple, Otruba, and Walter (2004); Munk (2008).
50Chapter 2 extends the difference model of habit formation to allow consumption to fall below the habit
level. However, in the model of Chapter 2, relative risk aversion still depends on (surplus) wealth.
97
Chapter 4. How to Invest and Draw-Down Wealth? A Utility-Based Analysis
strategy is state-independent, and thus easy to implement. We assume that the habit
level is a geometric (rather than an arithmetic) weighted average of the agent’s own past
consumption choices. Hence the habit level is internal to the agent and endogenously
determined.51 In the model of Abel (1990), the habit level depends only on consumption
in the previous period.
Due to the endogeneity of the habit level, our consumption and portfolio choice
problem cannot be solved in closed-form. By developing a linearization to the budget
constraint, we are able to derive an analytical closed-form solution to the approximate
optimization problem. Linearization of the agent’s budget constraint is not uncommon
in the economic literature; see, in a different context, e.g., Campbell and Mankiw
(1991); Fuhrer (2000). Our approximation method is shown to be very accurate when
consumption stays close to the habit level, and when the habit level responds slowly to
consumption. Indeed, our numerical results show that the approximation error (measured
in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption) is typically of order
0.01.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we show analytically that after
a wealth shock, it is optimal to adjust both the level and the future growth rates
of consumption, implying gradual response of consumption to financial shocks. This
justifies a mechanism for smoothing the change in consumption due to financial shocks.
The parameters in our model (i.e., the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the strength of
internal habit formation, and the deprecation rate of the habit level) have clear economic
interpretations, controlling the features of the optimal strategy. The coefficient of relative
risk aversion determines the effect of a wealth shock on the level of consumption. The less
risk averse the agent, the larger the effect of a wealth shock on the level of consumption.
The strength of internal habit formation determines the effect of a wealth shock on future
growth rates of consumption. The larger the strength of internal habit formation, the
larger the effect of a wealth shock on future growth rates of consumption. We also show
that the lower the deprecation rate of the habit level, the longer it takes to fully absorb
a wealth shock into current and future consumption.
51Corrado and Holly (2011) show that for the ratio model of habit formation, a geometric habit
specification is more desirable than an arithmetic habit specification. In particular, they prove that




Second, as the agent adjusts both the level and future growth rates of consumption
after a shock, the year-on-year volatility of consumption is less than the year-on-year
volatility of wealth. Thus, a risky investment portfolio does not automatically imply
a high year-on-year volatility of consumption. This finding stands in sharp contrast to
many popular portfolio and draw-down strategies (e.g., the remaining lifetime approach)
where an increase in the risk of the investment portfolio directly translates into a higher
year-on-year volatility of consumption. Furthermore, we show that the agent chooses to
reduce the fraction of wealth invested in risk-bearing assets as the end of life approaches.
Indeed, the agent has less time to absorb a wealth shock as he ages.
Third, we show that for a finitely-lived agent with a fixed lifetime, the expected
growth rate of consumption increases with the strength of internal habit formation as
well as with age.52 If the agent were to live forever, the effects of the strength of internal
habit formation and age on the expected growth rate of consumption would be absent.
Indeed, in the case of an infinite horizon, the effect of a marginal change in consumption
on future habit levels is independent of age, while in the more realistic case of a finite
horizon, the effect of a marginal change in consumption on future habit levels decreases
with age. Thus, in the finite horizon case, fostering the ability to keep catching up with
the internal habit creates an upward pressure on expected consumption growth. That is,
the agent prefers to postpone consumption because the utility gain of a marginal increase
in consumption rises with age.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is in our base model, which combines
CRRA utility with multiplicative internal habit formation, intimately related to the
coefficient of relative risk aversion: the lower the degree of relative risk aversion, the
higher the agent’s willingness to engage in intertemporal substitution. In an extension of
our model, we study the consumption and portfolio choice of an agent with preferences
that combine SDU with multiplicative internal habit formation. This extended preference
model allows us to disentangle the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the
coefficient of relative risk aversion while simultaneously maintaining the property of
multiplicative internal habit formation. As a result, the change in the median growth
52We note that in the case of an uncertain lifetime and the absence of longevity insurance, survival
probabilities create a downward pressure on expected consumption growth (see Yaari, 1965). In that
case, expected consumption growth is determined by internal habit formation as well as the shape of
the survival curve.
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rate of consumption following a change in the interest rate is no longer related to the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Applying our linearization of the budget constraint,
we are still able to derive the agent’s consumption and portfolio choice under the extended
model in closed-form. A model that combines SDU with multiplicative internal habit
formation has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been studied in existing literature.
The closest to the current chapter in this respect is Schroder and Skiadas (1999), who
analytically study SDU but do not consider multiplicative internal habit formation.
Finally, we conduct a welfare analysis in order to assess the impact of pursuing
alternative suboptimal investment and draw-down strategies on the agent’s welfare.
More specifically, we compute welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty
equivalent consumption) associated with implementing the remaining lifetime approach,
the Merton approach (Merton, 1969) and the difference model of habit formation. Our
results show that welfare losses can be large, especially when the agent exhibits a high
degree of internal habit formation. We also show that welfare losses are typically larger
for the remaining lifetime approach than for the Merton approach.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
financial market, the preferences and the maximization problem. Section 4.3 presents the
solution method used to solve the maximization problem. This solution method involves
applying a linearization to the budget constraint. Section 4.4 derives and studies the
agent’s consumption and portfolio choice. This section also conducts a welfare analysis.
Section 4.5 explores the consumption and portfolio choice of an agent with preferences
that combine SDU with multiplicative internal habit formation. Section 4.6 studies the
approximation error due to applying a linearization to the budget constraint. Finally,
Section 4.7 provides concluding remarks. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4.2. An Internal Habit Formation Model
4.2.1. The Financial Market
We consider a Black and Scholes financial market. Let T > 0 be a (possibly infinite)
terminal time. The financial market consists of a money market account and a risky
stock, which are traded continuously. The price of the money market account, i.e., Bt,
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= r dt. (4.2.1)
Here r stands for the interest rate. The risky stock price St satisfies
dSt
St
= (r + λσ) dt+ σ dWt. (4.2.2)
Here λ denotes the equity risk premium per unit of risk (i.e., Sharpe ratio), σ stands for
the diffusion parameter (i.e., stock return volatility), and Wt corresponds to a standard
Brownian motion.
It is well-known that if we exclude arbitrage opportunities in this financial market,




= −r dt− λ dWt. (4.2.3)
In the numerical computations, we use the following financial market parameter values:
the Sharpe ratio λ = 20%, the risk-free rate r = 1%, and the stock return volatility
σ = 20%. These parameter values are the same as those used by Gomes et al. (2008).
4.2.2. Preferences
The agent’s preferences are represented by the multiplicative habit specification originally
introduced by Abel (1990). More precisely, the instantaneous utility function is given
by53













Here γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ct stands for consumption at time
t, and ht denotes the habit level at time t to which the agent compares consumption ct.
In the difference model of habit formation (Constantinides, 1990), relative risk aversion
depends on (surplus) wealth. As a result, the optimal solution of the difference model
53If γ = 1, then u (ct, ht) = v (ct/ht) = log {ct/ht}.
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differs substantially from the optimal solution of the ratio model (see Section 4.4 for
further details).
Inspired by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and Corrado and Holly (2011), the log habit
level log ht satisfies the following dynamic equation:
d log ht = (β log ct − α log ht) dt, log h0 = 0. (4.2.5)
Here log h0 denotes the initial log habit level. We normalize log h0 to zero (i.e., h0 = 1).
We thus measure initial retirement wealth, consumption and the habit level in terms of
h0.
54 The preference parameter α ≥ 0 represents the rate at which the log habit level
depreciates. If α is small, then the log habit level exhibits a low degree of depreciation
(or, equivalently, a high degree of persistence). The preference parameter β ≥ 0 indexes
the extent to which the current log habit level responds to current log consumption. If
β is large, then current log consumption has a large impact on the log habit level. We
impose the following restriction on the agent’s preference parameters:
α ≥ β. (4.2.6)
The parameter restriction (4.2.6) prevents the habit level from growing exponentially
over time.





β exp {−α(s− u)} log cu du
}
× exp {exp {−α(s− t)} log ht} . (4.2.7)
Equation (4.2.7) shows that we can factor the habit level hs into two components:
one dependent upon the agent’s consumption choices between time t and time s (i.e.,
54The utility function is not invariant to the unit of measurement. The agent should thus change the
values of the preference parameters if the unit of measurement changes.
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the stochastic component) and the other not (i.e., the deterministic component). The
preference parameter β indexes the importance of the stochastic component relative
to the deterministic component (given α). The stochastic component becomes less
important as β decreases. Indeed, if β equals zero, then
exp {β exp {−α(s− u)} log cu} = 1. (4.2.8)
The stochastic component is an exponentially weighted product (and not an exponentially
weighted sum) of the agent’s consumption choices between time t and time s. The
habit level thus depends more on consumption in the recent past than it depends on
consumption in the distant past.
Corrado and Holly (2011) demonstrate that for the ratio model of habit formation,
a specification in which the habit level is geometric in consumption is more desirable
than a specification in which the habit level is arithmetic in consumption. In particular,
they prove that under the geometric habit specification, overall utility decreases as the
endogeneity parameter β increases, provided that consumption is larger than unity.56
This property does not hold true in the arithmetic habit specification. Futhermore, the
assumption of a geometric habit specification makes the agent’s maximization problem
analytically tractable.
4.2.3. Maximization Problem
This section formulates the agent’s maximization problem. Denote by At the agent’s
retirement wealth at time t, and by πt the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock
at time t. Wealth evolves according to
dAt = (r + πtλσ)At dt− ct dt+ πtσAt dWt, A0 ≥ 0 given. (4.2.9)
Equation (4.2.9) is referred to as the agent’s dynamic budget equation. This equation
shows that the agent’s retirement wealth equals the agent’s initial retirement wealth,
plus any gains from trading, minus cumulative consumption.
56Consumption is typically larger than unity because with internal habit formation, the agent has a
tendency to postpone consumption (i.e., consumption tends to exhibit a positive expected growth
rate); see Section 4.4.
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over the set of all admissible consumption and portfolio strategies subject the agent’s
dynamic budget constraint (4.2.9) and the habit formation process (4.2.5).57 Here E [·]
corresponds to the (unconditional) expectation operator, δu stands for the subjective rate
of time preference at time u, and v (ct/ht) represents the agent’s instantaneous utility
function (see equation (4.2.4)).58
We can, by virtue of the martingale approach (Pliska, 1986; Karatzas et al., 1987; Cox





















≤ A0, d log ht = (β log ct − α log ht) dt.
(4.2.11)
The optimal portfolio choice π∗t is determined in such a way that it finances the optimal
consumption choice c∗t .


























57For the definition of admissible consumption and portfolio strategies, see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve
(1998).
58Alternatively, we can view δu as the sum of the subjective rate of time preference at time u and the
force of mortality at time u. More specifically, in the case of deterministic mortality risk, expected


























































Here ρu represents the subjective rate of time preference at time u, D is the stochastic date of death,
tpx denotes the probability that an agent aged x at time 0 will survive to time x+ t, and µx+u is the
deterministic force of mortality at age x+ u.
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Here y ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier. The left-hand side of equation (4.2.12)
represents marginal utility, whereas the right-hand side denotes marginal cost. We can
decompose marginal utility into two components: the first representing the effect of an
increase in consumption on current instantaneous utility, and the second representing the
effect of an increase in consumption on future instantaneous utilities. We cannot obtain
the optimal consumption choice c∗t in closed-form due to the presence of the conditional
expectation operator Et [·] in the second component. The next section presents an
approximate problem to problem (4.2.11) that can be solved analytically.
4.3. The Solution Method
4.3.1. Applying a Change of Variable
By applying a change of variable, we can transform the agent’s maximization problem
(4.2.11) into an equivalent dual problem. Denote by ĉt the ratio between the agent’s





We refer to ĉt as the agent’s dual consumption choice. We can express the dynamics of
the log habit level in terms of the agent’s log dual consumption choice log ĉt (substitute
log ct = log ht + log ĉt into equation (4.2.5)):
d log ht = (β [log ht + log ĉt]− α log ht) dt
= (β log ĉt − [α− β] log ht) dt.
(4.3.2)
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β exp {−(α− β)(s− u)} log ĉu du
}
× exp {exp {−(α− β)(s− t)} log ht} .
(4.3.3)
Equation (4.3.3) shows that due to the parameter restriction (4.2.6), the habit level does







Equation (4.3.4) follows from substituting ct ≡ htĉt into the original static budget















≤ A0, d log ht = (β log ĉt − [α− β] log ht) dt.
(4.3.5)
We can obtain the optimal consumption choice c∗t from the optimal dual consumption






Here h∗t is the optimal habit level at time t implied by substituting the agent’s optimal
past dual consumption choices c∗u (u ≤ t) into equation (4.3.3).
To solve the agent’s maximization problem (4.2.11), we can thus restrict ourselves
to finding a solution to problem (4.3.5). The agent’s optimal consumption choice c∗t
then follows from applying equation (4.3.6). We can however still not solve the agent’s
maximization problem (4.2.11) analytically because the dual static budget constraint










(4.3.4) depends on the agent’s dual consumption choice in a nonlinear way. Indeed,
substitution of ht into equation (4.3.4) shows that the dual static budget constraint
depends on the agent’s dual consumption choice ĉt nonlinearly. The next section develops
a linearization to the agent’s dual static budget constraint (4.3.4). After applying this
linearization, we can obtain the agent’s dual consumption choice in closed-form.
4.3.2. Linearizing the Budget Constraint
This section linearizes the left-hand side of the agent’s dual budget constraint (4.3.4)
around the consumption trajectory ĉ = c/h = 1. We expect (and verify in Section
4.6) that the approximation error is accurate when the agent’s consumption choice ct
stays close to the habit level ht, and when the endogeneity parameter β is small or the
depreciation parameter α is large. Indeed, if the habit level is completely exogenous
(i.e., β = 0 or α = ∞), the solution to problem (4.3.5) coincides with the solution to
problem (4.2.11) (see also equation (4.2.12), which shows that we can solve the first-order
optimality condition analytically if β = 0 or α =∞). We expect the approximation to be
less accurate when the agent’s consumption choice ct deviates much from the habit level
ht. Section 4.6 examines the approximation error induced by applying a linearization to
the agent’s dual budget constraint.
By applying a first-order Taylor series approximation, we can write the left-hand side




























Here M̂t ≡Mt (1 + βPt) denotes the adjusted pricing kernel, and Pt stands for the price















60We can also view Pt as the amount of wealth needed to finance the consumption stream log cs/ log ht
if cs = hs for every s ≥ t.
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4.3.3. The Approximate Problem
This section presents an approximate problem to problem (4.3.5) based on linearizing


















Here Â0 denotes the adjusted initial wealth. We can obtain the agent’s maximization
problem (4.3.9) from (4.3.5) as follows. First, we replace the left-hand side of the static








from the new static dual budget constraint. We are allowed to do this because the
constant term (4.3.10) does not play a role in determining the first-order optimality
condition. Finally, we redefine the agent’s initial wealth A0 in such a way that the
optimal solution ĉ ?t is budget-feasible. That is, we determine the initial level of the












Here h ?t is the agent’s habit level at time t implied by substituting the agent’s optimal
past dual consumption choices ĉ ?u (u ≤ t) into (4.3.3). Straightforward computations
show that the agent’s adjusted initial wealth Â0 is given by
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Equation (4.3.12) shows that the agent’s adjusted initial wealth Â0 equals the agent’s
initial wealth A0 plus the approximation error evaluated at the optimal solution. We can
only compute the value of Â0 after problem (4.3.9) has been optimized.
4.4. Dynamic Consumption and Portfolio Choice
4.4.1. Consumption Choice
Theorem 4 below presents the optimal solution to the agent’s maximization problem
(4.3.9).
Theorem 4. Consider an agent with the utility function (4.2.4) and habit formation
process (4.2.5) who solves the consumption and portfolio choice problem (4.3.9). Denote
by h?t the habit level implied by substituting the agent’s optimal past dual consumption
choices ĉ ?u ≡ c?u/h?u (u ≤ t) into equation (4.3.3), and by y the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the static budget constraint in (4.3.9). Then the optimal consumption











The Lagrange multiplier y ≥ 0 is determined in such a way that the agent’s original
budget constraint holds with equality.
4.4.1.1. Infinite Terminal Time
This section analyzes the agent’s consumption choice for the case where the terminal
time T equals infinity. This assumption does not necessarily imply that the agent lives
forever. Indeed, if we also take into account mortality risk (see footnote 58), then T
stands for the maximum age the agent can possibly reach. The Appendix shows that we
can write the agent’s consumption choice c?t (see (4.4.1) where c
?
t is expressed in terms
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The parameter qu is defined as follows:
qu ≡ 1 +
β
α− β
(1− exp {−(α− β)u})
= q0 + (q∞ − q0) (1− exp {−ηu}) .
(4.4.3)
Here
q0 = 1, (4.4.4)




η ≡ α− β. (4.4.6)
We can view
q̄u ≡ qu/γ (4.4.7)
as the exposure of future log consumption log c?t+u to a current financial shock λ dWt. We
make the following observations. First, the risk exposure q̄u increases with the horizon
u: a current financial shock has a larger impact on log consumption in the distant
future than it has on log consumption in the near future. This implies that consumption
responds gradually to financial shocks. It provides a utility-based foundation for the
existence of smoothing mechanisms in drawing-down accumulated wealth by dampening
the change in consumption due to financial shocks. Second, the risk exposure of current
log consumption log c?t to a current financial shock λ dWt, i.e., q̄0, decreases with the
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. Hence the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ
determines the effect of a current financial shock on the level of log consumption (i.e.,
current log consumption). Third, β/(α − β) determines the effect of a current financial
shock on future growth rates of consumption. If the endogeneity parameter β is large or
the depreciation parameter η is small, then a current financial shock has a large effect
on future growth rates of consumption (see also equation (4.3.3)). Fourth, we can view
η = α − β as the rate at which q̄u converges to q̄∞. If η is small (i.e., the habit level
depreciates at a slow pace), then it takes a long time to fully absorb a financial shock
into current and future consumption. Finally, the Merton consumption strategy (see
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Merton, 1969) emerges as a special case when q̄u = 1/γ for all u. The risk exposure of
an agent with CRRA utility is always smaller than the risk exposure of an agent with
utility function (4.2.4), given γ. Figure 4.1 shows q̄u (expressed relative to σ = 20%) as a
function of the horizon u for various sets of parameter values. We choose the parameter
values such that the average risk exposure matches the risk exposure of a CRRA agent.
Figure 4.1.
Illustration of the risk exposure of future log consumption to a current financial shock







Merton (RRA = 5)















α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20
α = 0.80, β = 0.76, γ = 20
α = 0.5, β = 0.3, γ = 5
α = 0.66, β = 0.54, γ = 5
The figure illustrates the risk exposure q̄u (i.e., the risk exposure of future log consumption
log c?t+u to a current financial shock λ dWt) as a function of the horizon u for various sets of
parameter values. The figure also shows the Merton risk exposure for RRA = 2 and RRA =
5. Here RRA stands for relative risk aversion.
Equation (4.4.7) demonstrates that the parameters q̄0 (i.e., the exposure of current log
consumption to a current shock), q̄∞ (i.e., the exposure of long-term log consumption
to a current financial shock), and η (i.e., the time it takes to absorb a financial shock)
fully characterize the risk exposure q̄u. We can uniquely identify the agent’s original
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The Appendix shows that log consumption log c?t evolves according to














































The left-hand side of equation (4.4.11) consists of three terms. The first two terms
represent the median (or expected) growth rate of log consumption. The term logF dtt
represents past financial shocks that are reflected into the current median growth rate of
log consumption. This term disappears if β = 0 or q̄u = 1/γ for all u. The second term
represents the desired growth rate of consumption. The median value of log consumption
stays constant over time if β = 0, δu = δ and r = δ − 12λ
2 for all u. Finally, the last
term corresponds to current financial shocks that are absorbed into the level of log
consumption. The (annualized) volatility of d log c?t equals q0/γ · λ.
Figure 4.2 shows the median growth rate of consumption as a function of age for
various sets of parameter values. The black dashed line corresponds the case where
δu = r +
1
2
λ2 = 3% for all u. In that case, the median growth rate of consumption is
zero (i.e., median consumption stays constant over time). The other lines illustrate the
median growth rate of consumption if δ changes at the age of retirement (65 years) from
3% to 2%. The parameter δ can change because of a (discretionary) change in the force
of mortality (see also footnote 58). We observe that the agent reallocates consumption
from the short-run to the long-run. Indeed, the agent expects to live longer so that he
postpones consumption and saves more for the future. The effect of a decrease in δ on
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the median growth rate of consumption is more pronounced for large values of β and
small values of γ. Hence, if β is large or γ is small, then the agent is more willing to
substitute consumption over time. Section 4.5 considers a utility specification in which
the coefficient of relative risk aversion does not affect the agent’s willingness to substitute
consumption over time.
Figure 4.2.
Illustration of the median growth rate of consumption (T =∞)








































γ = 2, β = 0
γ = 2, β = 0.20
γ = 2, β = 0.40
γ = 5, β = 0.20
γ = 5, β = 0.40
The figure illustrates the median growth rate of consumption as a function of age for various
sets of parameter values. The depreciation parameter α is set equal to 0.6, the subjective rate
of time preference δ to 0.02, and the Lagrange multiplier y to unity. The black dashed line
represents the median growth of consumption in the case of δ = r + 12λ
2 = 0.03.
4.4.1.2. Finite Terminal Time
This section analyzes the agent’s consumption choice for the case where the terminal
time T is finite (i.e., T < ∞). The Appendix shows that we can write the agent’s
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Here




We can obtain equation (4.4.13) from equation (4.4.2) by replacing the interest rate r
with the adjusted interest rate r̂u. The Appendix proofs the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let the adjusted interest rate r̂u be defined by equation (4.4.14). Then:
1. The adjusted interest rate r̂u increases as the endogeneity parameter β increases,
given η = α− β.
2. The adjusted interest rate r̂u decreases as the terminal time T increases. In particular,
r̂u → r if T →∞.
Current consumption has a large impact on future habit levels if β is large. Furthermore,
the utility gain of an infinitesimal increase in consumption is smaller when the agent is
(relatively) young (i.e., small t) than when the agent is (relatively) old (i.e., large t).
These two facts together explain why the median consumption choice tends to go up
with age if the endogeneity parameter β is large. Indeed, as already pointed out by
Deaton (1992), the agent derives utility not only from consumption levels but also from
consumption growth. If T equals infinity, the utility gain of an infinitesimal increase
in consumption is age-independent. Hence, the agent does no longer have a desire to
postpone consumption. In our model, four factors thus affect the median consumption
choice (see also equation (4.4.13)): the financial market (i.e., r, λ and σ), the subjective
rate of time preference, the survival curve, and the strength of internal habit formation.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the median growth rate of consumption for various values of the
endogeneity parameter β.
4.4.2. Portfolio Choice
This section analyzes the agent’s portfolio choice π?t . The Appendix shows that the
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Figure 4.3.
Illustration of median growth rate of consumption (T <∞)








































The figure illustrates the median growth rate of consumption as a function of age for various
values of the endogeneity parameter β. The parameter η ≡ α − β is set equal to 0.2, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ to 5, the subjective rate of time preference δ to 0.01, the
terminal time T to 20, and the Lagrange multiplier y to unity.











V ut du and V
u
t denotes the (market) value at time t of c
?
t+u:
V ut ≡ c?tF ut Cut . (4.4.17)
Equation (4.4.17) shows that the market value of future consumption, i.e., V ut /c
?
t , consists
of two factors. The first factor, i.e., F ut , represents past financial shocks that are absorbed
into future growth rates of consumption. This factor equals unity if the agent directly
adjusts consumption after unexpected financial shocks (i.e., q̄u = 1/γ for all u). The
horizon-dependent annuity factor Cut summarizes the impacts of desired consumption
streams and future rates of return on the market value of future consumption. The
Appendix provides an explicit analytical expression for the horizon-dependent annuity
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factor Cut (see equation (4.8.3) in the Appendix).
Table 4.1 shows the median portfolio choice as a function of age for various sets of
parameter values. The agent implements a life cycle investment strategy (that is, the
fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock decreases on average as the agent ages),
even without taking human capital into account. Indeed, the agent has less time to
absorb a wealth shock as he grows older.
Table 4.1.
The agent’s median portfolio choice
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) Merton (RRA = 2) Merton (RRA = 5)
65 0.20 0.27 0.41 0.65 0.50 0.20
70 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.64 0.50 0.20
75 0.15 0.19 0.36 0.56 0.50 0.20
80 0.10 0.12 0.29 0.40 0.50 0.20
85 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.20
The table reports the agent’s median portfolio choice (i.e., the median fraction of assets invested
in the risky stock) as a function of age for various sets of parameter values. The table also
reports the Merton portfolio strategy. (1) corresponds to α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20; (2) to
α = 0.80, β = 0.76, γ = 20; (3) to α = 0.5, β = 0.3, γ = 5; and (4) to α = 0.66, β = 0.54,
γ = 5.
Table 4.2 shows the (annualized) volatility of the relative change in consumption and the
(annualized) volatility of the relative change in wealth. With internal habit formation,
the volatility of the relative change is consumption is smaller than the volatility of the
relative change in wealth. Hence the agent can take substantial stock market risk without
affecting the year-on-year volatility of consumption. Indeed, the degree of internal habit
formation largely determines the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock, while
the coefficient of relative risk aversion largely determines the year-on-year fluctuations
in consumption.
4.4.3. Welfare Analysis
This section conducts a welfare analysis. More specifically, we compare a number of
alternative popular draw-down and investment strategies to the draw-down and investment
strategy implied by the agent’s maximization problem (4.3.9). The welfare loss associated
with implementing an alternative draw-down and investment strategy is computed relative
to the agent’s optimal draw-down and investment strategy. More precisely, the performance
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Table 4.2.
Volatility of the change in consumption and the volatility of the change in wealth
Age (1) (2) Merton (RRA = 2) Merton (RRA = 5)
σc σA σc σA σc σA σc σA
65 1.00 3.95 4.00 12.99 10.00 10.00 4.00 4.00
70 1.00 3.56 4.00 12.81 10.00 10.00 4.00 4.00
75 1.00 2.92 4.00 11.12 10.00 10.00 4.00 4.00
80 1.00 1.99 4.00 7.90 10.00 10.00 4.00 4.00
85 1.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 10.00 10.00 4.00 4.00
The table reports the volatility of the change in consumption σc and the volatility of the
change in wealth σA as a function of age for various sets of parameter values. (1) corresponds
to α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20; and (2) to α = 0.66, β = 0.54, γ = 5. The numbers represent a
percentage.
of an alternative strategy is evaluated by measuring the relative decline in certainty
equivalent consumption. We define the certainty equivalent of an uncertain consumption
strategy to be the constant, certain consumption level that yields indifference to the
uncertain consumption strategy. Certainty equivalents are computed using the lifetime
utility function (4.2.10). Due to the presence of internal habit formation, the computation
of certainty equivalents is non-standard; see also Chapter 2. In the welfare analysis, we
consider the following alternative draw-down and investment strategies:
• The remaining lifetime approach (i.e., the 1/T -rule): the proportion of wealth







Here T−t denotes the agent’s remaining lifetime which is assumed to be non-random.
We assume that the agent invests a fixed percentage (0, 20, 40, 60 or 80 percent)
of wealth into the risky stock. Equation (4.4.18) shows that consumption responds
directly to a financial shock.
• The Merton approach: the proportion of wealth withdrawn from the agent’s retirement





exp {(x1 − x2)(T − t)} − 1
, (4.4.19)
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We assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 2, 5 or 20. Like the
remaining lifetime approach, consumption is directly adjusted after a wealth shock.












subject to the dynamic budget constraint (4.2.9) and the habit formation process
dht = (βct − αht) dt.
The consumption strategy is given by








Here y is a Lagrange multiplier. Consumption (4.4.22) responds gradually to a
financial shock. The investment strategy follows from replicating the consumption
strategy (4.4.22). Unlike the investment strategy implied by the ratio model (see
equation (4.4.15)), the investment strategy implied by the difference model depends
on the habit level. Indeed, if the habit level approaches consumption, the agent
reduces the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock.
Table 4.3 reports welfare losses associated with implementing the remaining lifetime
approach. The welfare losses are relatively large if the agent exhibits a significant degree
of internal habit formation; see the first two rows of Table 4.3. Table 4.4 reports the
welfare losses due to implementing the Merton strategy. The welfare losses are smaller
compared to the remaining lifetime approach. Indeed, the Merton strategy emerges
as a special case of our model when β = 0. However, welfare losses associated with
implementing the Merton strategy may still be significant when the strength of internal
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habit formation is large. Finally, Table 4.5 reports the welfare losses due to implementing
the difference model of habit formation. Again, the welfare loss increases as the strength
of internal habit formation (i.e., β) increases. Also, the welfare losses are larger compared
to the Merton approach.
Table 4.3.
Welfare losses due to implementing the remaining lifetime approach
Optimal Strategy
Fraction of Assets Invested in the Risky Stock
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20 35.16 34.07 36.97 42.76 50.37
α = 0.80, β = 0.76, γ = 20 42.93 42.35 43.84 46.97 51.45
α = 0.50, β = 0.30, γ = 5 7.45 2.90 2.79 7.11 15.44
α = 0.66, β = 0.54, γ = 5 8.85 3.16 1.71 4.79 11.87
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing the remaining lifetime approach. The table reports the
welfare losses for various values of the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock. The
numbers represent a percentage. We assume that δu = δ = 3% for all u and T = 20.
Table 4.4.
Welfare losses due to implementing the Merton approach
Optimal Strategy
Relative Risk Aversion Coefficient
2 5 20
α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20 23.85 5.19 2.44
α = 0.80, β = 0.76, γ = 20 29.55 13.13 8.50
α = 0.50, β = 0.30, γ = 5 2.95 0.63 3.93
α = 0.66, β = 0.54, γ = 5 2.85 1.86 5.31
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to the consumption and portfolio strategy of an agent with CRRA utility
(i.e., the Merton strategy). The table reports the welfare losses for various values of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ underlying the Merton strategy. The numbers represent a
percentage. We assume that δu = δ = 3% for all u and T = 20.
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Table 4.5.
Welfare losses due to implementing the difference model of habit formation
Optimal Strategy Welfare Loss
α = 0.64, β = 0.56, γ = 20 5.63
α = 0.80, β = 0.76, γ = 20 9.10
α = 0.50, β = 0.30, γ = 5 4.33
α = 0.66, β = 0.54, γ = 5 4.31
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) due to implementing the difference model of habit formation. The numbers
represent a percentage. We assume that δu = δ = 3% for all u and T = 20.
4.5. Stochastic Differential Utility
4.5.1. Preferences and Maximization Problem
This section considers consumption and portfolio choice of an agent with preferences
that combine SDU with multiplicative internal habit formation. We specify the agent’s
utility process {Vt}t∈[0,T ] in terms of the intertemporal aggregator f . More specifically,













As in the previous sections, the log habit level log ht evolves according to equation (4.2.5).


















Here ζ > −1 and ϕ < min {1, 1/ (1 + ζ)} are preference parameters. Equation (4.5.2)
is usually referred to as the Kreps-Porteus aggregator. If ζ = 0 and the habit level ht










cϕt − δVt. (4.5.3)
61If ζ = 0, then f (ct/ht, Vt, t) = (1 + ζVt) [log {ct/ht} − (δ/ζ) log {1 + ζVt}].
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equation (4.5.2) subject to the habit formation process (4.2.5) and the dynamic budget
constraint (4.2.9).
We can transform this dynamic consumption and portfolio choice problem into an
equivalent static consumption and portfolio choice problem (similar to what we did in
Section 4.2.3). After transforming this static problem into a dual problem and applying
a linearization to the static dual budget constraint (which takes the same form as in our
















The next section presents the optimal solution to problem (4.5.5).
4.5.2. Dynamic Consumption and Portfolio Choice
The agent’s maximization problem (4.5.5) obtained in the dual model upon linearizing
the dual budget constraint can be solved by invoking the approach of Schroder and
Skiadas (1999). The next theorem presents the optimal consumption choice.
Theorem 6. Consider an agent with utility process (4.5.1), intertemporal aggregator
(4.5.2) and habit formation process (4.2.5) who solves the consumption and portfolio
choice problem (4.5.5). Let h?t be the agent’s habit level implied by substituting the agent’s
optimal past dual consumption choices ĉ ?u ≡ c?u/h?u (u ≤ t) into equation (4.3.3) and let
y be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint in (4.5.5). Then
the agent’s optimal consumption choice c ?t is given by















































































The optimal portfolio choice π?t is the same as in Section 4.4.2. Equation (4.5.7) shows
that with SDU, the parameter ψ determines the willingness to substitute consumption
over time. Relative risk aversion is thus decoupled from the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Figure 4.4 shows the median growth rate of consumption as a function of
age for various values of ψ and δ. We observe that the change in the median growth rate
of consumption following a (permanent) change in the subjective rate of time preference
δ at the age of retirement (65 years) is small if ψ is small in absolute terms.
4.6. The Accuracy of the Approximation Method
The consumption and portfolio strategies presented in Section 4.4 are exact only in the
case of β = 0 and/or α =∞. In all other cases the consumption and portfolio strategies
are approximate based upon linearizing the left-hand side of the agent’s dual budget
constraint (4.3.4) around the consumption trajectory c/h = 1. This section analyzes the
approximation error due to applying a linearization to the dual budget constraint.62
We determine the optimal consumption choice c∗t by using the method of backward
induction. That is, first, we determine the optimal consumption choice at the terminal
time T . Then, the optimal consumption choice at time T − 1 is determined taking the
62The Appendix linearizes the left-hand side of the dual budget constraint (4.3.4) in a multi-period,
discrete-time setting.
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Figure 4.4.
Illustration of median growth rate of consumption (SDU utility)




































δ = 0.03, ψ = 0.05
δ = 0.02, ψ = 0.05
δ = 0.03, ψ = 0.15
δ = 0.02, ψ = 0.15
δ = 0.03, ψ = 0.2
δ = 0.02, ψ = 0.2
The figure illustrates the median growth rate of consumption as a function of age for various
values of ψ and δ. The endogeneity parameter β is set equal to 0.4, the depreciation parameter
α to 0.6, the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ to 5, the terminal time T to infinity, and
the Lagrange multiplier y to unity. The black solid line corresponds to the case where median
consumption growth is zero.
optimal consumption choice at time T as given. We continue this process backwards in
time until all optimal consumption choices have been determined. The terminal time T is
set equal to three (we also consider the case where the terminal time T equals four), the
time interval ∆t equals unity and the underlying uncertainty is described by a binomial
tree.63 The computation of the optimal consumption choice c∗t rapidly becomes infeasible
as the number of time steps increases.
We evaluate the performance of the (sub-optimal) consumption choice c?t by measuring
the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption (see Section 4.4.3 for the definition
of certainty equivalent consumption).64 Tables 4.6 – 4.9 report our results. The first three
tables show the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
63By considering a binomial tree, we can exactly compute the conditional expectations involved in the
optimization technique.




e−αt dt ≤ 1. If T is large, then
∫ T
0
e−αt dt ≈ 1α . Hence we can always compute (for any T ) the
certainty equivalent consumption choice c̄ if βα ≤ 1.
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consumption) for the case where the terminal time equals three. We find that the
approximation error is an increasing function of β, and an decreasing function of α
and γ. Indeed, if α is large and/or β is small, the impact of an increase in consumption
on future habit levels is limited. Also, if γ is large, consumption stays close to the habit
level. In all cases, the approximation error is smaller than 1%. Table 4.9 reports the
approximation error for case where the terminal time T equals four. The approximation
error is still very small.
Table 4.6.
Welfare losses (γ = 2 and T = 3)
β
α 0 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.6
0 0 – – – –
0.15 0 0.0229 – – –
0.2 0 0.0178 0.0516 – –
0.3 0 0.0149 0.03053 0.1263 –
0.6 0 0.0153 0.0293 0.0689 0.6840
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) associated with implementing the consumption choice c?t . The numbers represent
a percentage. We only report welfare losses for the case α ≥ β. The terminal time T is set
equal to 3, initial wealth to 3, and the subjective rate of time preference δ to 3%.
Table 4.7.
Welfare losses (γ = 5 and T = 3)
β
α 0 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.6
0 0 – – – –
0.15 0 0.0078 – – –
0.2 0 0.0012 0.0101 – –
0.3 0 0.0164 0.0021 0.0197 –
0.6 0 0.0017 0.0285 0.0096 0.0479
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) associated with implementing the consumption choice c?t . The numbers represent
a percentage. We only report welfare losses for the case α ≥ β. The terminal time T is set




Welfare losses (γ = 20 and T = 3)
β
α 0 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.6
0 0 – – – –
0.15 0 0.0000 – – –
0.2 0 0.0002 0.0003 – –
0.3 0 0.0019 0.0008 0.0024 –
0.6 0 0.0000 0.0008 0.0012 0.0017
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) associated with implementing the consumption choice c?t . The numbers represent
a percentage. We only report welfare losses for the case α ≥ β. The terminal time T is set
equal to 3, initial wealth to 3, and the subjective rate of time preference δ to 3%.
Table 4.9.
Welfare losses (γ = 2 and T = 4)
β
α 0 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.6
0 0 – – – –
0.15 0 0.0486 – – –
0.2 0 0.0561 0.0989 – –
0.3 0 0.0777 0.1025 0.2309 –
0.6 0 0.3997 0.2779 0.2081 1.3957
The table reports the welfare losses (in terms of the relative decline in certainty equivalent
consumption) associated with implementing the consumption choice c?t . The numbers represent
a percentage. We only report welfare losses for the case α ≥ β. The terminal time T is set
equal to 4, initial wealth to 4, and the subjective rate of time preference δ to 3%.
4.7. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have built a rich consumption-portfolio choice model with preferences
that combine both multiplicative internal habit formation and stochastic differential
utility. To solve our preference model, we have developed an approximation method
based upon linearizing the agent’s (dual) budget constraint. For reasonable values of the
preference parameters, the approximation error induced by our method is very small. We
have shown that after a wealth shock, the agent optimally chooses to adjust both the level
and future growth rates of consumption, giving rise to gradual response of consumption
to financial shocks. Furthermore, expected consumption tends to grow with age, and
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relative risk aversion does not affect the willingness to substitute consumption over time.





This appendix linearizes the left-hand side of the agent’s dual static budget constraint
(4.3.4) around the consumption trajectory ĉ = c/h = 1. The partial derivative of hs with





= β exp {−(α− β)(s− t)} hs
ĉt
. (4.8.1)
Equation (4.8.1) follows from differentiating (4.3.3) with respect to ĉt dt. The partial







= β exp {−(α− β)(s− t)} .
Define the function f (ĉ ) as follows:



















= Mt + βEt
[∫ T
t
Ms exp {−(α− β)(s− t)} ds
]
= Mt (1 + βPt) .
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We can, by virtue of Taylor series expansion, approximate the dual budget constraint
f (ĉ ) by
f (ĉ ) ≈ f(1) + E
[∫ T
0
Mt (1 + βPt) (ĉt − 1) dt
]
.
Proof of Theorem 4






















0 δu duv (ĉt)− yM̂tĉt
]
dt+ yÂ0.
Here y ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the static budget constraint.
The agent aims to maximize e−
∫ t
0 δu duv (ĉt) − yM̂tĉt. The optimal dual consumption
choice ĉt satisfies the following first-order optimality condition:
e−
∫ t
0 δu duĉ−γt = yM̂t.




















A standard verification (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, p. 103) stating that the
optimal solution to the Lagrangian equals the optimal solution to the dual problem
completes the proof.
Derivation of (4.4.2), (4.4.11) and (4.4.13)
This appendix explicitly writes the agent’s consumption choice c?t in terms of past
financial shocks. We can write the adjusted pricing kernel M̂t ≡Mt (1 + βPt) as follows
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(this follows from applying Itô’s Lemma to M̂t = f (Mt, Pt) = Mt (1 + βPt)):


















































Here ȳ ≡ −
(
log y + log M̂0
)
.













































































































































Equation (4.4.2) follows from equation (4.4.13) and Theorem 5.
Dividing log c?t+∆t by log c
?
t and taking the limit ∆t⇒ 0 yields equation (4.4.11).
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Proof of Theorem 5
We first proof that the (partial) derivate of r̂u with respect to β is positive given η = α−β.
Substituting α = η + β into equation (4.4.14) yields
r̂u = β +
r − (η + β)βPu
1 + βPu
.








−ηPu − 2βPu − ηβP 2u − 2 (βPu)
2 − rPu + ηβP 2u + (βPs)
2
1 + 2βPu + (βPu)
2
= 1 +
−ηPu − 2βPu − (βPu)
2 − rPu





≥ 0⇔ −ηPu − 2βPu − (βPu)
2 − rPu
1 + 2βPu + (βPu)
2 ≥ −1
⇔ ηPu + 2βPu + (βPu)
2 + rPu ≤ 1 + 2βPu + (βPu)
2
⇔ (r + η)Pu ≤ 1⇔ 1− exp {−(r + η)(T − u)} ≤ 1.
This last inequality is obviously true. Hence ∂r̂u/∂β is positive (given η).
Finally, we proof that the (partial) derivate of r̂u with respect to T is negative. The
derivate of r̂u with respect to T is given by
∂r̂u
∂T
= −r (1 + βPu)
−2 ∂Pu
∂T




Using the fact that ∂Pu/∂T is positive, we find that ∂r̂u/∂T is negative. Furthermore,
simple algebra yields that r̂u = r if T =∞ (here we use the fact that Pu ⇒ 1/(r+α−β)
as T ⇒∞).
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Derivation of (4.4.15)
Straightforward computations show that





























































































Setting equation (4.8.5) equal to equation (4.8.4) and solving for πt yields (4.4.15).
Proof of Theorem 6
Schroder and Skiadas (1999) derive the optimal dual consumption choice ĉ ?t . The optimal
consumption choice c ?t follows from equation (4.3.6).
4.8.2. Multi-Period Discrete-Time Model
This section linearizes the left-hand side of the agent’s dual budget constraint (4.3.4) in
a multi-period, discrete-time setting. Let us denote by ∆t the time step (the magnitude
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Let us define the following function:

















By Taylor series expansion,
































































Personal Pension Plans with Risk
Pooling: Investment Approach
versus Consumption Approach65
Personal pension plans with risk pooling (PPRs) promise to play a new role in the
provision of retirement income. These plans unbundle the main functions of variable
annuities. In particular, a PPR individualizes the savings, investment and withdrawal
functions of variable annuities, and organizes the insurance function collectively. A
policyholder can adopt an investment approach or a consumption approach to a PPR.
This chapter explores these two approaches in detail. We show that in the investment
approach, a policyholder can freely adjust the investment policy without affecting the
intertemporal allocation of the market value of the consumption stream. This is not
the case for the consumption approach. We also explore the collective versions of the
investment approach and the consumption approach.
5.1. Introduction
Private pension provision is in transition, moving from defined benefit (DB) pension
plans towards defined contribution (DC) pension plans (Investment Company Institute,
2014). The global financial crisis and its aftermath have accelerated this trend. The
move towards DC pension plans, however, may be problematic as these pension plans
primarily focus on wealth accumulation rather than providing stable lifelong income
streams. Indeed, according to The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (2013),
“there is an urgent need to find a better balance between the individual orientation of
65This chapter is co-authored with Lans Bovenberg.
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a DC plan and a collective (or pooled) approach where there is some sharing of risks
within and between generations.”
The pension plans being proposed by Bovenberg and Nijman (2015) promise to play
a new role in the provision of retirement income. These pension plans, which are called
personal pension plans with risk pooling (PPRs), unbundle the main functions of variable
annuities. In particular, a PPR individualizes the savings, investment and withdrawal
functions of variable annuities66 and arranges the insurance function (i.e., pooling of
idiosyncratic longevity risk) collectively. By pooling idiosyncratic longevity risk and
taking systematic risks on behalf of the policyholders, pension funds can provide lifelong
income streams during retirement at relatively low costs.67 A policyholder can adopt an
investment approach or a consumption approach to a PPR. This chapter examines these
two approaches in detail.
In the investment approach, the policyholder exogenously specifies the contribution
level, the investment policy and the assumed interest rate. The annuity units (i.e., the
lifelong consumption streams in retirement) are derived endogenously. We show that in
this approach, the policyholder can freely adjust the investment policy without affecting
the intertemporal allocation of the market value of the consumption stream. This
property facilitates pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk. Indeed, a myopic policyholder
cannot reallocate market value from the long-run to the short-run by changing the
investment policy.
In the consumption approach, the policyholder exogenously specifies the volatility of
annuity units, the expected growth rate of annuity units and the initial annuity units.
The contribution level, the investment policy and the assumed interest rate are derived
endogenously. Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008, 2013) find that people
value annuities more when framed in terms of consumption than when framed in terms
of investment. In the consumption approach, policyholders can reallocate value from
the long-run to the short-run by raising the volatility of annuity units. Hence, myopic
policyholders face an incentive to raise the risk of annuity units to consume more today.
66Individualization of these functions is possible without any welfare losses. Indeed, pooling of systematic
risks does not generate any welfare gain. In fact, individualization of these functions may even lead
to an improvement in welfare because these functions can now be tailored to the specific needs of the
policyholders (see Mehlkopf, Boelaars, Bovenberg, and van Bilsen, 2015).
67We can view a PPR as a middle ground between a DB and a DC pension plan. It aims to provide
a stable lifelong income stream during retirement (as in DB pension plans), while property rights are
defined in terms of a personal investment account (as in DC pension plans).
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We also examine a collective defined contribution (CDC) pension system (which is the
collective analogue of the investment approach) and a collective defined ambition (CDA)
pension system (which is the collective analogue of the consumption approach). These
pension plans allow policyholders to share non-traded risk factors. However, collective
pension systems have several disadvantages. In particular, they allow for less tailor-made
solutions, require the valuation of annuity units, and may well lead to intergenerational
conflicts about the (unobservable) parameters.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
underlying assumptions. Section 5.3 formalizes the investment approach and Section 5.4
the consumption approach. Section 5.5 explores a CDC pension system and Section 5.6




The financial market consists of a money market account and a risky stock. The price








= (r + λσ) dt+ σdWt. (5.2.2)
Here λ denotes the equity risk premium per unit of risk (i.e., Sharpe ratio), σ stands for
the diffusion parameter (i.e., stock return volatility), and Wt corresponds to a standard
Brownian motion. The pricing kernel (or stochastic discount factor) mt is subject to
(see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998):
dmt
mt
= −rdt− λdWt. (5.2.3)
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5.2.2. Longevity Insurance
The insurer pools idiosyncratic longevity risk, so that policyholders are protected from
outliving their retirement wealth. Denote by y the date of birth, by xr the age at
which policyholders retire, and by xmax the maximum age policyholders can reach. The
policyholder receives a pension payment at time t if he is alive and his birthdate y falls
between time t−xr and time t−xmax. The probability that a policyholder aged x = t−y









where µx+v corresponds to the force of mortality at age x+ v.
5.3. The Investment Approach
The investment approach defines pension entitlements in terms of a personal investment
account. The policyholder exogenously specifies the (current) value of his account,
the investment policy (i.e., the fraction of assets invested in the risky stock) and the
assumed interest rate. The assumed interest rate determines how fast retirement wealth
is depleted. Current annuity units, the volatility of annuity units and the expected
growth rate of annuity units are determined endogenously. Figure 5.1 summarizes the
investment approach. The left-hand side of the figure shows the exogenous parameters of
the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the endogenous variables
on the right-hand side of the figure. A green line describes a positive relationship between
an exogenous parameter and an endogenous variable whereas a red line describes a
negative relationship. Section 5.3.1 formalizes the pension contract. This section also
derives the rate at which retirement wealth is depleted. Section 5.3.2 determines the
endogenous variables of the pension contract. Finally, Section 5.3.3 explores the impact




Illustration of the investment approach
The figure illustrates the investment approach. The left-hand side of the figure shows the
exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the
variables on the right-hand side of the figure.
5.3.1. The Pension Contract
Denote by X iy,t the value of the personal investment account at time t of policyholder i
born at time y, and by φi the fraction of wealth invested in the risky stock by policyholder





µt−y + r + φ
iλσ
)
dt+ φiσdWt − diy,tdt, X iy,t ≥ 0 given. (5.3.1)
Here diy,t is the decumulation rate (or withdrawal fraction) at time t of policyholder i
born at time y. Equation (5.3.1) shows that the expected rate of return on the assets
X iy,t is equal to the sum of the biometric rate of return µt−y and the expected financial
rate of return r + φiλσ. The assumed interest rate determines the decumulation rate
diy,t. Denote by δ
i
t+v the (forward) assumed interest rate at time t for horizon v ≥ 0. The
68The value of policyholder i’s personal investment account accrues to the insurer if policyholder i passes
away.
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y,t, if t > y + xr;
0, if t ≤ y + xr.
(5.3.2)

















Equations (5.3.2) and (5.3.3) show that the decumulation rate increases with the assumed
interest rate. Hence an increase in the assumed interest rate reallocates consumption
from the long-run to the short-run.
5.3.2. The Endogenous Variables
Denote by Biy,t the annuity units at time t of policyholder i born at time y. The value
of the personal investment account X iy,t together with the annuity factor A
i
y,t determine

























Hence current annuity units Biy,t fully absorb the mismatch between assets and the
annuity factor. The dynamic equation of the annuity factor is given by (this follows


















r + φiλσ − δit
)
dt+ φiσdWt. (5.3.7)
The (annualized) volatility of annuity units ωi is thus given by
ωi = φiσ. (5.3.8)
Furthermore, equation (5.3.7) shows that the current expected growth of annuity units
πit is equal to the difference between the expected financial rate of return r + φ
iλσ and
the assumed interest rate δit:
πit = r + φ
iλσ − δit. (5.3.9)
A high assumed interest rate thus implies not only a high decumulation rate but also a
low expected growth rate of annuity units.
5.3.3. Changes in Parameters
This section explores the impact of (discretionary) changes in the exogenous parameters
(i.e., the investment policy and the assumed interest rate) on the endogenous variables.
We also consider changes in the Sharpe ratio and the force of mortality. Whereas
the investment policy and the assumed interest rate are parameters specified by the
policyholder, the Sharpe ratio and the force of mortality are parameters describing the
external environment (i.e., non-traded risk factors). Changes in parameters are not
traded on financial markets, and are thus not valued ex ante.
5.3.3.1. Investment Policy
Policyholder i can freely adjust its investment policy φi before or during the retirement
period. A change in the investment policy of ∆φi causes – ceteris paribus – the expected
growth rate of annuity units πit to change by λσ∆φ
i (see equation (5.3.9)). The expected
growth rate of annuity units thus changes as a result of a change in the investment policy.
The assumed interest rate is not affected by a change in the investment policy. A change
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in the investment policy thus impact neither the speed with which retirement wealth is
depleted nor the horizon-dependent market value V i,hy,t :















Hence the investment policy is not mixed up with the intertemporal allocation of the
market value of the consumption stream. Perverse incentives in the investment policy are
thus absent: a myopic policyholder (whose discount rate exceeds the assumed interest
rate because of hyperbolic discounting or a short life expectancy) does not face incentives
to change the investment policy in order to reallocate consumption away from the future
to the present. This property facilitates pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk. Indeed,
policyholders whose life expectancy declines as a result of adverse health shocks cannot
reallocate market value from the long-run to the short-run by increasing the fraction of
wealth invested in the risky stock. A change in investment policy does, however, impact








] ≈ hλσ∆φi. (5.3.11)
Hence an increase in φi leads to an increase in not only the volatility of annuity units but
also expected annuity units. Indeed, a change in the investment policy causes a different
position on the risk-return frontier.
5.3.3.2. Assumed Interest Rate
The policyholder can also change the assumed interest rate δit+v.
69 We assume that
a change in the assumed interest rate δit+v is a weighted average of a change in the








69In a model with interest rate risk and/or (expected) inflation risk, also changes in these risk factors
may affect the assumed interest rate.
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Here κ ≥ 0 is a weight parameter. If κ is small, then ∆δit+v is largely determined by the





A change in the assumed interest rate of ∆δit+v causes – ceteris paribus – current






























An increase in the assumed interest rate causes not only an increase in current annuity
units (see equation (5.3.13)) but also a decrease in the expected growth rate of annuity
units πit+v (v ≥ 0) (see equation (5.3.9)). We note that a change in the investment policy
leaves current annuity units unaffected (see Section 5.3.3.1).
A change in the assumed interest rate also affects expected annuity units and the































Indeed, whereas D̂i,0y,t denotes the impact of a permanent shock, D̂
i,κ
y,t represents the impact of a
temporary shock. The impact of the temporary shock declines with the speed κ with which a
temporary shock dies out.
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An increase in the assumed interest rate thus reallocates market value from the long-run
to the short-run. In particular, a permanent shock ∆δi∞ > 0 raises the market value at
horizon h as long as h is smaller than the average duration, i.e., h < D̂i,0y,t. Similarly,
a temporary shock ∆δit −∆δi∞ > 0 raises the market value at horizon h as long as the
κ-adjusted duration is smaller than the average κ-adjusted duration, i.e., Dκ,h < D̂i,κy,t .
Intuitively, a higher assumed interest rate yields two effects. First, the direct effect is to
reduce the annuity factor. Second, the indirect effect is through an immediate increase
in current annuity units on account of a lower annuity factor (see equation (5.3.4)).
Whereas the first effect (i.e., the reduction in the annuity factor) increases with the
horizon, the second effect (i.e., the increase in current annuity units) is uniform for all
horizons and amounts (in absolute value) to the weighted average of the first effects.
Hence the sum of the two effects declines with the horizon and adds up to zero (weighted
with the market shares).
5.3.3.3. Sharpe Ratio
A change in the Sharpe ratio of ∆λ leads to similar effects on the endogenous variables
as a change in the investment policy. That is, the intertemporal allocation of the market









] ≈ hφiσ∆λ. (5.3.19)
5.3.3.4. Force of Mortality
This section considers a change in the force of mortality µt−y+v. Inspired by Lee and
Carter (1992), we assume that a change in the force of mortality µt−y+v, is driven by a
change in a common risk factor f :
∆µt−y+v = gt−y+v∆f. (5.3.20)
Here gt−y+v ≥ 0 represents the exposure of µt−y+v to the risk factor f . We can view
gt−y+v∆f as the change in the assumed biometric rate of return.
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The intertemporal allocation of the market value of the consumption stream also changes








Improved longevity (i.e., ∆f < 0) thus reallocates market value from the short-run to
the long-run. Intuitively, after a positive longevity shock, policyholders on average live
longer so that it is optimal to save more for the future. We note that the expected growth
rate of annuity units is unaffected by a change in the force of mortality.
5.4. The Consumption Approach
The consumption approach defines pension entitlements in terms of a personal investment
account, just like the investment approach. However, the policyholder now exogenously
specifies current annuity units, the expected growth rate of annuity units and the volatility
of annuity units. These parameters characterize the entire consumption stream in
retirement under the assumption that future annuity units are log-normally distributed.
The current value of the personal investment account, the assumed interest rate (i..e, the
discount rate used to determine the current account value) and the investment policy
(i.e., the fraction of assets invested in the risky stock) are determined endogenously.
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Figure 5.2 summarizes the consumption approach, where the assumed interest rate is
an intermediate variable that links the current account value with the expected growth
rate of annuity units and the volatility of annuity units. The left-hand side of the figure
shows the exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters
determine the endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the figure. A green line
describes a positive relationship between an exogenous parameter and an endogenous
variable whereas a red line describes a negative relationship. Section 5.4.1 formalizes the
pension contract. This section also derives the entire consumption stream in retirement.
Section 5.4.2 determines the endogenous variables of the pension contract. Finally,
Section 5.4.3 explores the impact of (discretionary) changes in the exogenous parameters
on the endogenous variables.
Figure 5.2.
Illustration of the consumption approach
The figure illustrates the consumption approach. The left-hand side of the figure shows the
exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the
variables on the right-hand side of the figure.
5.4.1. The Pension Contract
Policyholder i exogenously specifies current annuity units Biy,t, the expected growth rate
of annuity units πit and the volatility of annuity units ω
i. We can view the consumption
approach as a generalization of defined benefit to stochastic retirement consumption
streams. Indeed, the consumption approach in a stochastic setting is sometimes called
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defined ambition. The annuity units Biy,t, which can be viewed as the liabilities of the






y,t ≥ 0 given. (5.4.1)
Straightforward application of Itô’s Lemma to (5.4.1) shows that the annuity units at






















the entire consumption stream in retirement.
5.4.2. The Endogenous Variables
The Appendix shows that the market value of the consumption stream in retirement V iy,t
is equal to







where the annuity factor Aiy,t is given by (5.3.3). The assumed interest rate can be
computed from the expected growth rate of annuity units and the volatility of annuity
units as follows:
δit = r + ω
iλ− πit. (5.4.4)
With a non-stochastic consumption stream (i.e., ωi = 0), equation (5.4.4) boils down to
the assumed interest rate of a DB pension plan. The fraction of assets invested in the





Equation (5.4.5) shows that the volatility of annuity units determines the investment
policy (see also Figure 5.2): the more volatile annuity units are, the higher the fraction
of assets invested in the risky stock. Equation (5.4.5) also implies that financial shocks
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φiσdWt = ω
idWt are directly absorbed into current annuity units B
i
y,t (see also equation
(5.4.1)). Chapter 6 considers a pension contract in which annuity units respond gradually,
rather than directly, to financial shocks.
5.4.3. Changes in Parameters
This section explores the impact of (discretionary) changes in the exogenous parameters
(i.e., the volatility of annuity units and the expected growth rate of annuity units) on
the endogenous variables. We also investigate changes in the Sharpe ratio and the force
of mortality. Whereas the volatility of annuity units and the expected growth rate of
annuity units are parameters specified by the policyholder, the Sharpe ratio and the
force of mortality are parameters describing the external environment (i.e., non-traded
risk factors).
5.4.3.1. Ex Ante Changes in Parameters
This section considers changes in parameters before or at the beginning of the retirement
period (i.e., ex ante). We assume that a change in the expected growth rate of annuity
units πit+v is a weighted average of a change in the short-term expected growth rate of








Here θ ≥ 0 is a weight parameter. As in Section 5.3.3.4, we assume that a change in the
force of mortality µt−y+v is driven by a change in a common risk factor f :
∆µt−y+v = gt−y+v∆f. (5.4.7)
The market value of future annuity units (i.e., the current account value which is an














Equation (5.4.8) shows that the market value of future annuity units is an increasing
function of the expected growth rate of annuity units, and a decreasing function of the
volatility of annuity units, the Sharpe ratio and the force of mortality. The market value
of the future consumption stream decreases if the policyholder increases the volatility of
annuity units. This tempts myopic policyholders to raise the volatility of annuity units
in order to consume more today. We note that in the investment approach, an increase
in the investment policy (which implies an increase in the volatility of annuity units)
does not affect the market value of the future consumption stream.
5.4.3.2. Ex Post Changes in Parameters
Parameters may also change during the retirement period (i.e., ex post). Ex post we allow
for a more general closure rule than ex ante. In particular, the policyholder can adjust
not only the current account value (which was endogenous ex ante) but also current
annuity units and/or the expected growth rate of annuity units (which were exogenous
ex ante). Figure 5.3 summarizes the consumption approach (ex post).
Figure 5.3.
Illustration of the consumption approach (ex post)
The figure illustrates the consumption approach (ex post). The left-hand side of the figure shows
the exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the
variables on the right-hand side of the figure.
Changes in parameters lead to mismatch between assets and liabilities (see equation
(5.4.8)). Mismatch causes the funding rate, which is defined as the ratio between the
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value of the assets and the value of the liabilities, to deviate from unity. We assume
that the policyholder contributes a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the mismatch (or funding
gap) between assets and liabilities ∆V iy,t into his personal investment account. As a
consequence, a fraction (1 − α) of ∆V iy,t is absorbed into current annuity units and the
expected growth rate of annuity units. The new balance of the investment account
X iy,t + α∆V
i
y,t must match the new market value of future annuity units:

















where V i,hy,t +∆V
i,h
y,t stands for the horizon-dependent market value of future annuity units
after annuity units are adjusted:

































Here M iy,t is given by (see Appendix)



















y,t. If qh strictly increases with the
horizon h, then annuity units in the distant future are more exposed to mismatch risk










γi,hy,tqhdh = 1. (5.4.13)
We note that the ex post closure rule coincides with the ex ante closure rule if α = 1
(mismatch risk is not absorbed into current and future annuity units at all). We can
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consider the following special case for qh (see also Chapters 4 and 6).






(1− q0) . (5.4.14)
The so-called growth rate method (i.e., qh = h) is given by q0 = 0 and η ⇓ 0. With



































Permanent shocks do not affect V i,hy,t if the growth rate method is adopted (i.e., α = 0
and qh = h). A temporary shock in the expected growth rate of annuity units leaves
the intertemporal allocation of the market value of the consumption stream unaffected
if q0 = α = 0 and η equals the speed θ with which the temporary shock dies out.
Endogenous changes in the assumed interest rate (through endogenous changes in the
expected growth rate of annuity units) exactly offset the exogenous changes in the
assumed interest through the exogenous changes in the parameters. Finally, we note
that a myopic policyholder has an incentive to raise the volatility of annuity units if
current annuity units (rather than the expected growth rate of annuity units) is the
endogenous closure variable.
5.5. Collective Defined Contribution
5.5.1. The Pension Contract
This section considers a collective defined contribution (CDC) pension system. In such a
pension system, the insurer has one general pooled account. Property rights are defined
in terms of annuity units, rather than in terms of a personal investment account. The
current value of the collective investment account, the investment policy and the assumed
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interest rate are specified exogenously. In addition, the insurer specifies the annuity units














c̄y,t ≡ cyVy,t/Vt, (5.5.4)
where cy denotes the number of policyholders born at time y, xs stands for the age at
which policyholders enter the pension fund, Vy,t represents the price at time t of the




















and dy,t denotes the decumulation rate at time t for a policyholder born at time y:
dy,t =
By,t/Vy,t, if t > y + xr;0, if t ≤ y + xr. (5.5.7)
The assumed interest rate and the investment policy do no longer depend on i (i.e., all
policyholders face the same risk profile). Hence, a pension system with a single collective
asset pool allows for less tailor-made solutions. It follows from equations (5.5.1), (5.5.5)
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and (5.5.6) that the current annuity units By,t evolve according to:
dBy,t
By,t
= (r + φλσ − δt) dt+ φσ dWt, By,t ≥ 0 given. (5.5.8)
5.5.2. Changes in Parameters
5.5.2.1. Investment Policy and Sharpe Ratio
Discretionary changes in the investment policy and/or the Sharpe ratio do not affect the
horizon-dependent market value











Hence, in a CDC pension system, the insurer can adjust the investment policy and/or
the Sharpe ratio without causing value transfers between generations.
5.5.2.2. Assumed Interest Rate and Force of Mortality
The market value of the total liabilities Vt changes as a result of changes in the assumed
interest rate δt+v and/or the force of mortality µt+v. We assume that the change in the
assumed interest rate and the change in the force of mortality are given by equations
(5.3.12) and (5.3.20), respectively. The policyholders of the pension system contribute a
fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the mismatch between assets and liabilities ∆Vt into the collective
asset pool. As a consequence, a fraction (1 − α) of ∆Vt is absorbed into current and
future annuity units. Figure 5.4 illustrates a CDC pension system. If we allow for value































































Permanent shocks do not affect Vy,t if the growth rate method is adopted (i.e., α = 0
and qh = h). If, however, the level method is adopted (i.e., α = 0 and qh = 1), then a
change in the assumed interest rate redistributes value from long horizons (i.e., young
policyholders) to short horizons (i.e., old policyholders). Intuitively, a higher assumed
interest rate raises the funding rate, thereby increasing the scope to pay out today.
There are no value transfers between generations if the insurer chooses qh such that
∆Vy,t/Vy,t = 0. Alternatively, the insurer can ring-fence the assets of each generation.
In that case, adjustments in current annuity units typically depends on the age of the
policyholder.
5.6. Collective Defined Ambition
5.6.1. The Pension Contract
This section considers a collective defined ambition (CDA) pension system. The pension
fund has one general pooled account and defines property rights in terms of annuity




Illustration of a CDC pension contract
The figure illustrates a CDC pension contract. The left-hand side of the figure shows the
exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the
variables on the right-hand side of the figure.
rate of annuity units, and the volatility of annuity units are specified exogenously. The
annuity units are adjusted according to a collective version of (5.4.1):
dBy,t
By,t
= πtdt+ ωdWt, By,t ≥ 0 given. (5.6.1)
The volatility of annuity units and the expected growth rate of annuity units do no longer
depend on i.
In a collective pension system without personal investment accounts, proper pricing
of future annuity units is essential. Indeed, if annuity units are not priced properly, some
generations may sponsor other generations, thereby giving rise to intergenerational value
transfers. The price at time t of the consumption stream in retirement for a policyholder




V hy,t dh. (5.6.2)
Here V hy,t represents the price at time t of annuity units at time t+ h for a policyholder
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born at time y:


















V hy,t dh dy, (5.6.4)
5.6.2. Changes in Parameters
5.6.2.1. Ex Ante Changes in Parameters
In a CDA pension system, changes in parameters before or at the beginning of retirement
(i.e., ex ante) typically lead to a change in the purchase price of annuity units. As in
Section 5.4.3, we consider changes in the volatility of annuity units, the expected growth
rate of annuity units, the Sharpe ratio and the force of mortality. The change in the
expected growth of annuity units and the change in the force of mortality are given by
equations (5.4.6) and (5.4.7), respectively. As a result, the purchase price of annuity




≈ D̂0y,t (∆π∞ − ω∆λ−∆ωλ) + D̂θy,t (∆πt −∆π∞)− Ĝy,t∆f. (5.6.5)
Younger policyholders (i.e., larger h) are more affected by a change in parameters than
older policyholders (i.e., smaller h).
5.6.2.2. Ex Post Changes in Parameters
In a CDA pension system, a change in parameters during retirement (i.e., ex post)
typically leads to intergenerational redistribution of market value. The policyholders of
the pension system contribute a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the mismatch between assets and
liabilities ∆Vt into the collective asset pool. A fraction (1− α) of ∆Vt is thus absorbed
71Rauh (2008) addresses a change in discounting as a result of a change in the volatility of annuity
units in the context of DB pension plans with corporate risk sponsors. He shows that if corporations
can employ the expected return on their investment portfolio to discount annuity units, corporate
sponsors face an incentive to raise the risk of future annuity units. Intuitively, by raising the risk of
future annuity units, they can reduce the cost to the corporation of sponsoring these annuity units at
the expense of the policyholders of the pension fund.
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into current and future annuity units. Figure 5.5 illustrates a CDA pension system.





























Whether one wants to ensure that discretionary changes in the Sharpe ratio do not lead
to intergenerational distribution is a matter of debate. On the one hand, one could argue
that changes in the Sharpe ratio should lead to similar intergenerational risk sharing as
with changes in the interest rate. In particular, a higher Sharpe ratio (at a given risk)
raises the expected future rates of return and thus reduces the current price of funding
an uncertain future pension. The pension contract thus allows generations to share
risk factors that are not traded on financial markets. This approach views the pension
contract as a social contract that allows for trade in risk factors (such as the Sharpe
ratio) that are not traded on financial markets. On the other hand, allowing changes
in the Sharpe ratio to redistribute market value across horizons and therefore across
generations may well lead to intergenerational conflicts about the unobservable Sharpe
ratio. Moreover, pension funds cannot hedge discretionary changes in the Sharpe ratio.
Hence, to avoid these problems, one could argue that the horizon-dependent market value
Vy,t should remain constant if λ changes. This approach views the pension contract as
a pure financial contract that includes only risk factors that are traded on financial
markets. A value neutral transfer can be accomplished by ring-fencing the assets of each
generation or choosing qh such that ∆Vy,t/Vy,t = 0.
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Figure 5.5.
Illustration of a CDA pension contract
The figure illustrates a CDA pension contract. The left-hand side of the figure shows the
exogenous parameters of the pension contract. These exogenous parameters determine the
variables on the right-hand side of the figure.
5.7. Concluding Remarks
Private pension provision faces the challenge of providing adequate retirement income.
PPRs promise to play a new role in the provision of retirement income. These pension
plans individualize the savings, investment and withdrawal functions of variable annuities
and arrange the insurance function collectively. We have explored two approaches to a
PPR: the investment approach and the consumption approach. In the first approach,
the contribution level, the investment policy and the assumed interest rate are specified
exogenously, while in the second approach, current annuity units, the expected growth
rate of annuity and the volatility of annuity units are specified exogenously. We have
demonstrated that in the investment approach, the policyholder can freely adjust the
investment policy without affecting the intertemporal allocation of the market value of





Derivation of (5.3.11), (5.3.13), (5.3.17), (5.3.18), (5.3.21) and (5.3.24)




















































− 1 ≈ hλσ∆φi.
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can be computed in a similar fashion. A change in the



















































Derivation of (5.4.3), (5.4.8), (5.4.11) and (5.4.15)






























































































The relative change in the market value of future annuity units is given by (the second
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Setting (5.8.3) equal to (5.8.4) and solving for M iy,t yields
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M iy,t + h
(








Substituting (5.8.5) into (5.8.6) yields (5.4.15).
Derivation of (5.5.10)






















−Ghy,t∆f − h∆δ∞ −Dκ,h (∆δt −∆δ∞)
}
dh dy − 1.




≈Mt − D̂0t∆δ∞ − D̂κt (∆δt −∆δ∞)− Ĝt∆f. (5.8.7)
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dh dy − 1
≈ α
[




Setting (5.8.7) equal to (5.8.8) and solving for Mt yields
Mt ≈ (1− α)
[






























Substituting (5.8.9) into (5.8.10) yields (5.5.10).
Derivation of (5.6.5) and (5.6.6)

























Chapter 5. PPRs: Investment Approach versus Consumption Approach
Here we assume that ∆ω∆λ ≈ 0. By Taylor series expansion, we can write
∆Vy,t
Vy,t
≈ D̂0y,t (∆π∞ − ω∆λ− λ∆ω) + D̂θy,t (∆πt −∆π∞)− Ĝy,t∆f. (5.8.12)






















−Ghy,t∆f + h (∆π∞ − ω∆λ−∆ωλ) +Dθ,h (∆πt −∆π∞)
}
dh dy − 1.




≈Mt + D̂0t (π∞ − ω∆λ−∆ωλ) + D̂θt (∆πt − π∞)− Ĝt∆f. (5.8.13)
















+ h (∆π∞ − ω∆λ− λ∆ω) +Dθ,h (∆πt −∆π∞)
}
dh dy − 1
≈ α
[
D̂0t (∆π∞ − ω∆λ− λ∆ω) + D̂θt (∆πt −∆π∞)− Ĝt∆f
]
(5.8.14)
Setting (5.8.13) equal to (5.8.14) and solving for Mt yields
Mt ≈ −(1− α)
[












































Buffering Shocks in Variable
Annuities: Valuation, Investment
and Communication72
This chapter explores defined ambition pension plans that allocate stock market risk
among policyholders on the basis of complete pension contracts while pooling idiosyncratic
longevity risk. Entitlements respond gradually to financial shocks. We show how pension
entitlements can be valued in a market-consistent fashion. The market-consistent discount
rate includes a risk premium that rises with the horizon. Proper valuation ensures
efficient intertemporal consumption smoothing and protects the value of property rights
of existing policyholders. In the tradition of liability-driven investment, we determine the
investment policy from the stochastic pension promises. We show that gradual absorption
of financial shocks leads to life cycle investment.
6.1. Introduction
Corporations are increasingly withdrawing as sponsors from defined benefit (DB) pension
plans (Investment Company Institute, 2014). As a consequence, pension funds become
mutual insurers in which policyholders, rather than corporations, bear stock market
risk. These so-called defined ambition (DA) pension plans retain several advantages of
DB pension plans.73 In particular, by pooling idiosyncratic longevity risk, pension funds
can still provide lifelong benefits at relatively low costs. Also, by specifying (dis)saving
and investment decisions, DA pension plans protect financially illiterate policyholders
72This chapter is co-authored with Lans Bovenberg and Roel Mehlkopf.
73DA pension plans share some characteristics with non-financial defined contribution (NDC) pension
plans (Holzmann, Palmer, and Robalino, 2012). In particular, both NDC and DA pension plans lack
outside sponsors.
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against behavioral biases. To illustrate, risk management and payout policies seek to
provide policyholders with stable income streams after they retire.
Pension entitlements are adjusted gradually after an unexpected financial shock that
causes a mismatch between assets and the value of liabilities. Hence retirees take
investment risk but can take some time to adjust their standard of living after an
unexpected financial shock. Gradual absorption of financial shocks is consistent with
internal habit formation (see, e.g., Fuhrer, 2000); see also Chapter 4. It reconciles
defined benefit thinking in which current consumption is stable with defined contribution
thinking in which policyholders bear investment risk. Indeed, future rather than current
consumption bears most of current investment risk. As a consequence, the year-on-year
volatility of current consumption is smaller than the year-on-year volatility of wealth.
This property stands in sharp contrast to many (popular) variable annuity products.
Indeed, traditional variable annuities usually assume that payouts respond directly,
rather than gradually, to an unexpected financial shock (see, e.g., Chai et al., 2011;
Maurer et al., 2013b).74 Other important parameters of the pension contract are the
assumed expected rates of return on risky securities. If actual expected rates of return
exceed assumed expected rates of return, then the actual growth rate of annuity units –
ceteris paribus – exceeds the desired growth rate of annuity units, and vice versa.
We show how pension entitlements can be valued in a market-consistent fashion.
Proper valuation is relevant for determining the prices at which variable annuities can be
bought and sold. Indeed, we show how pension contributions can be derived endogenously
from the stochastic pension promises, which are the liabilities of the pension contract.
This is reminiscent of DB pension plans in which pension contributions are determined
by the costs of the desired consumption stream in retirement. The discount rate is equal
to the sum of the interest rate and a risk premium that rises with the investment horizon.
We show that the discount rate for valuing variable annuities is typically in between the
expected rate of return on the actual investment portfolio and the risk-free interest rate.
Market-consistent valuation ensures efficient intertemporal consumption smoothing and
intergenerational fairness. It also helps to protect the value of property rights of existing
policyholders. The contract can thus be changed without giving rise to value transfers.
74Insurers have also developed variable annuities for which payouts respond sluggishly to an unexpected
financial shock (see, e.g., Guillén et al., 2006; Maurer et al., 2013a, 2014). However, these variable
annuity products are often based on complex profit-sharing rules and hence difficult to value.
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We demonstrate how the investment policy can be determined endogenously from
the stochastic pension promises. The current chapter thus extends the principle of
liability-driven investment from DB pension plans to DA pension plans. We in fact
generalize asset-liability management (ALM) to stochastic liabilities. Indeed, the pension
contract is complete not only in terms of the allocation of stock market risk but also in
terms of the investment policy so that policyholders obtain the exposures that have
been communicated to them. Furthermore, we show that gradual absorption of financial
shocks leads to life cycle investment in which the stock market exposure declines with
age. This is because retired agents have less time to absorb financial shocks when their
remaining expected lifetime declines. Stock market exposures are thus tailored to the
investment horizon.
DA pension plans are based on proposed risk-sharing systems in the Netherlands,
and evolved from traditional DB pension plans with (nominally) guaranteed pension
entitlements. Also in public-sector pension plans in the United States, risk sharing is
being considered as a way to reduce the costs of these plans (see, e.g., Novy-Marx and
Rauh, 2014). This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on the implications of
moving from a DB design towards a DA design. The DA plans considered in the current
chapter encompass both the accumulation and the decumulation phases; however, a
DA plan can be limited to the decumulation phase or the accumulation phase only.
Indeed, one can view a DA pension plan as a particular way to draw-down accumulated
retirement wealth.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the
financial market. Section 6.3 specifies the pension contract. This section also investigates
how pension funds can calibrate and communicate the risk of future pension entitlements.
Section 6.4 explores the pricing of future pension entitlements, and derives the replicating
portfolio strategy. Section 6.5 shows how the pension contract can be expressed in terms
of mismatch between assets and liabilities. This section also investigates the impact
of using an incorrect discount rate on intertemporal consumption smoothing. Section
6.6 explores a subclass of risk profiles in which adjustments in pension entitlements are
determined by a single state variable. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter and explores the
roles of public supervision. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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6.2. The Financial Market
We assume a simple continuous-time financial market with a single risk factor, which we
interpret as an aggregate stock market index. Let us denote by St the value of the stock
market index at time t. Throughout, boldface type is used to denote uncertain variables















Here r is the nominal risk-free interest rate, λ denotes the equity risk premium per unit
of risk (i.e., Sharpe ratio), σ represents the stock return volatility, and Wt corresponds to
a standard Brownian motion. Empirically, the value of λσ−σ2/2 is found to be positive
(see, e.g., Brennan and Xia, 2002).
6.3. The Pension Contract
6.3.1. Specification
In this section, we specify the pension contract. Entitlements are defined in terms of
annuity units. Denote by By,t the annuity units at time t of a policyholder born at
time y, by xr the age at which a policyholder retires, and by xmax the maximum age
a policyholder can reach. The insurer adjusts annuity units at discrete points in time
t = t0+1, t0+2, ..., y+xmax. Here t0 represents the time at which the pension contribution
is paid. If the birth date y falls between t− xr and t− xmax and the policyholder is still
alive at time t, then this policyholder receives a pension payment at time t. We denote









Here µx+j represents the force of mortality between age x+ j − 1 and age x+ j.75 The
force of mortality µx+j is assumed to not change over time.




where dx+j stands for
the one-year death probability between age x+ j − 1 and age x+ j.
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The annuity units at time t+h (h ∈ N) of a policyholder born at time y, i.e., By,t+h,
are specified in terms of past and future stock market shocks as follows:
By,t+h = By,t0 exp
{

































Here dW∗s ≡ dWs + (λ− λ∗) dt where λ∗ denotes the assumed Sharpe ratio. This
assumed Sharpe ratio may differ from the actual Sharpe ratio λ.76 The parameter qh




dW∗s . We define qh at discrete points in time. Indeed, h is an integer
because adjustments of pension entitlements occur only once per period. We require
that the marginal risk exposure qh ⇒ 1 as h ⇒ ∞. Hence the parameter ω can be
viewed as the exposure of long-term annuity units log By,∞ to current stock market
shocks. Finally, the parameter πt+1 represents the desired (or targeted) growth rate of
annuity units between time t and time t + 1. The desired growth rate of annuity units
coincides with the median growth rate of annuity units (conditional upon information
available at time t0) if the assumed Sharpe ratio λ
∗ equals the actual Sharpe ratio λ (see
also Section 6.3.2).
6.3.2. Horizon Differentiation
Specification (6.3.2) allows the marginal risk exposure qh to depend on the investment
horizon h.77 Indeed, if qh strictly increases with the investment horizon h, then long
investment horizons exhibit a larger exposure to current stock market shocks than shorter
investment horizons. We impose that the marginal risk exposure qh is non-decreasing
with the investment horizon h, i.e., qh ≥ qh−1 for all h > 1. Specification (6.3.2) allows
76Merton (1980) shows that estimates of expected returns are less accurate than estimates of variances.
Therefore, we distinguish only between the assumed expected return and the actual expected return.
In particular, we assume that the actual variance matches the assumed variance.
77The present chapter assumes that the marginal risk exposure does not depend on age nor time.
Specification (6.3.2) can however be extended by allowing the marginal risk exposure to depend on
age and time.
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the marginal risk exposure to depend only on the investment horizon h and thus only
indirectly on age x = t − y. As a direct consequence, life cycle investment in which
the stock market exposure declines with age continues during the decumulation phase.
Internal habit formation can explain this type of horizon differentiation in marginal risk
exposures (see, e.g., Fuhrer, 2000); see also Chapter 4.78
Figure 6.1 shows horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures.79 The dash-dotted
line displays the case where qh = h/N for h < N and qh = 1 for h ≥ N . In that case,
short investment horizons h < N = 10 exhibit a smaller risk exposure than longer
investment horizons h ≥ N = 10. In particular, the marginal risk exposure at a one-year
investment horizon (h = 1) is only one-tenth of the marginal risk exposure at a ten-year
investment horizon (h = 10). We can view the parameter N as the smoothing period.
If N increases, then it takes longer to fully absorb current stock market shocks into
annuity units. The solid line corresponds to the case of exponential smoothing. That
is, qh = 1 − exp {−ηh}. The parameter η can be regarded as a smoothing parameter.
If η ⇒ 0, horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures is maximal, whereas horizon
differentiation in marginal risk exposures is absent if η ⇒∞. The dotted line illustrates
the case where horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures is absent (i.e., qh = 1
for all h). Finally, the dashed line displays a linear combination of the last two rules,
i.e.,
qh = (1− q1)× 1 + q1 × (1− exp {−ηh}) = 1− (1− q1) exp {−ηh} (6.3.3)
with q1 ≥ 0. The rule (6.3.3) characterizes horizon differentiation in terms of two
parameters: q1 ≤ 1 (i.e., the part of current stock market shocks that is absorbed into
the level of annuity units) and η (i.e., the speed at which the remaining part of current
stock market shocks is absorbed into future growth rates of annuity units).
Dividing By,t+h by By,t yields
By,t+h
By,t











78In the case where risk differentiation is based on human capital risk rather than internal habit
formation, marginal risk exposures depend on not only the investment horizon h but also age x = t−y
(see Bodie et al., 1992).
79Although adjustments in pension entitlements occur only once per period, the figures in this chapter




Illustration of horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures




























for h < N and qh = 1 for h ≥ N
qh = 1 − (1 − q 1)exp{−ηh}
qh = 1
The figure illustrates horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures. The dashed-dotted
line displays the case where qh = h/N for h < N and qh = 1 for h ≥ N (with N = 10).
The solid line corresponds to the case where qh = 1 − exp {−ηh} (with η = 0.2). The dotted
line illustrates the case where qh = 1 for all h. The dashed line represents the case where

































captures how past stock market shocks affect future annuity units. In the case of no
horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures, F ht is equal to unity (substitute qh = 1
for all h in (6.3.5)). Indeed, in the absence of horizon differentiation in marginal risk
exposures, stock market shocks are absorbed immediately into current annuity units. The
horizon-dependent funding ratio (6.3.5) is thus the direct consequence of the gradual
adjustment of annuity units to stock market shocks. Intuitively, sluggish adjustment
of annuity units to stock market shocks gives rise to funding imbalances that must
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be absorbed in the future. As a direct consequence, future adjustments of pension
entitlements become predictable. The horizon-dependent funding ratio F ht summarizes
the predictable changes of future annuity units By,t+h as a result of past stock market
shocks that have not yet been fully absorbed into current annuity units. Figure 6.2
illustrates the horizon-dependent funding ratio F ht as a function of the investment horizon
h, with a single unexpected stock-market shock that occurred one year ago.
Figure 6.2.
Illustration of the horizon-dependent funding ratio





































The figure illustrates the horizon-dependent funding rate F ht as a function of the investment
horizon h, with a single unexpected stock-market shock that occurred one year ago. That is,
log {St/St−1} −
(
r + λσ − 12σ
2
)






r + λσ − 12σ
2
)
= 0 for all
j ≥ 1. The figure is based on ω = 0.5 and qh = 1 − (1− q1) exp {−ηh} (with q1 = 0.5 and
η = 0.2).




















where Mt [·] stands for the median operator conditional upon all information available
at time t. Equation (6.3.6) shows that the median value of future annuity units differs




due to two factors:
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one factor capturing the past and the other factor corresponding to future stock market
returns. In particular, the first factor F ht represents past stock market shocks that have
not yet been fully absorbed into annuity units. The second factor (λ− λ∗)ω
∑h
j=1 qj is
due to the gap between the actual Sharpe ratio λ and the assumed Sharpe ratio λ∗. The
desired growth rate of median pension entitlements can thus be increased by not only
increasing πh but also reducing the assumed Sharpe ratio λ
∗.
6.3.3. Bonus Policy
This section explores how annuity units (and thus pensions in payment) change as time











× F 1t . (6.3.7)
Equation (6.3.7) can be viewed as the bonus (or dividend) policy of the pension scheme,
showing how annuity units develop as time proceeds. The first term at the right-hand
side of equation (6.3.7) represents the desired growth rate. The second term denotes
the impact of current stock market shocks on current annuity units while the last term
reflects the impact of past stock market shocks on current annuity units.
The bonus policy (6.3.7) can be rewritten as follows:
By,t+1
By,t
= exp {πt+1} × F̄ 0t+1. (6.3.8)
Here F̄ h−1t+1 denotes the horizon-dependent funding ratio before annuity units are adjusted
but after stock market shocks between time t and time t + 1, i.e.,
∫ t+1
t
dW ∗s , have been
realized:








The horizon-dependent funding ratio after annuity units are adjusted is given by (see
Appendix)
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The second term at the right-hand side of (6.3.10) denotes current stock market shocks
that result in the new funding ratio F̄ h−1t+1 . The last term represents past stock market
shocks that are gradually being absorbed into annuity units so that they are no longer
included in the funding ratio.
6.3.4. Calibrating the Risk of Future Annuity Units
Future annuity units exhibit a lognormal distribution. The pth quantile of future annuity















Here Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
We can calibrate the marginal risk exposure qh and the long-term risk exposure ω from
the desired risk of the median value of future annuity units. For example, the insurer
can set the desired difference between the log median value of future annuity units and













The parameters qh and ω can then be endogenously derived from (6.3.12).
80
6.3.5. Communicating the Risk of Future Annuity Units
Given current annuity units By,t, insurers should communicate ex ante both the median
value of future annuity units (6.3.6) and the 2.5% quantile of future annuity units
(6.3.11), and ex post the difference between the realized pension outcome and the pension









stochastic model used by the insurer. Supervisory authorities may have to prescribe
parameter values to prevent insurers from providing excessively optimistic projections.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of future annuity units (the
quantiles are expressed relative to the median value of future annuity units). The




dashed lines represent the case of horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures
(i.e., qh = 1 − (1− q1) exp {−ηh} with q1 = 0.5 and η = 0.2), while the dash-dotted
lines correspond to the case of no horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures (i.e.,
qh = 1 for all h).
Figure 6.3.
Illustration of the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of future annuity units














2.5% quantile (w/o horizon differentat ion)
97.5% quantile (w/o horizon differentat ion)
2.5% quantile (w horizon differentat ion)
97.5% quantile (w horizon differentat ion)
The figure illustrates the 2.5% and 97.5% (log) quantiles of future annuity units (the quantiles
are expressed relative to the median value of future annuity units). The solid lines represent
the case of horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures (i.e., qh = 1− (1− q1) exp {−ηh}
with q1 = 0.5 and η = 0.2), while the dash-dotted lines correspond to the case of no horizon
differentiation in marginal risk exposures (i.e., qh = 1 for all h). The figure is based on ω = 0.5.
6.4. Market-Consistent Valuation
6.4.1. Useful Decomposition
Denote by V hy,t the market-consistent value at time t of annuity units By,t+h. We can
compute V hy,t by solving the following conditional expectation (see, e.g., Cochrane, 2001):
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where mt stands for the pricing kernel (or stochastic discount factor) at time t. The
Appendix provides an exact analytical expression for mt and shows that










Equation (6.4.2) shows that the market price of future annuity units in terms of current
annuity units, i.e., Chy,t, consists of two factors. The horizon-dependent funding ratio
F ht corresponds to past stock market shocks that have not yet been fully absorbed into
current annuity units. This factor equals unity if current stock market shocks are fully
absorbed into current annuity units (i.e., qh = 1 for all h). The horizon-dependent
annuity factor Ahy,t summarizes the impacts of desired growth and risk of annuity units,
and future assumed expected rates of return on the market price of future annuity units.
The next section gives an exact analytical expression for the forward (market-consistent)
discount rate δjy,t.
6.4.2. The Forward Discount Rate
The forward discount rate δjy,t is given by (see Appendix)
δjy,t = µt−y+j + r − πt+j + qjωλ
∗ + ξj






where ξj ≡ −12q
2
jω
2 denotes a second-order term. Equation (6.4.4) collapses to the
survival premium µt−y+j plus the (forward) interest rate r if annuity units are fixed
and guaranteed (i.e., πt+j = ω = 0). More generally, the discount rate (6.4.4) is a
decreasing function of the desired growth rate πt+j, and an increasing function of future
178
Market-Consistent Valuation
biometric and (assumed) expected financial rates of return provided that λ∗ > 1
2
qjω. The
survival credit µt−y+j represents the future biometric rate of return. The risk premium
qjωλ
∗ is due to the impact of stock market shocks on annuity units: riskier annuity units
yield higher expected returns, thereby raising discount rates and reducing the costs of the
consumption stream. It depends on the exposure of annuity units to stock market shocks
(determined by both the marginal risk exposure qj and the long-term risk exposure ω)
and the assumed Sharpe ratio λ∗.
6.4.3. The Discount Curve








t−y + r − π̄ht + q̄hωλ∗ + ξ̄h. (6.4.5)







The quantities µ̄ht−y, π̄
h



















The average and marginal risk exposure, i.e., q̄h and qh, relate to each other in an
analogous way as the YTM relates to the forward interest rate. The non-decreasing
nature of the marginal risk exposure qh (i.e., qh ≥ qh−1 for all h > 1) implies that the
average risk exposure q̄h is non-decreasing as well (i.e., q̄h ≥ q̄h−1 for h > 1). Also, it
follows that the average risk exposure does not exceed the marginal risk exposure (i.e.,
q̄h ≤ qh for all h ≥ 1). Figure 6.4 illustrates both the average risk exposure q̄h and the
marginal risk exposure qh with horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures.
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Figure 6.4.
Illustration of the average and marginal risk exposure






















The figure illustrates the average risk exposure q̄h as well as the marginal risk exposure qh
with horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures. The marginal risk exposure is given by
qh = 1− (1− q1) exp {−ηh} (with q1 = 0.5 and η = 0.2).
In the case of gradual adjustment of annuity units to stock market shocks, the risk
premium q̄hωλ
∗ increases with the investment horizon h. Figure 6.5 shows the risk
premium q̄hωλ
∗ with horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures.
6.4.4. Discounting the Median Value of Future Annuity Units
We can also discount the median value of future annuity units to find the market-consistent
value V hy,t. We find





















Illustration of the horizon-dependent risk premium


















The figure illustrates the horizon-dependent risk premium q̄hωλ
∗ with horizon differentiation
in marginal risk exposures. The marginal risk exposure is given by qh = 1− (1− q1) exp {−ηh}
(with q1 = 0.5 and η = 0.2). The figure is based ω = 0.5 and λ
∗ = 0.2.
Whereas the actual risk premium λ features in discounting the median value of future
annuity units (see equation (6.4.11)), only the assumed risk premium λ∗ features in
discounting current annuity units By,t (see equation (6.4.4)). This implies that the
market-consistent value of annuity units does not depend on the subjective parameter
λ of the stochastic model but depends only on the parameters of the contract πt+j, λ
∗
and qj.
81 Whereas model risk (i.e., the value of λ) does not affect the market-consistent
value of future annuity units, it does impact the median value of future annuity units
(6.3.6) and the quantiles of future annuity units (6.3.11).
81Here we implicitly assume that the actual variance coincides with the assumed variance.
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6.4.5. Comparison with Traditional Annuities
6.4.5.1. Nominal Fixed Annuities
The market-consistent value at time t of a guaranteed nominal annuity payment (i.e.,
πt+j = 0 for every j and ω = 0) at time t+ h is given by









We identify three differences between the market price of variable annuities (see equation
(6.4.2)) and the market price of traditional DB pension plans (see equation (6.4.12)).
Whereas traditional DB pension plans keep current annuity unitsBy,t constant in nominal
terms, variable annuities vary with stock market returns. First, a horizon-dependent
risk premium q̄hωλ
∗ + ξ̄h, which typically rises with the investment horizon, is added
in (6.4.5) to account for the conditional, risky nature of future annuity units. Second,
desired indexation π̄ht is included in (6.4.5) to measure the costs of the desired bonus
payments. Third, a factor F ht is included in (6.4.2) representing past stock market shocks
that have not yet been fully absorbed into current annuity units.
6.4.5.2. Traditional Variable Annuities
In the case of a traditional variable annuity in which shocks are absorbed immediately
into current annuity units (i.e., qh = q̄h = 1 for all h ≥ 1) and the median annuity
payments are constant in nominal terms (i.e., πt+j = 0 for every j), equation (6.4.2)
boils down to












Comparing equation (6.4.13) with equation (6.4.2), we observe that the term representing
past stock market shocks F ht is not present in this case because stock market shocks are
absorbed immediately into current annuity units By,t. Hence, predictable future changes
in pension entitlements resulting from past stock market shocks are absent. Moreover,
the risk premium in the discount rate does not depend on the investment horizon because
there is no horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures.
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6.4.6. Conversion Factor versus Annuity Factor
Assuming that newly bought pension entitlements share in current funding gaps, we can











We employ the formula (6.4.14) to calculate the price of newly bought entitlements. This
is in line with the DB tradition in which the pension premium is determined by the costs
of the desired consumption stream in retirement. The conversion factor Cy,t represents
the economically fair price that a policyholder with birth year y should pay for each
annuity unit to ensure that the newly bought annuity units do not affect the value of
existing pension entitlements.
In the case of gradual adjustment of annuity units to stock market shocks, the





because newly bought annuity units share in current funding gaps. As a consequence, the
conversion factor is smaller than the annuity factor in the presence of underfunding (i.e.,
F ht < 1). Intuitively, underfunding reduces the growth of future consumption streams,
thereby reducing the costs of future annuity units. The conversion factor Cy,t would
coincide with the aggregate annuity factor Ay,t if newly bought annuity units do not
share in past stock market shocks.
The valuation of annuity units (6.4.2) assumes that policyholders pay a fair economic
price for new annuity units so that the value of existing annuity units is not affected by
the purchase of new annuity units. Indeed, valuation of existing annuity units (6.4.2)
relies on the premium rule (6.4.14) for newly bought annuity units. With this premium
rule, the aggregate value of the variable annuities matches the current value of aggregate
assets Xt:
Xt = Vt. (6.4.16)
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The pension contract thus exhibits a defined contribution character in the sense that
stock market shocks are absorbed into pension entitlements through adjustments in
current annuity units (i.e., the so-called bonus payments) and future predictable changes
F ht . Outside sponsors (such as companies, future policyholders, insurance companies,
tax payers, shareholders) are absent: risks are borne by the current policyholders. The
pension promises are backed by financial assets so that the system is always fully funded
on a so-called discontinuity basis.82 Indeed, the funding ratio is unity if we measure
liabilities in terms of the market value of promised cash flows Vt.
If newly bought annuity units share in current funding gaps but pricing is based on
the annuity factor (6.4.15), the pension contract involves risk sharing between current
policyholders and new policyholders. In particular, new policyholders subsidize (tax)
current policyholders in case of underfunding, i.e., F ht < 1 (overfunding, i.e., F
h
t > 1).
6.4.7. Replicating Portfolio Strategy
This section derives the portfolio strategy that replicates the pension contract (6.3.2).
We allow the insurer to invest in a risky stock and a nominal money market account.
The portfolio strategy is determined in such a way that the value of the assets matches
the value of the liabilities in each state of the world. We thus apply the principle of
liability-driven investment familiar from DB pension plans to arrive at the replicating
portfolio strategy.
Replication of the pension contract requires a fraction q̂y,t of the assets to be invested







where αhy,t is defined as follows:
αhy,t ≡ V hy,t/Vy,t (6.4.18)
Equation (6.4.17) shows that in the case of gradual adjustment of annuity units to stock
market shocks, the portfolio weight decreases as the policyholder ages.
82This means that the policyholders receive their promised benefits even if the insurer is wound up.
Hence, the policyholders are not exposed to the credit risk of the insurer.
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6.5. Mismatch Risk and an Incorrect Discount Rate
6.5.1. Mismatch Risk
The expression for the bonus rate (6.3.7) can be written in terms of mismatch. In





The bonus rate expression (6.3.7) can now be written as
By,t+1
By,t






× F 1t . (6.5.2)













Mt+1. We can rewrite the funding
ratio (6.3.5) in terms of mismatch in past (substitute (6.5.1) into (6.3.5)):










We can also write (6.3.4) in terms of mismatch in the past:
By,t+h
By,t















6.5.2. Discounting with Expected Returns
A popular way to compute the value of annuity units is to employ the expected return




V̂ hy,t0 , (6.5.5)
where
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Linearization of V̂ hy,t0 around q̂y,t0 = ω/σq̄h yields











































For traditional variable annuities without gradual absorption of shocks (i.e., qh =
q̄h = 1), the traditional method of using expected returns on the current portfolio yields
the correct result (since in equation (6.5.8), ω/σθy,t0 = q̂y,t0 = 1 if qh = q̄h = 1 for all
horizons h ≥ 1). With horizon differentiation, in contrast, the method of using current
expected returns tends to understate the value of actual liabilities since ω/σθy,t0 <
q̂y,t0 .
83 Hence the overall discount curve for valuing variable annuities is typically in
between the expected return on the actual investment portfolio and the risk-free term
structure. Intuitively, current expected returns exceed future returns because with life
cycle investment, risk is taken back when policyholders age. Also, using an incorrect
discount rate leads to inefficient intertemporal consumption smoothing. Indeed, a higher
discount rate raises the funding ratio (i.e., Vy,t0/V̂y,t0 > 1), thereby increasing the scope
to pay out today (i.e., consumption is reallocated from the long-run to the short-run).
83This is always the case if liabilities are concentrated around a certain horizon because horizon
differentiation (i.e., qh > q1) implies q
h
h > q̄h and thus q̂y,t0 > ω/σθy,t0 if β
h
y,t0
≈ αhy,t0 . If liabilities
are dispersed over various horizons and βhy,t0 > α
h
y,t0
for long horizons h, we may theoretically have
q̂y,t0 < θy,t0 because longer horizons with larger q̄
h and qh receive a larger weight in the calculation
of θy,t0 than in the calculation of q̂y,t0 .
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6.6. Exponential Decay and the Cash-Flow Funding Rate
6.6.1. Exponential Decay
Equation (6.3.5) implies that for each horizon, we need a separate state variable to
summarize past stock market shocks. For a specific specification of the marginal risk
exposure qh, we can, however, summarize past stock market shocks in one state variable.
Specifically, we assume that
qh = 1− ρh. (6.6.1)
The coefficient ρ in equation (6.6.1) governs horizon differentiation in marginal risk
exposures. With ρ = 0, horizon differentiation in marginal risk exposures is absent and
qh = 1. In that case, shocks are absorbed immediately so that F
h
t = 1 (see equation
(6.3.5) with qh = 1 for all h). With ρ ↑ 1, horizon differentiation in marginal risk
exposures is maximal and qh/q1 ⇒ h. Specification (6.6.1) thus implies that the risk of
future annuity units is parameterized by the long-term risk exposure ω and the parameter
0 ≤ ρ < 1.
With (6.6.1), we can write the horizon-dependent funding ratios in terms of one state



























6.6.2. The Cash-Flow Funding Rate
We can write the single state variable F̂t in terms of a so-called cash-flow funding
ratio. This funding ratio is computed on the basis of an alternative definition of the
liabilities. With this alternative definition, the aggregate value of the liabilities is no
longer necessarily equal to the value of the assets so that the so-called cash-flow funding
ratio can deviate from unity. The calculation of a funding ratio unequal to one makes
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the pension system reminiscent of DB pension systems. The difference with traditional
DB pension systems is that funding disequilibria are absorbed by the policyholders
themselves rather than an outside sponsor such as a corporation.
The alternative definition of the liabilities is based on the ambition to increase current
pension entitlements By,t in line with desired indexation (in median and with the desired
risk of future annuity units). In particular, the value of the liability at horizon h of an








} = V hy,t
F ht
. (6.6.4)
We can view F ht as the horizon-dependent funding ratio because it represents the ratio
between the actual value of annuity payments (‘assets’) at horizon h and the value of
















These liabilities are the resources that are currently needed to consistently increase
current pension entitlements By,t in line with desired indexation (in median and with
the desired risk of future annuity units parameterized by ω and ρ). This definition of
liabilities thus abstracts from predictable changes in future annuity payments that are
the result of gradual adjustment of annuity units to past stock market shocks.
The ‘cash-flow’ funding ratio Fy,t is equal to the weighted average of horizon-specific
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The Appendix employs a linear approximation to write the state variable F̂t (see (6.6.3))













Equation (6.6.9) represents the relationship between the economy-wide state variable
F̂t, which summarizes realized economy-wide risk in the past, and the cash-flow funding
ratio Fy,t, which depends on age determining the exposure of the fund to this aggregate
risk. The older the policyholder, the less he is exposed to past macro-economic shocks
if horizon differentiation implies smoothing of adjustment to shocks. With horizon
differentiation, qh rises with h so that larger weights γ
h
y,t of the shorter horizons reduces
the exposure q̌y,t of the fund to macro-economic shocks F̂t.
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Equation (6.6.11) shows how the assets Vy,t are distributed across the various horizons.
The funding ratio Fy,t = Vy,t/Ly,t is computed by using the observed actual assets Vy,t
and the liabilities Ly,t from (6.6.5). We do not need information on how past shocks have
occurred over time.
6.7. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored DA plans that provide variable annuities to policyholders. The
pension fund exogenously specifies the entire stochastic income stream in retirement.
In line with internal habit formation, pension payments respond gradually to financial
shocks. The specification of the pension contract endogenously determines contribution
levels and the investment policy. We have shown that the discount rate includes a risk
premium that rises with the horizon and that the fraction of assets invested in the risky
stock decreases as the policyholder ages. Also, the gradual absorption of financial shocks
leads to predictable changes in pension payments. The effects of past stock market shocks
on future adjustments in annuity units can be captured in one state variable (i.e., the
funding ratio) if financial shocks are smoothed out in an exponentially declining manner.
Public supervision plays four important roles. The first two of these four roles
involve the risk of future annuity units and the last two roles are associated with proper
valuation and ensuring intergenerational fairness. First, the supervisory authorities
should induce the funds to communicate the expected income streams and the risks
involved (e.g., based on a ‘bad weather’ scenario) on the basis of standardized stochastic
models. Second, they should monitor that the investment policy of the fund is consistent
with the desired risk of future annuity units. Third, public supervision should ensure
that the annuities are priced fairly, especially when participation is compulsory and
competition does not discipline funds. Fourth, if funds change the pension contract
(e.g., the way that annuity units are discounted), the authorities should check whether
the exchange of annuities occurs at fair prices. By preventing intergenerational transfers,





Derivation of (6.3.6), (6.3.7) and (6.3.10)
We can write (6.3.4) as
By,t+h
By,t

























Taking the median of (6.8.1) yields (6.3.6).
Equation (6.3.7) follows from (6.3.4) with h = 1 where
∫ t+1
t
dWs is now known:
By,t+1
By,t













































= exp {πt+1} × F̄ 0t+1,
where q0 = 0 by convention and F̄
h−1
t+1 is the horizon-dependent funding ratio before
annuity units are adjusted:





















The horizon-dependent funding ratio after annuity units are adjusted is given by (see
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equation (6.3.5))
F h−1t+1 =























so that F 0t+1 = 1.
Derivation of (6.4.2) and (6.4.17)
The pricing kernel mt is subject to the following dynamic equation:
dmt
mt
= −rdt− λ dWt.
Application of Ito’s lemma yields













































Substituting equation (6.8.3) and equation (6.3.4) into equation (6.4.1), we arrive at

























































































We can rewrite V hy,t as follows:













































µt−y+1 + r + qhωλ







Let Xhy,t be the value of the assets at time t that finances By,t+h, and let q̂
h
y,t be the
corresponding investment policy (i.e., q̂ hy,t denotes the fraction of X
h
y,t invested in the
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Comparing equation (6.8.5) with equation (6.8.6) and using Xhy,t = V
h
y,t, we find














































Substitution of this approximation in (6.6.6) yields
































Pricing and Risk Management of
Variable Annuities in Defined
Ambition Pension Plans84
This chapter explores defined ambition pension plans, which are pension plans that
allocate various risks (i.e., real interest rate risk, expected inflation risk and stock market
risk) among policyholders on the basis of complete pension contracts while simultaneously
pooling idiosyncratic longevity risk. We demonstrate how to value these pension plans in
a market-consistent fashion. Market-consistent valuation of entitlements is important for
avoiding conflicts between the insurer’s policyholders and ensuring efficient intertemporal
consumption smoothing. We also show that the costs of variable real annuities may be less
sensitive to the nominal interest rate as compared to the costs of fixed nominal annuities,
thereby reducing the nominal interest rate duration of the intertemporal hedging portfolio.
7.1. Introduction
Around the world, many firms are declining to continue to sponsor employer-sponsored
defined benefit (DB) pension plans, due to the high risks these pension plans are now
seen to impose on corporate sponsors (Investment Company Institute, 2014). In response,
the defined ambition (DA) pension plans being designed in the Netherlands promise to
play a new role, serving as mutual insurers in which policyholders, rather than corporate
sponsors, bear investment risk. These DA pension plans aim to retain several advantages
of traditional DB pension plans. In particular, by pooling idiosyncratic longevity risk,
lifelong benefits can be provided at relatively low costs. Furthermore, risk management
84This chapter is co-authored with Lans Bovenberg.
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seeks to provide retirees with stable income streams after they leave employment. To
this end, real interest rate risk and expected inflation risk are actively managed during
both the accumulation and the decumulation phase.
This chapter investigates the pricing and risk management of DA pension plans that
provide variable annuities to policyholders.85 Property rights of individual policyholders
(i.e., pension entitlements) are defined in terms of annuity units (i.e., payouts) that vary
with financial shocks. The pension contract specifies not only how annuity units respond
to financial shocks but also how the desired (or targeted) growth rate of annuity units
develops over time. In particular, the desired growth rate depends on the expected
rate of inflation to protect the purchasing power of consumption, and on the interest
rate to account for intertemporal substitution in consumption. Traditional variable
annuities typically assume a constant (i.e., state-independent) desired growth rate (see,
e.g., Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos, 2009, 2010; Maurer et al., 2013b).
We show how annuity units can be valued in a market-consistent fashion. Proper
valuation of annuity units is relevant for determining the prices at which variable annuities
can be bought and sold. It ensures that buying and selling of variable annuities does not
impose externalities on other policyholders. Furthermore, market-consistent valuation
helps protect the value of property rights if the pension contract is changed. Accordingly,
the pension contract can be adapted to new circumstances without giving rise to conflicts
between the insurer’s policyholders. Also, proper pricing of annuity units ensures efficient
intertemporal consumption smoothing, and allows policyholders to endogenously set their
saving levels in order to realize a particular pension ambition in terms of a lifelong income
stream during retirement.
We show that the costs of annuity units are an increasing function of the desired
growth rate, and a decreasing function of assumed expected financial and biometric rates
of return.86 To account for the uncertain nature of future annuity units, the discount
rate includes a risk premium that depends on assumed expected financial rates of return.
Indeed, the annuity factor formalizes how the costs of annuity units depend not only on
85We define a variable annuity as an insurance contract in which annuity payments depend on the
performance of the investment portfolio. A variable annuity does not include a guarantee.
86The annuity factor depends on assumed expected returns rather than actual expected returns. Selling
and buying of annuities on the basis of prices that depend on assumed, rather than actual, expected
returns does not impose externalities on other policyholders. In that case, however, actual expected
consumption growth deviates from assumed expected consumption growth. Hence, intertemporal
consumption smoothing is inefficient.
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the median level (and desired growth rate) of future annuity units, but also on the risk
of future annuity units. The more uncertain future annuity units are, the higher – ceteris
paribus – this risk premium can be and thus the lower the costs of annuity units become.
Biometric rates of return are the survival premia that depend on mortality rates. Higher
mortality rates result in higher biometric rates of return reducing the costs of annuity
units. This chapter focuses on stochastic financial rates of return and assumes that
mortality rates are non-stochastic.
In a complete financial market, the portfolio strategy can be derived in closed-form by
generalizing the principle of liability-driven investment from DB pension plans to variable
annuities. In particular, the so-called replicating portfolio strategy can be decomposed
into two components: a speculative component and an intertemporal hedging component.
This decomposition is familiar from the literature on optimal consumption and portfolio
choice under a stochastic investment opportunity set (see, e.g., Brennan and Xia, 2002;
Wachter, 2002; Chacko and Viceira, 2005; Liu, 2007). The speculative portfolio allows
policyholders to take advantage of risk premia. We show how the exposures to the various
risk factors should be chosen if the policyholder aims to maximize the expected rate of
return on the assets subject to a given amount of consumption risk. Unlike the replicating
portfolio strategy with exogenous risk exposures, the efficient portfolio strategy depends
on actual risk premia and thus suffers from model risk. The intertemporal hedging
portfolio hedges changes in the future investment opportunity set that affect the costs of
annuity units (see Merton, 1971). These changes in the future investment opportunity
set are due to shocks in the real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. The
intertemporal hedging portfolio depends on the extent to which the interest rate affects
the desired growth rate of annuity units. In the special case where a one percent point
increase in the interest rate leads to a one percent point increase in the desired growth
rate, the intertemporal hedging portfolio fully disappears.
We allow the actual portfolio strategy to differ from the replicating portfolio strategy.
In that case, the actual portfolio strategy determines how annuity units develop over time
(i.e., assets determine liabilities instead of the other way around). We show how annuity
units should be adjusted such that the actual portfolio strategy does not affect – ex
ante – the intertemporal allocation of the market value of annuity units. A mutual
insurer can thus change its portfolio strategy without causing value transfers between
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generational cohorts. Alternatively, a mutual insurer can ring-fence the assets of each
generation so that he needs not to worry about value transfers between generational
cohorts. An advantage of ring-fenced accounts over one general pooled account is that
the pension plan can be tailored to the needs of each generation (see also Bovenberg
and Nijman, 2015). Furthermore, we show how an incorrect interest rate sensitivity of
the intertemporal hedging portfolio gives rise to inefficient intertemporal consumption
smoothing. In a collective pension fund without ring-fenced accounts, an incorrect
interest rate sensitivity of the intertemporal hedging portfolio results in not only inefficient
intertemporal consumption smoothing but also inefficient intergenerational risk sharing
and intergenerational conflicts about the choice of the intertemporal hedging portfolio
for the pension fund as a whole.
We allow the equity risk premium to be stochastic through a negative relationship
with the nominal interest rate. Our specification of the equity risk premium causes
the intertemporal hedging portfolio to depend on the speculative portfolio: a larger
speculative portfolio renders the annuity factor less sensitive to the nominal interest
rate, thereby reducing the nominal interest rate sensitivity of the intertemporal hedging
portfolio. The stochastic model of the equity risk premium can be explained by stochastic
variations in risk aversion that cause the rates of return on safe securities to move in
an opposite direction from the rates of return on risky securities. Empirically, whereas
nominal interest rates tend to vary pro-cyclically over the business cycle, the equity risk
premium typically varies in a countercyclical fashion.87 Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
attribute this time variation in equity risk premia to the countercyclical behavior of
risk aversion. In addition, countercyclical monetary policy causes nominal interest rates
to behave pro-cyclically. These two stylized facts motivate our stochastic model of the
equity risk premium.
We show how in an incomplete financial market, a mutual insurer can determine
the intertemporal hedging portfolio so as to minimize the mismatch between the fund’s
aggregate assets and liabilities. In particular, if only a single nominal bond is available
to hedge both real interest rate risk and expected inflation risk, then the duration of
the best hedging portfolio (i.e., the portfolio that minimizes the mismatch between
87The literature has shown that equity risk premia tend to be larger in economic troughs than in booms




the fund’s aggregate assets and liabilities) trades-off hedging real interest risk against
hedging inflation risk. If real interest rate risk dominates expected inflation risk, then
the duration of the best hedging portfolio is close to the duration of the liabilities. The
duration of the best hedging portfolio becomes shorter, however, if expected inflation risk
dominates real interest rate risk. In an incomplete financial market, the intertemporal
hedging portfolio depends on the financial model and thus becomes subject to model
risk. The same holds true for the valuation of a variable real annuity. Indeed, in the
absence of real securities that hedge expected inflation risk, real annuities cannot be
priced objectively. We thus face a trade-off between optimal risk sharing on the one
hand and objective market-consistent pricing of annuities on the other hand. To avoid
conflicts with policyholders about the pricing of annuities, the insurer may want to
provide variable annuities that can be valued objectively. In that case, non-traded
expected inflation risk is also not traded between the insurer and its policyholders.
Alternatively, the insurer can ring-fence the assets of a each generation so that the
valuation of a variable real annuity cannot give rise to conflicts between generations. A
disadvantage of ring-fenced accounts over one general pooled account is that non-traded
risks (e.g., systematic longevity risk) can no longer be shared between generations.88
This chapter extends Chapter 6 in a number of ways. First, we consider continuous
rather than discrete adjustments of entitlements. Second, and most importantly, we
extend the number of risk factors by considering not only stock market risk but also
real interest rate risk and expected inflation risk. These additional risk factors affect
future investment opportunities so that the annuity factor becomes stochastic. With
a stochastic annuity factor, the costs of annuity units (and hence contribution levels)
depend on the macro-economic environment (i.e., the real interest rate and the expected
rate of inflation). Indeed, the nominal interest rate sensitivity of the annuity factor yields
conversion risk and thus results in intertemporal hedging demands aimed at hedging this
risk. In fact, compared to Chapter 6, we include a number of extensions that affect how
sensitive the annuity factor is with respect to changes in the nominal interest rate.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes the
economy. Section 7.3 specifies the DA pension contract. Section 7.4 values the variable
88One could conclude separate swap contracts on these risks. These swap contracts, however, cannot
be priced objectively (see also Bovenberg and Nijman, 2015).
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annuities in a market-consistent fashion and explores the sensitivity of the annuity factor
to the nominal interest rate. Section 7.5 determines the replicating portfolio strategy as
well as the efficient portfolio strategy. Section 7.6 considers the case where the actual
portfolio strategy deviates from the replicating portfolio strategy. This section also
investigates the case of ring-fenced individual accounts while idiosyncratic longevity risk
is still being pooled. Section 7.7 extends our results to a financial model with a stochastic
equity risk premium. Section 7.8 considers an incomplete financial market in which real
interest rate risk and expected inflation risk cannot be hedged simultaneously. Section
7.9 concludes the chapter. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
7.2. The Economy
This section outlines the economy. Section 7.2.1 describes the dynamics of the state
variables. The price of a zero-coupon bond is derived in Section 7.2.2. Throughout,
boldface type is used to denote uncertain variables at time t.
7.2.1. Dynamics of the State Variables
We consider a continuous-time economy with three state variables: the short-term real
interest rate rt, the short-term expected rate of inflation πt and the nominal stock price St.
The real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation follow mean reverting processes of
the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type. The nominal stock price is driven by a geometric Brownian
motion. More specifically,
drt = κ (r̄ − rt) dt+ σrdWrt , (7.2.1)
dπt = θ (π̄ − πt) dt+ σπdWπt , (7.2.2)
dSt
St
= (Rt + λSσS) dt+ σSdW
S
t . (7.2.3)
Here κ > 0 and θ > 0 are mean reversion coefficients, r̄ and π̄ denote long-term means,
Rt stands for the short-term nominal interest rate at time t, λS is the constant equity
risk premium per unit of risk (i.e., the Sharpe ratio of the risky stock), σr > 0, σπ > 0







Brownian motions. The real interest rate, the expected rate of inflation and the nominal
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stock price follow the same dynamics as in Brennan and Xia (2002).89








where ρij (i, j ∈ {r, π, S} and i 6= j) denotes the correlation coefficient between dWit
and dWjt .
The real pricing kernel mt evolves according to (see, e.g., Brennan and Xia, 2002)
dmt
mt
= −rtdt+ φrdWrt + φπdWπt + φSdWSt
= −rtdt+ φ>dWt.
(7.2.5)
Here > denotes the transpose sign, φ ≡ (φr, φπ, φS)









constant coefficients φr, φπ and φS determine the market prices of risk associated with
the state variables. More specifically, the vector of market prices of risk λ ≡ (λr, λπ, λS)
can be computed from φ as follows:
λ = −ρφ. (7.2.6)
7.2.2. Price of a Zero-Coupon Bond
Denote by P hα,t the price at time t of a zero-coupon bond with fixed maturity date t+ h.
Here h ≥ 0 represents the time to maturity, and α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter indicating the







89In contrast to Brennan and Xia (2002), we assume that the expected rate of inflation coincides with
the realized rate of inflation. The results that follow can, however, be extended to the case where the
expected rate of inflation differs from the realized rate of inflation.
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If α = 1, the payoff of the bond is fully linked to the price index, while the payoff of the
bond is not linked to the price index at all if α = 0. For values of α in between zero and
one, the payoff of the bond is only partially linked to the price index. We can view Πt
as the consumer price index or the wage price index.
The price of the bond can be obtained by computing the following conditional
expectation:































where Et [·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on all information available at
time t. We find (see Appendix)








Here rvα,t stands for the instantaneous forward interest rate at time t for horizon v ≥ 0.
The exact expression for rvα,t can be found in the Appendix (see (7.10.9)).


















/x with x = κ or x = θ. We note that Dx,h/h decreases with the
horizon h and Dx,h ⇒ 0 as x⇒∞. Long-term YTMs are thus less variable as compared
to short-term YTMs, especially when the mean reversion coefficients κ and θ are large.
This property is consistent with empirical data (see Ang, Bekaert, and Wei, 2008). The
exact expression for the horizon-dependent constant Ehα can be found in the Appendix
(see (7.10.11)).
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rt + (1− α)πt − λrσrDκ,h − (1− α)λπσπDθ,h
)
dt
− σrDκ,hdWrt − (1− α)σπDθ,hdWπt .
(7.2.11)
We make the following observations. First, the expected return on the bond in excess of
rt + (1− α)πt (i.e., the bond risk premium) is given by
−λrσrDκ,h − (1− α)λπσπDθ,h. (7.2.12)
Estimates of λr and λπ are typically negative (see, e.g., Brennan and Xia, 2002), so that
bond risk premia are usually positive. Second, Dκ,h and Dθ,h increase at a declining rate
with the horizon h, implying that long-term bond risk premia exceed short-term bond
risk premia. Third, the short-term nominal interest rate can be obtained from (7.2.11)
by taking the limit h⇒ 0. We find that the short-term nominal interest rate equals the
short-term real interest rate plus the short-term expected rate of inflation. The Fisher
equation thus holds true in this economy. Fourth, Dx,h decreases with x. Hence bond
risk premia are small if the mean reversion coefficients κ and θ are large. Finally, Dκ,h
and (1− α)Dθ,h measure the sensitivity of the bond price with respect to (unexpected)
changes in the real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation, respectively. Hence
we can view Dκ,h and (1 − α)Dθ,h as the real interest rate duration and the expected
inflation duration of the bond, respectively.
The numerical illustrations in the chapter use the parameter values contained in Table
7.1 (see Appendix).
7.3. Specification of the Pension Contract
This section specifies the pension contract. Pension entitlements are framed in terms
of (deferred) variable annuity units (i.e., payouts).91 Let us denote by By,t the annuity
units at time t of a policyholder born at time y, by xr the age at which a policyholder
91Brown et al. (2008, 2013) show that agents value annuities more when presented in a consumption
frame than when presented in an investment frame.
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retires (e.g., xr = 65 years of age), and by xmax the maximum age a policyholder can
reach (e.g., xmax = 120 years of age). If the birth date y of a policyholder falls between
time t− xr and time t− xmax and the policyholder has survived up to time t, then this
policyholder receives a pension payment at time t. The probability that a policyholder









Here µx+v denotes the force of mortality at age x + v. We assume that the force of
mortality µx+v does not change over time. Systematic longevity risk is thus absent.
Furthermore, in view of the law of large numbers, the insurer pools idiosyncratic longevity
risk so that policyholders are insured against outliving their retirement assets.
The annuity units at time t+ h (h ≥ 0) of a policyholder born at time y, i.e., By,t+h,
are specified in terms of past and future financial shocks as follows:92











































Here t0 is the time at which the (single) contribution is paid, ω
∗ ≡ (ω∗r , ω∗π, ω∗S), and
dW∗t ≡ dWt + (λ− λ∗) dt with λ∗ ≡ (λ∗r, λ∗π, λ∗S).93 The parameter ω∗i is the exposure
of current annuity units By,t to the (observed) financial shock dW
i∗





S are the assumed market prices of risk. The assumed market
prices of risk are allowed to differ from the actual market prices of risk λr, λπ and λS.
94
92Specification (7.3.2) assumes that no pension premia are paid after time t0. We thus adopt a
discontinuity perspective in which we only consider future annuity units on account of annuity units
that have been accumulated up to time t0.
93The financial shocks dWr∗t and dW
π∗
t can be determined from the observed price dynamics of two
nominal zero-coupon bonds (with different times of maturity).
94As shown by Merton (1980), estimates of expected returns are less accurate than estimates of
(co)variances. Therefore, we distinguish only between actual risk premia and assumed risk premia. In
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The desired growth rate of annuity units (i.e., the growth rate of annuity units if
ω∗ = 0) is affected by three factors. First, the parameter β represents the sensitivity
of annuity units to the price index. If β = 1, then annuity units aim to keep up with
price inflation, while annuity units are not linked to the price index at all if β = 0.
Second, the parameter ψ measures how the desired growth rate varies with the interest
rate.95 If ψ is positive, then the desired growth rate increases as the interest rate (i.e.,
the return on savings) rises. The parameter ψ thus models intertemporal substitution in
consumption.96 Finally, the parameter g denotes a constant growth rate.
Log annuity units are adjusted according to (this follows from (7.3.2))
d log By,t = (βπt + ψ (rt + (1− β)πt) + g) dt+ ω∗>dW∗t . (7.3.3)
Equation (7.3.3) can be viewed as the bonus (or dividend) policy of the pension plan,
showing how annuity units develop as time proceeds. The right-hand side of equation
(7.3.3) does not depend on age. Hence annuity units are adjusted uniformly across
policyholders: each policyholder faces the same uniform adjustment of annuity units.
The first term at the right-hand side of equation (7.3.3) represents the desired growth
rate of annuity units. The second term denotes the impact of current financial shocks
on current annuity units. We observe that current financial shocks are fully absorbed
into current annuity units. Chapter 6 considers a pension plan for which annuity units
respond gradually, rather than directly, to financial shocks. Our results that follow can
be extended to the case of gradual absorption of financial shocks.
particular, we assume that actual (co)variances coincide with assumed (co)variances.
95If annuity units are fully linked to the price index (i.e., β = 1), then the desired growth rate depends
on the real interest rate, while the desired growth rate depends on the nominal interest rate if annuity
units are not linked to the price index at all (i.e., β = 0).
96Schroder and Skiadas (1999) show that if the investment opportunity set is constant, ψ can be viewed
as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see also Chapter 4).
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7.4. Pricing of Future Annuity Units
7.4.1. Market-Consistent Valuation
This section computes the market-consistent value of future annuity units. Denote by
V hy,t the market-consistent value at time t of future annuity units By,t+h. We can compute
V hy,t by solving the following conditional expectation (see, e.g., Cochrane, 2001):









Straightforward computations show that (see Appendix)
V hy,t = By,tA
h
y,t, (7.4.2)









Here δvy,t denotes the forward discount rate at time t for maturity v ≥ 0 for a policyholder
born at time y:
δvy,t = µt−y+v + (1− ψ)rvβ,t + ω∗>λ∗ + ξv − g. (7.4.4)
The horizon-dependent annuity factor Ahy,t summarizes the impacts of the desired growth
rate and the risk of annuity units on the costs of future annuity units. The value of the
annuity factor Ahy,t is determined by the forward discount rate δ
v
y,t which depends on the
forward biometric rate of return, the expected rate of return on the investment portfolio
and the desired growth rate of annuity units. The term ξv includes second-order and
interaction terms and represents the impact of the correlation between the underlying
speculative and intertemporal hedging portfolio on the rate of return of the investment
portfolio as a whole (see equation (7.10.12) in the Appendix).97 If annuity units are
constant over time (i.e., ψ = g = ω∗ = 0), then the forward discount rate δvy,t is equal to
97The forward interest rate rvβ,t also includes second-order and interaction terms (see equation (7.10.9)
in the Appendix).
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the sum of the survival premium µt−y+v and the forward interest rate r
v
β,t. More generally,
the forward discount rate δvy,t is a decreasing function of the desired growth rate of
annuity units (i.e., β, ψ and g), and an increasing function of future (assumed) expected
biometric and financial rates of return. The biometric rate of return is represented by
the force of mortality µt−y+v, whereas future (assumed) expected financial rates of return
are represented by the other terms (except g). The risk premium ω∗>λ∗ is due to the
impact of financial shocks on future annuity units. It depends on the exposure of future
annuity units to financial shocks ω∗ and the vector of assumed market prices of risk λ∗.
The ‘speculative’ risk premium ω∗>λ∗ reflects the expected excess rate of return on the
underlying (liability-driven) speculative investment portfolio.
7.4.2. Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Annuity Factor
The horizon-dependent annuity factor Ahy,t is stochastic and depends on the real interest
rate rt and the expected rate of inflation πt. The sensitivity of the log annuity factor






= −(1− ψ)Dκ,h. (7.4.5)
Equation (7.4.5) is usually referred to as the real interest rate duration of the annuity
factor. This equation shows that changes in the real interest rate do not affect the
annuity factor Ahy,t if ψ = 1. Intuitively, by raising future returns, a higher real interest
rate reduces the price of a given consumption stream. With intertemporal substitution
in consumption (i.e., ψ > 0), a higher real interest rate also raises the desired growth
rate of future annuity units, thereby increasing the magnitude of future consumption
streams. In the special case of ψ = 1, the price and volume effects of movements in the
real interest rate cancel each other out. Figure 7.1 illustrates the interest rate sensitivity
of logAhy,t for various values of ψ.
We can also compute the sensitivity of the log annuity factor logAhy,t with respect to





= −(1− ψ)(1− β)Dθ,h. (7.4.6)
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Figure 7.1.
Illustration of the interest rate sensitivity of the market price
Horizon

























The figure illustrates the interest rate sensitivity of logAhy,t for various values of ψ. The financial
market parameter values are given in Table 7.1.
This equation shows that if annuity units are fully linked to the price index Πt (i.e.,
β = 1), the annuity factor Ahy,t is affected only by changes in the real interest rate while
an expected inflation shock leaves the annuity factor unaffected. Intuitively, in that case,
the pension contract is defined in real terms so that pure nominal variables do not impact
the costs of future annuity units. If annuity units are only partially linked to the price
index (i.e., β < 1), a higher expected rate of inflation – ceteris paribus – reduces the
costs of future annuity units.
7.4.3. The Conversion Factor
The market-consistent value at time t of an annuity unit for a policyholder born at time















The sensitivity of the log conversion factor logAy,t with respect to unexpected changes





= −(1− ψ)D̂κy,t, (7.4.9)






















= −(1− ψ)(1− β)D̂θy,t. (7.4.11)
Equation (7.4.7) is relevant for computing pension contributions and the portfolio strategy
aimed at hedging conversion risk. We can distinguish between two alternative methods
for determining pension premia, depending on what is assumed to be exogenous. A first
method assumes that the newly bought annuity units By,t are exogenously set and that
the contribution Vy,t varies endogenously with the real interest rate and the expected rate
of inflation affecting the aggregate annuity factor Ay,t according to (7.4.9) and (7.4.11),
i.e., Vy,t = By,tAy,t. This is consistent with defined ambition thinking in which annuity
units (or pension ambitions) By,t endogenously determine pension contributions. The
second method assumes that the contribution Vy,t is exogenously set and that the newly
bought annuity units By,t depend on the macro-economic environment determining Ay,t,
i.e., By,t = Vy,t/Ay,t. This is consistent with defined contribution thinking in which
contributions are fixed.
The method in which Vy,t is exogenous and By,t is endogenous is also relevant for
determining the annuity units that can be bought at retirement from a capital sum.
Indeed, Ay,t can be viewed as the conversion factor at which a given amount of capital
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can be transformed into a consumption stream, i.e., By,t = Vy,t/Ay,t. More generally,
during the decumulation phase, we can view Vy,t = By,tAy,t as the value of an individual
account that corresponds to a certain number of annuity units By,t of a policyholder
born at time y. If property rights are defined in terms of (variable) annuity units (as
in defined ambition thinking), Vy,t corresponds to the market value of the annuity units
By,t.
The intertemporal hedging portfolio aims at hedging the impact of macro-economic
shocks (i.e., real interest rate shocks and expected inflation shocks) on the conversion
factor and thus the consumption stream. That is why (7.4.7) is also important for the
portfolio strategy of a policyholder who plans to buy an annuity at or during retirement.
Hedging conversion risk ensures that an individual account can buy a fixed amount of
annuity units without putting in more capital if the real interest rate and the expected
rate of inflation change. Hedging the costs of future annuity units is also essential for an
insurer providing (deferred) variable annuities. The next section explores the portfolio
strategy in more detail.
7.5. Liability-Driven Investment
7.5.1. The Replicating Portfolio Strategy
This section derives the portfolio strategy that replicates the contract (7.3.2) for a
policyholder born at time y. We allow the insurer to invest in three risky securities:
two nominal zero-coupon bonds (with different times of maturity) and a risky stock.
The number of risky securities thus equals the number of sources of risk. Let Xy,t be the
assets at time t of a policyholder born at time y, $iy,t be the fraction of assets invested
in a nominal bond with time to maturity ni (i = 1, 2), and $
3
y,t be the fraction of assets
invested in the risky stock. The fraction of assets invested in the nominal money market











determined such that the value of the assets matches the value of the liabilities in each
state of the world. We thus apply the principle of liability-driven investment familiar
from DB pension plans to arrive at the replicating portfolio strategy. Specifically, the
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y,t are given in the Appendix (see (7.10.14),
(7.10.15) and (7.10.16)). The right-hand side of equation (7.5.1) denotes the real interest








− (1− ψ)D̂κy,t, (7.5.4)
while the left-hand side of equation (7.5.1) corresponds to the real interest rate sensitivity
































The replicating portfolio strategy can be decomposed into two terms. The first terms
at the right-hand sides of equations (7.5.1), (7.5.2) and (7.5.3) denote the speculative
demands, whereas the second terms at the right-hand sides of (7.5.1) and (7.5.2) represent
the intertemporal hedging demands. The intertemporal hedging demands depend on the
sensitivity of the annuity factor with respect to unexpected shocks in the real interest
rate and the expected rate of inflation. The intertemporal hedging portfolio is thus
determined by the impact of financial shocks on the aggregate annuity factor. Indeed,
the intertemporal hedging portfolio hedges the impact of these shocks on the aggregate
annuity factor.
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7.5.2. Mismatch Risk
The bonus rule (7.3.3) can be rewritten as follows:
d log By,t = (βπt + ψ (rt + (1− β)πt) + g) dt+ d log My,t, (7.5.8)
where
d log My,t ≡
[
− (1− ψ)D̂κy,tσr (dWr∗t + λ∗rdt)




− (1− ψ)D̂κy,tσr (dWr∗t + λ∗rdt)




can be viewed as the mismatch between the replicating portfolio strategy (i.e., the
portfolio strategy that replicates the pension contract (7.3.2)) and the intertemporal
hedging portfolio strategy (i.e., the portfolio strategy that hedges stochastic variations
in the aggregate annuity factor). Equation (7.5.8) shows that the speculative portfolio
strategy determines how annuity units develop over time.
Mismatch is the difference between the development of assets and the development
of ‘norm’ liabilities. The ‘norm’ liabilities are defined excluding unexpected shocks
(i.e., under the assumption that expectations are met). The intertemporal hedging
portfolio represents the value of these ‘norm’ liabilities. Mismatch (7.5.9) is absorbed
by the policyholders themselves. This causes liabilities (including unexpected shocks) to
continue to match assets such that the funding ratio remains unity.
7.5.3. The Efficient Portfolio Strategy




S should be chosen if the
policyholder aims to maximize the expected rate of return on the assets subject to a




= ω∗>ρω∗. Here ω∗ρ is exogenously given. The



















= ω∗>ρω∗. This yields







The efficient portfolio strategy is obtained by substituting (7.5.11) for ω∗ in the replicating
portfolio weight vector. Equation (7.5.11) shows that the vector of optimal risk exposures
ω? depends on the actual risk premia λr, λπ and λS. The efficient portfolio strategy is
thus vulnerable to model risk.
7.6. Asset-Driven Liabilities
This section allows the actual portfolio strategy to differ from the replicating portfolio
strategy. As a result, assets determine liabilities instead of the other way around. We
thus speak of asset-driven liabilities instead of liability-driven investment.
7.6.1. Collective Defined Contribution
This section assumes that the mutual insurer has one general pooled account. Mismatch
risk is shared between policyholders. We call this plan collective defined contribution
(CDC): an external sponsor is absent and the annuity units are determined endogenously
by the investment policy and by how mismatch risk is measured and allocated among
policyholders with different ages.
We define total mismatch risk d log Mt as follows:
d log Mt ≡ d log M1t + d log M2t + d log M3t , (7.6.1)
where
d log M1t ≡ ω∗>dW∗t , (7.6.2)




d log M3t ≡ −
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where xs denotes the age at which policyholders start their working career and γy,t ≡












consists of the actual
speculative demands, while−Hrt and−Hπt denote the actual hedging demands. Equation
(7.6.3) can be viewed as the mismatch between the actual speculative portfolio and
the ‘desired’ speculative portfolio (i.e., the speculative portfolio that finances (7.3.2)),
whereas equation (7.6.4) represents the mismatch between the actual intertemporal
hedging portfolio and the ‘desired’ intertemporal hedging portfolio (i.e., the intertemporal
hedging portfolio that finances (7.3.2)). Total mismatch risk is defined as the mismatch
between the actual portfolio and the ‘desired’ hedging portfolio (as determined by the
discount rate that is used to compute the value of the ‘norm’ liabilities). Indeed, we
measure total mismatch as the difference between the development of assets and the
development of the ‘norm’ liabilities (as measured by the ‘desired’ intertemporal hedging
portfolio).
The bonus rule is determined in such a way that the actual portfolio strategy does
not affect – ex ante – the value of the liabilities V hy,t. This is important for avoiding
conflicts between the insurer’s policyholders. Using the requirement that the aggregate
portfolio strategy does not redistribute market value among policyholders, we find that
the bonus rule is given by (see Appendix)
d log By,t =
(
βπt + ψ (rt + (1− β)πt) + g + ξ̃y,t − ξ̂y,t
)
dt+ d log Mt. (7.6.6)
Here ξ̃y,t and ξ̂y,t are second-order terms defined in the Appendix. Equation (7.6.6) shows
that although the market value does not change as a result of a change in the actual
portfolio strategy, the median value and the risk of future annuity units do change.
The ratio between the actual annuity units at time t + h and the ‘desired’ annuity


















98Vy,t now represents the market value at time t of all policyholders born at time y.
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Equations (7.6.6) and (7.6.7) show that the actual portfolio strategy determines how
future annuity units develop over time.
7.6.2. A Special Case
This section assumes that the insurer promises a real fixed annuity to its policyholders.
However, supervisory authorities force the insurer to employ the nominal term structure
to discount future annuity units (i.e., β = 0, ω∗ = 0 and ψ = 0).
7.6.2.1. Inefficient Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing





t = 0), equation (7.6.1) collapses to









The actual sensitivity of log future annuity units log By,t+h with respect to unexpected




πdt) is not D
θ,h (implied by (7.3.2)
with β = 1, ω∗ = 0 and ψ = 0) but rather D̂θt (implied by (7.6.7) and (7.6.8) with β = 0,
ω∗ = 0 and ψ = 0). Accordingly, the difference between the actual and the ‘desired’
sensitivity of log future annuity units log By,t+h is given by
D̂θt −Dθ,h 6= 0. (7.6.9)
An expected inflation shock leads to a shock in real consumption, even though the actual
portfolio strategy aims to mimic a real fixed annuity. Intuitively, by using a nominal
discount rate rather than a real discount rate for calculating liabilities, intertemporal
consumption smoothing is not efficient. In particular, a positive expected inflation shock
typically causes a decline in real long-term consumption (i.e., D̂θt < D
θ,h for large h)
and an increase in real short-term consumption (i.e., D̂θt > D
θ,h for small h). Indeed, a
higher nominal interest rate on account of a higher expected rate of inflation depresses
the value of the ‘norm’ intertemporal hedging portfolio, thereby understating the value
of the ‘true’ intertemporal hedging portfolio (which takes into account the impact of a
higher expected rate of inflation). The mismatch on account of an understatement of real
liabilities raises consumption in the short run. The gain of consumption at short horizons
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is at the expense of long-term consumption, which receives inadequate compensation for
a higher expected rate of inflation (the cost of a higher expected rate of inflation at
horizon h is measured by Dθ,h which exceeds D̂θt for large h).
7.6.2.2. Inefficient Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Equation (7.6.9) shows that an incorrect discount rate produces not only inefficient
intertemporal consumption smoothing but also inefficient intergenerational risk sharing.
In particular, in the case of a positive expected inflation shock, old generations gain
at the expense of young generations, thereby making real consumption more risky than
necessary. These inefficiencies in the allocation of consumption across generations become
larger in more heterogeneous pension funds with large discrepancies in horizons (which
causes Dθ,h to differ substantially from the average duration D̂θt for large and small
horizons h).
7.6.2.3. Intergenerational Conflict about the Portfolio Strategy
Inefficient intergenerational risk sharing of inflation shocks leads to intergenerational
conflicts about the investment policy. In particular, to hedge against expected inflation
shocks, young policyholders would prefer to invest in real bonds with a long duration
such that the expected inflation duration of these bonds matches the expected inflation
duration of their own consumption stream. Older policyholders, in contrast, would prefer
to invest in nominal bonds with no or small expected inflation duration. Intuitively,
each generation would like to distort the aggregate investment policy so as to offset
the distortions of intergenerational risk sharing. The changes in the investment policy
desired by old generations worsen expected inflation risk for young generations further,
thereby causing an intergenerational conflict about the aggregate intertemporal hedging
portfolio.
7.6.2.4. Inefficient Portfolio Strategy
If the insurer matches the prescribed nominal liabilities to avoid conflicts with the
supervisor, then the difference between the actual and the ‘desired’ sensitivity of log
future annuity units log By,t+h with respect to unexpected changes in the expected rate
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of inflation is given by
−Dθ,h. (7.6.10)
Hence inefficiencies on account of a shock in the expected rate of inflation would on
average be larger compared to (7.6.9), even though expected inflation risk for older
generations with small horizons h would be smaller. Intuitively, the mutual insurer
engages in not only inefficient intertemporal consumption smoothing and inefficient
intergenerational risk sharing but also inefficient portfolio strategy: the incorrect discount
rate introduces departures from the efficient portfolio, thereby worsening the risk-return
trade-off further.
7.6.3. Ring-Fenced Accounts
This section assumes that each generation bears its own mismatch risk. That is, the
assets belonging to cohort y are ring-fenced from the other assets in the fund. An
advantage of ring-fenced accounts over one general pooled account is that the portfolio
strategy (and hence the payout profile) can be tailored to the needs of each generation.
Hence intergenerational conflicts about the investment policy are absent. At the same
time, longevity risk is still being shared within a generation. Moreover, ring-fencing
eliminates intergenerational conflicts about the valuation of financial risks.
Allowing for the actual portfolio to differ from the replicating portfolio, we can define
total mismatch risk of each generation y in analogy of (7.6.1) as follows:
d log My,t ≡ d log M1y,t + d log M2y,t + d log M3y,t, (7.6.11)
where
d log M1y,t ≡ ω∗>dW∗t (7.6.12)






d log M3y,t ≡ −
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consists of the actual speculative demands, while
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−Hry,t and −Hπy,t denote the actual hedging demands. The bonus rule is determined in
such a way that V hy,t is not affected by changes in the actual portfolio strategy so that
a generation cannot affect the intertemporal allocation of market value. This facilitates
the pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk (see Chapter 5). We find (see Appendix)
d log By,t =
(
βπt + ψ (rt + (1− β)πt) + g + ξ̃y,t − ξ̂y,t
)
dt+ d log My,t. (7.6.15)
Here ξ̃y,t and ξ̂y,t are second-order terms defined in the Appendix. We note that equation
(7.6.15) coincides with equation (7.5.8) if the actual portfolio strategy matches the
replicating portfolio strategy. The ratio between the actual annuity units at time t + h


















Equations (7.6.15) and (7.6.16) show that the actual portfolio strategy determines how
future annuity units develop over time.
The special case in which the mutual insurer aims to mimic a real fixed annuity
but supervisory authorities force the insurer to employ the nominal term structure
to discount future annuity units still produces inefficient intertemporal consumption
smoothing. With ring-fenced accounts, however, inefficient intergenerational risk sharing
and intergenerational conflicts about the portfolio strategy are no longer present. We
also note that supervisory authorities may grant more discretion to mutual insurers to
select and modify their own discount rates because these discount rates no longer affect
the distribution of value among policyholders.
7.7. Stochastic Equity Risk Premium
The previous sections have assumed that the equity risk premium is constant over time.
This section assumes that the equity risk premium varies stochastically over time.
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7.7.1. Specification of the Equity Risk Premium
The real interest rate rt and the expected rate of inflation πt follow the same dynamic




= (Rt + et) dt+ σSdW
S
t , (7.7.1)
where the equity risk premium et ≡ λSt σS is a linear function of the real interest rate
and the expected rate of inflation. That is,
et = ν − art − bπt (7.7.2)
for some positive constants ν, a and b. The equity risk premium et is subject to the
following dynamic equation:
det = −aκ (r̄ − rt) dt− bθ (π̄ − πt) dt− aσrdWrt − bσπdWπt . (7.7.3)
If a = 1 and b = 1, then the expected nominal rate of return on the risky stock is equal
to ν, while if a = 0 and b = 0, then the equity risk premium is constant. The real pricing
kernel mt satisfies the following dynamic equation:
dmt
mt
= −rtdt+ φrtdWrt + φπt dWπt + φSt dWSt














t determine the market prices of
risk λr, λπ and λ
S
t = (ν − art − bπt) /σS that are associated with the state variables. The






can be computed from φt as follows:
λt = −ρφt. (7.7.5)
The YTM is given by equation (7.2.10).99
99See also Vasicek (1977).
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7.7.2. The Pension Contract
The annuity units at time t + h (h ≥ 0) of a policyholder born at time y, By,t+h, are
given by specification (7.3.2). Financial shocks are now defined as follows:









. The assumed equity risk premium is denoted by e∗t ≡ ν∗ −
a∗rt − b∗πt. We assume that the vector of long-term risk exposures ω∗ is constant.
7.7.3. Pricing of Future Annuity Units
7.7.3.1. Market-Consistent Valuation
Let V hy,t be the market-consistent value at time t of By,t+h. Straightforward computations
show that (see Appendix)























+ ω∗>Et [λ∗t+h−v] + ξv − g.
(7.7.9)
The second and third term at the right-hand side of equation (7.7.9) arise because
the equity risk premium is negatively linearly related to the real interest rate and the
expected rate of inflation. The risk premium ω∗>Et [λ∗t+h−v] arises because the insurer
takes speculative risk. This risk premium is not constant but time-dependent. Indeed,
the equity risk premium varies stochastically over time. The risk premium ξv includes
second-order and interaction terms. The exact expression for ξv can be found in the
Appendix.
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7.7.3.2. Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Annuity Factor
The sensitivity of logAhy,t with respect to unexpected changes in the real interest rate is









Dκ,h − (1− ψ)Dκ,h. (7.7.10)
The sensitivity of logAhy,t with respect to unexpected changes in the expected rate of









Dθ,h − (1− ψ)(1− β)Dθ,h. (7.7.11)
The horizon-dependent annuity factor Ahy,t may become less sensitive to unexpected
changes in the real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation if the equity risk
premium varies stochastically over time. Intuitively, a low nominal interest rate implies
a high equity risk premium, so that the costs of future annuity units may become less
sensitive to unexpected changes in the real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation
if the insurer takes stock market risk. Figure 7.2 shows the real interest rate sensitivity
of logAhy,t for various values of a
∗ (ψ = 0). We assume that the insurer invests 50% of
wealth into the risky stock. The figure shows that the real interest rate duration of the
liabilities decreases by 25% if a∗ goes up from 0 to 0.5.
7.7.4. Liability-Driven Investment
This section derives the replicating portfolio strategy for a policyholder born at time y.
We allow the insurer to invest in three risky securities: two nominal zero-coupon bonds
(with different times of maturity) and a risky stock. Let $iy,t be the fraction of assets
invested in a nominal bond with time to maturity ni (i = 1, 2) and $
3
y,t be the fraction of
assets invested in the risky stock. The fraction of assets invested in the nominal money









and $3∗y,t are determined in such a way that the value of the assets matches the value
of the liabilities in each state of the world. The replicating portfolio weights solve the
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Figure 7.2.
Illustration of the interest rate sensitivity of the annuity factor
Horizon



























The figure shows the interest rate sensitivity of logAhy,t for various values of a
∗ (ψ = 0). The
insurer invests 50% of wealth into the risky stock. The financial market parameter values are
given in Table 7.1.

































The replicating portfolio strategy can be decomposed into two terms. The first terms at
the right-hand sides of equations (7.7.12), (7.7.13) and (7.7.14) denote the speculative
demands, while the second and third terms at the right-hand sides of (7.7.12) and (7.7.13)
correspond to the intertemporal hedging demands. The intertemporal hedging portfolio
now depends on ω∗S because the equity risk premium is stochastic. Indeed, a larger ω
∗
S
typically renders the annuity factor less sensitive to the nominal interest rate, thereby
reducing the nominal interest rate sensitivity of the intertemporal hedging portfolio.
Hence the intertemporal hedging portfolio is now affected by the speculative portfolio.
224
Stochastic Equity Risk Premium
7.7.5. An Incorrect Discount Rate
This section assumes that the actual portfolio strategy takes into account the fact that






t = (1−ψ)(1−β)D̂θt − D̂θtω∗Sb∗/σS). However, supervisory authorities
force the insurer to discount liabilities by (7.4.4). The mutual insurer has one general
pooled account. Mismatch risk is thus shared between generations. We can define total
mismatch risk as follows (note that d log M2t = 0):
d log Mt = d log M
1
t + d log M
3
t

















The bonus rule is determined in such a way that V hy,t is not affected by a change in the
actual portfolio strategy. We find (see Appendix)
d log By,t =
(
βπt + ψ (rt + (1− β)πt) + g + ξ̃y,t − ξ̂y,t
)
dt+ d log Mt. (7.7.16)
Here ξ̃y,t and ξ̂y,t are second-order terms (see Appendix). The ratio between the actual













The actual sensitivity of log future annuity units log By,t+h with respect to unexpected




rdt) is not ψD










. Accordingly, the difference between the actual and the desired sensitivity






An incorrect discount rate thus produces inefficient intertemporal consumption smoothing
and inefficient intergenerational risk sharing. In the same way as in Section 7.6.2.4, this
leads to intergenerational conflicts about the investment policy.
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7.8. Incomplete Financial Market







In addition, we assume that the investment opportunity set consists of a nominal money
market account and a single zero-coupon nominal bond. The pension contract (7.8.1)
can thus not be replicated unless β = 0. That is, the actual portfolio strategy is forced to
differ from the replicating portfolio strategy. As in Section 7.6, we assume that the insurer
shifts the mismatch between the actual portfolio strategy and the replicating portfolio
strategy back to its policyholders. The insurer can, to some degree, control mismatch
risk by appropriately choosing the duration of the actual portfolio strategy. We show
that the duration of the best hedging portfolio strategy (i.e., the portfolio strategy that
minimizes mismatch risk) is small (large) if fluctuations in the nominal interest rate are
largely driven by fluctuations in the expected rate of inflation (real interest rate).101
Intuitively, if changes in the nominal interest rate are primarily driven by changes in
the expected rate of inflation, then investing in short-term financial instruments (such
as a nominal money market account) provides a ‘good’ hedge against expected inflation
risk. Section 7.8.1 assumes one general account for all policyholders (i.e., mismatch
risk is shared between generations), while Section 7.8.2 considers the case of ring-fenced
accounts (i.e., mismatch risk is not shared between generations).
7.8.1. Collective Defined Contribution
In what follows, we assume that κ = θ. This assumption implies that Dκ,h = Dθ,h. The
best hedging portfolio is defined as the one that minimizes the variance of the mismatch
between the actual portfolio strategy and the replicating portfolio strategy (note that
the replicating portfolio strategy does not exist because real bonds are not available).
The mutual insurer chooses to shift the mismatch between the actual portfolio and the
100Specification (7.8.1) arises as a special case of specification (7.3.2) if ψ = g = ω∗ = 0.
101This assumes that the insurer aims to hedge a real annuity. However, if the insurer aims to hedge
a nominal annuity, then the duration of the best hedging portfolio strategy exactly matches the
duration of the liabilities.
226
Incomplete Financial Market
replicating portfolio back to all its policyholders (i.e., mismatch risk is shared between
generations). Let Dκ,n be the duration of the single zero-coupon nominal bond with
time to maturity n, and let $t be the fraction of assets invested in the zero-coupon
nominal bond (with the remaining fraction of assets being invested in the nominal money
market account). The insurer determines $t such that the variance of mismatch risk is
minimized. Mismatch risk is defined as follows:





















The insurer faces the following minimization problem:
Minimize
$t
V [d log Mt] . (7.8.3)
Solving (7.8.3) yields
$∗t =







The ratio between the duration of the best hedging portfolio (i.e., $∗tD
κ,n) and the










We observe that $∗tD
κ,n ⇒ D̂κt if σπ ⇒ 0. On the other hand, if σπ ⇒∞, then $∗tDκ,n ⇒
0. The duration of the best hedging portfolio is thus small (large) if fluctuations in the
nominal interest rate are largely driven by fluctuations in the expected rate of inflation
(real interest rate). Figure 7.3 shows the function





for various values of h and β. We observe that for β = 1, the duration of the best hedging
portfolio is approximately 80% of Dκ,h.
Valuation of the pension contract (7.8.1) is relevant for determining the duration D̂κt .
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Figure 7.3.
Illustration of the interest rate sensitivity of the best hedging portfolio
Horizon
























The figure illustrates the interest rate sensitivity of the best hedging portfolio for various values
of β. The financial market parameter values are given in Table 7.1.
cannot be objectively determined. The insurer thus faces a trade-off between optimal
risk sharing on the one hand and objective market-consistent pricing of annuities on
the other hand. Indeed, in order to avoid conflicts with policyholders about the pricing
of annuities, the insurer may want to provide variable annuities that can be valued
objectively. In that case, non-traded expected inflation risk is also not traded between
the insurer and its policyholders.
7.8.2. Ring-fenced Accounts
This section assumes that mismatch risk is not shared between generations. Let $y,t
be the fraction of assets invested in the zero-coupon nominal bond (with the remaining
fraction of assets being invested in the nominal money market account). The insurer
determines $y,t such that the variance of mismatch risk is minimized. Mismatch risk is
now defined as follows:








































As in Section 7.8.1, the insurer faces a trade-off between objective market-consistent
pricing of annuities on the one hand (i.e., the value of the generational account Vy,t can
be objectively determined because the assets of cohort y are ring-fenced from the other
assets in the fund) and sharing of systemic risks (e.g., expected inflation risk) between
generations on the other hand.
7.9. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored pricing and risk management of variable annuities in DA
pension plans. We have shown that the costs of variable real annuities may be less
sensitive to the nominal interest rate as compared to the costs of fixed nominal annuities.
This is so because of three reasons. First of all, the desired growth rate of annuity units
may increase with the interest rate due to intertemporal substitution in consumption.
Second, the desired growth rate rises with the expected rate of inflation so that the
costs of these annuities depend on the real rather than the nominal interest rate. Hence,
changes in nominal interest rates impact the cost of an annuity only if these changes in
nominal interest rates reflect changes in real interest rates. The costs of real annuities
tend to be more stable than the costs of fixed nominal annuities because the real interest
rate is less volatile than the nominal interest rate: fluctuating inflation expectations
affect mainly the nominal rather than the real interest rate. In an incomplete financial
market in which real interest rate risk and expected inflation risk cannot be hedged
simultaneously, insurers must trade-off hedging real interest rate risk against hedging
expected inflation risk. This reduces the nominal interest sensitivity of the annuity
factor, especially when fluctuations in the nominal interest rate are driven by changes
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in the expected rate of inflation rather than by changes in the real interest rate. A
third factor reducing the nominal interest sensitivity of the annuity factor is that the
expected rates of return on risky securities tend to be less sensitive to the nominal
interest rate when compared to the rates of return on safe securities. Overall then, the
cost of real variable annuities tend to be more stable than the costs of nominal fixed
annuities because real expected rates of return on risky securities are less volatile than
nominal rates of return on safe securities. Indeed, TIAA-CREF has fixed the assumed
real expected rate of return on its variable annuities at 4% since it started to provide














Stock Return Process σS 0.343
λS 0.158
Correlation Matrix ρrπ -0.061
ρrS -0.129
ρπS -0.024
The table reports the parameter values employed in the numerical illustrations. The parameter




Derivation of (7.2.9), (7.2.10) and (7.2.11)
We start by deriving the analytical solution to the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. After applying Itô’s Lemma to the function f (t, rt) ≡
eκt (rt − r̄), we find (where the second equality follows from equation (7.2.1))
df (t, rt) = κe
κt (rt − r̄) dt+ eκtdrt
= κeκt (rt − r̄) dt− eκtκ (rt − r̄) dt+ eκtσrdWrt = σreκtdWrt .
(7.10.1)
The solution to the SDE (7.10.1) is given by




The real interest rate at time t + v > t is given by (where the first and third equality
follow from the definition of f (t, rt), and the second equality follows from (7.10.2))
rt+v = r̄ + e
−κ(t+v)f (t, rt+v)

















In a similar fashion, we find








The (conditional) expectation of the real interest rate Et [rt+v] and the (conditional)
expectation of the expected rate of inflation Et [πt+v] are given by
Et [rt+v] = rt + κ (r̄ − rt)Dκ,v, (7.10.4)
Et [πt+v] = πt + θ (π̄ − πt)Dθ,v. (7.10.5)
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The average real interest rate řht ≡ 1h
∫ h
0




πt+vdv play a key role in determining the yield to maturity. We find (where






























































































































































Here ᾱ ≡ 1− α. The instantaneous forward interest rate rvα,t is defined as follows:














The log bond price is given by (this follows from (7.10.4), (7.10.5), (7.10.8) and (7.10.9))




rt + κ (r̄ − rt)Dκ,v + ᾱπt














Solving the integral (7.10.10) yields102
















































= −rtDκ,h − ᾱπtDθ,h − Ehα,
















































In order to calculate how the value of the bond with a fixed maturity t + h develops as
time proceeds (i.e., t+ h is fixed but t changes), we apply Itô’s Lemma to
P hα,t = exp
{
−rtDκ,h − ᾱπtDθ,h − Ehα
}
.










































dt− σrDκ,hdWrt − ᾱσπDθ,hdWπt
=
(
rt + ᾱπt − λrσrDκ,h − ᾱλπσπDθ,h
)
dt− σrDκ,hdWrt − ᾱσπDθ,hdWπt .
Derivation of (7.4.2), (7.4.5), (7.4.6), (7.4.9) and (7.4.11)
The market-consistent value of By,t+h is given by (where the first equality follows from
substituting equation (7.3.2) into (7.4.1) to eliminate By,t+h)
V hy,t = hpt−yBy,t exp
{∫ h
0















































































V hy,t = hpt−yBy,t exp
{∫ h
0



























































































δvy,t = µt−y+v + ψ̄
(
Et [rt+v] + β̄Et [πt+v]− λrσrDκ,v − β̄λπσπDθ,v
)
+ ω∗>λ∗ + ξ̂v − g
= ψ̄rvβ,t + ω























































The market-consistent value is given by (where the first and second equality follow from
103The term ξ̂v arises because we measure security price performance in terms of log (continuously
compounded) returns. Indeed, with log returns, the portfolio return is not equal to the weighted sum
of the individual returns (i.e., log returns do not aggregate across securities). However, log returns
do aggregate across time.
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equation (7.4.1))
log V hy,t = logBy,t + logA
h






































to logAhy,t yields A
h
y,t/Ay,t ≡ γhy,t. Equations (7.4.9) and (7.4.11) now follow from Itô’s
Lemma.
Derivation of (7.5.1), (7.5.2) and (7.5.3)














































104Without loss of generality, we assume that the current time t is smaller than y + xr.
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Applying the principle of liability-driven investment yields equations (7.5.1), (7.5.2) and
(7.5.3). The replicating portfolio strategy can be computed explicitly. We find













































Derivation of (7.6.6) and (7.6.15)
The aggregate annuity factor does not change as a result of changes in the investment
strategy. It follows that
d log By,t = d log Vy,t − d log Ay,t,
where
d log Vy,t =
(
rt + πt + µt−y + ω
>






















− g + µt−y + ω∗>λ∗ − ψ̄σrλrD̂κy,t − ψ̄β̄σπλπD̂θy,t + ξ̂y,t
)
dt
− ψ̄σrD̂κy,tdWrt − ψ̄β̄σπD̂θy,tdWπt .
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Here,




















































































































































+ g + ξ̃y,t − ξ̂y,t
)
dt+ d log Mt.
Equation (7.6.15) can be derived in a similar fashion as above. We now have









































































Derivation of (7.7.7), (7.7.10), (7.7.11), (7.7.12), (7.7.13), (7.7.14) and (7.7.16)






































































Here $h,i denotes the fraction of X
h
y,t invested in a nominal bond with time to maturity
ni (i = 1, 2), and $h,3 represents the fraction of X
h
y,t invested in the risky stock.























































































































































where Et [et+v] = et − aκ (r̄ − rt)Dκ,v − bθ (π̄ − πt)Dθ,v.




S/σS (this follows from
comparing equation (7.10.17) with equation (7.10.18)). Substituting equations (7.10.6),
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(7.10.7), (7.10.19) and $∗v,3 = ω
∗





























































Et [rt+v] + β̄Et [πt+v]
)









































































































































1, 2, 3). Equations (7.7.12), (7.7.13) and (7.7.14) now follow. The market value V hy,t =
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Xhy,t is given by (this follows from comparing equation (7.10.17) with equation (7.10.20))








Et [rt+v] + β̄Et [πt+v]
)











































































Dθ,v + µt−y+v − g + ω∗>Et [λ∗t+h−v] + ξv
with














Equations (7.7.10) and (7.7.11) follow from Itô’s Lemma. The bonus rule (7.7.16) is
derived in a similar fashion as (7.6.6).
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